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PEACE WITH ITALY—AN APPRAISAL

SOMEWHAT to the general surprise, for the event was not expected for some time, the Moscow Radio announced at the end of August that the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet had ratified the treaties of peace with the former satellites of Nazi Germany, treaties which had been signed in Paris in February of this year. The ratifications of the Italian treaty were duly deposited in Paris on September 15 and, from that date, Italy is therefore once more formally at peace with the Allies. While the technical restoration of peace may not make a great deal of difference in a situation dominated by more immediately pressing necessities and problems, for the longer run, the provisions of these settlements are bound to be of considerable importance.

The purpose of this discussion is to examine the Italian treaty. Among the so-called satellites of Germany, Italy stands in a special position. In fact, she drifted only gradually into the rôle of satellite as the result of her own avoidable mistakes. For some years after the advent of the Nazis to power she retained considerable freedom of decision; in the days of the Abyssinian and Spanish civil wars, her own activity was a capital factor in the relations among the Powers. The miscalculations attending the latter adventure, circumstances of which Germany made skilful use in her own relations with her prospective enemies as well as in the Axis, tended to place Italy in a subordinate position in that partnership. The *Anschluss,* and the official acceptance of it by Mussolini, made her a virtual prisoner of the association, but the outbreak of war in 1939 gave her a renewed opportu-

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nity to extricate herself. In 1939, as in 1914, and with much the same sort of legal basis—compare the Treaty of the Triple Alliance and the so-called Pact of Steel of 1939 between Germany and Italy — Italy remained neutral at the outset. Ignoble as her aggression of June 1940 against Britain and France was, it was based on the same error of judgment which was shared by the major part of the world at the time: the belief that Britain would either be defeated or at best have to accept some compromise which would exclude her from the continent of Europe. The error of these prognostications, the events of 1941, and the prospect of a long-drawn-out conflict, for which Italy was sadly unprepared despite the bombast of fascism, sealed her fate. The declaration of war against the United States was as concrete a symbol of national suicide as a régime ever indulged in. These developments and the extraordinarily sorry performance of her arms—far weaker than there was any reason to expect and poorer than in the First World War—finally made her the complete dependent of Germany.

All this had other consequences as well. Since the collapse of fascism, the stream of evidence of the incredible inefficiency of that régime has been steadily growing larger. Had it not been for this factor, the country could undoubtedly have given a better account of herself in the war. But, allowing for incompetence, the fact remains that the fundamental reason for Italy's failure was that, in greater measure even than Germany, she undertook a task beyond her means. It is well to remember that, in one way or another, Italy had been almost uninterruptedly at war since 1935; minor as the Abyssinian and Spanish episodes were in military terms and by comparison with the efforts of the Second World War, they constituted nevertheless an enormous drain on the exiguous resources of the country. That is why Italy, by far the largest of the German satellites, was the first of them to collapse. Three dates, in themselves alone, contain a whole story. On July 10, 1943 the Allies landed in Sicily; on July 23, following a stormy session of the Fascist Grand Council, the King appointed Marshal Badoglio Prime Minister, Mussolini was arrested, and the whole fascist edifice collapsed; on September 8 the announcement was made

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that Italy had signed an armistice on the basis of unconditional surrender.

From the point of view of the Allies, the Italian surrender represented an important success; but, for all its importance, it was no more than an episode, a move in the larger purpose of the war against Germany. From the Italian point of view, the armistice proved to be a miscalculation; for it was predicated on acceptance of the fact that Italy was no longer capable of carrying on the war, from which premise it followed that by surrender she would withdraw from it. Whether bolder Allied action could have made it possible to secure the whole country in September 1943 will remain a debated point. The fact is that the Allies did not attempt such action, with the result that it became necessary for them to work their way laboriously up the whole length of the peninsula. It took the better part of two years to do this and instead of having escaped from the war Italy became one of its most bitterly contested battlegrounds.

The consequences of this state of affairs can hardly be overemphasized. The real significance of war came to Italy *after* she was already so exhausted that she felt she could no longer continue the struggle. Following a brief period of hesitation, the Germans took over the bulk of the country whose terrain they used with skill in fighting a delaying action. This meant much physical destruction due to military activity and a ruthless exploitation of whatever resources the land had to offer. It meant also a painful division of the country, economic as well as political.

In the circumstances, there could be no question of a return to normal political life, let alone of making peace. Whatever political activity there was centered in the resistance movement. Having made an armistice with the Badoglio government, the Allies continued to recognize that government and were opposed to any drastic solution of the institutional question—the issue whether the monarchy should be retained or a republic established in its place—pending complete liberation of the country and a consultation of the people. It may be added that the not very inspiring spectacle of a reviving political activity in the liberated portion of the country (the backward south) con-

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firmed Allied leadership in the belief, held by many, in Italian political immaturity and in the view, shared by many Italians, that the monarchy was an element of stability and cohesion for the country. Some semblance of democratic government was reëstablished, first with the broadening of the Badoglio government, then, after the liberation of Rome in June 1944, with its substitution by a coalition of the six parties which had emerged. Needless to say, these parties did not derive from the electoral process, and when elections were finally held after complete liberation in 1946, a quite different composition of the government was to be the result. This legitimate government of Italy, operating behind the Allied lines over a slowly increasing portion of the national territory, also declared war on its former ally as early as October 1943. The fact that it was allowed to do this was an indication of the very different and much more lenient view which the Allies had always taken of Italian fascism in contrast with their feeling toward German nazism. The contribution of a defeated and disorganized Italy, largely still in German hands, could hardly be of great consequence as a military factor; nor was it for all that she coöperated with complete loyalty. But the significance of the gesture was considerable; naturally, Italians endeavored to make the most of it and even indulged in unwarranted hopes as a consequence. The result was an anomalous situation, for Italy continued technically at war with the Allies whom she had joined in their struggle against Germany; still bound by the terms of the armistice, she was granted the uncertain status of cobelligerent.

At the same time that Italy was thus reëntering the war from which she had vainly sought to escape, Mussolini was dramatically rescued by the Germans from his place of detention. He shortly reappeared in the north where he set up a neo-fascist régime, the so-called Italian Social Republic. The Republic was an interesting, though not very significant, postscript to the main episode of fascism. It naturally continued in the war on the side of Germany, but the events of July-August 1943 had too severely disrupted the organization of the whole country to make its contribution of significance on the German any more than on the Allied side. The war in Italy was fought

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essentially by the Allies and the Germans. The latter assumed increasingly direct control of the territory they held, treating the land as a conquered country and pushing Mussolini into ever greater effacement.

In these conditions the war went on in Italy, the front slowly moving up the length of the peninsula until the end came abruptly in May 1945. It is a common error to equate the cessation of active hostilities with the return of peace, but the end of the former makes at least possible the beginning of the process of the reëstablishment of the latter. The foregoing survey of developments between the armistice of 1943 and the termination of fighting in 1945 has been given because of its inevitable bearing on the peace settlement. What stands out first is the fact that Italy was conquered—or liberated—by the western allies. To this statement, one important qualification must be made, especially because of its subsequent considerable influence. During the closing phase of the war, the Yugoslav forces of Marshal Tito coming from the eastern side of the Adriatic had overrun the whole of Julian Venetia, including Trieste and even beyond the frontiers of 1914. On the basis of the terms of the German surrender in northern Italy, the western allies claimed the right of occupation within the boundaries of 1939. This claim and the fact of Yugoslav occupation produced some hectic days of tension. Eventually, the issue was compromised by the establishment of the so-called Morgan Line which marked the limits of occupation between the two sets of forces. The line ran west of the 1939 frontier, but Trieste and western Istria were evacuated by the Yugoslavs. This episode was a forerunner of greater difficulties to come over the eastern frontier of Italy.

In any case, however, there was reason to look for a disposition of leniency toward Italy on the part of all the major Allies, a disposition foreshadowed by the status of cobelligerency already granted her. There was also reason to expect that account would be taken of the degree to which Italy had "worked her passage home", to use Mr. Churchill's phrase, a phrase obviously subject to elastic interpretation. In this interpretation, the disposition of the Italian people as shown by their political

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activity could evidently be of considerable assistance. A word should be said about this factor.

Following the completion of liberation, the Bonomi government which had been in office for just a year was reorganized and replaced, after a short tenure under Ferruccio Parri, by a new coalition under De Gasperi in December 1945. Through crises and reshufflings De Gasperi has retained the premiership ever since. The first genuine consultation of the Italian electorate in nearly a quarter of a century took place in June 1946 following municipal elections earlier in the year. The purpose of the voting was twofold: the election of a constituent assembly, and a referendum on the institutional question. The latter issue showed the country to be fairly evenly divided: 12,717,923 votes were registered for a republican régime against 10,719,284 in favor of a retention of the monarchy. On June 10, 1946 Italy was proclaimed a republic and King Humbert left the country to join, like his father, the ranks of displaced monarchs.

The returns for the Assembly showed three parties well in the lead of all others: the Christian Democrats, heirs to the old *popolari* and resembling the French *Mouvement Républicain Populaire*, emerged with 207 deputies, followed some distance behind by the Socialists with 115 and the Communists with 104. All other parties together accounted for the remaining 130 deputies. Among these mention may be made of the *Uomo Qualunque* (the ordinary man), a heterogeneous group founded by the writer Guglielmo Giannini, which poses as a flippant and pretendedly realistic critic of all others—an easy task in the difficult condition of Italy. This group is rather reminiscent of fascism in its early days though hardly likely to be the core of a similar development. Of the three mass parties, the Communists are by far the most vigorous, best organized and disciplined, under the leadership of Palmiro Togliatti who returned from a long sojourn in Russia early in 1944. They also seem to be liberally financed. The Socialists are chiefly torn by the issue of the extent to which they should make common cause with the Communists, an issue which eventually led to an open split among them. The Christian Democrats, led by De Gasperi,

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cover the widest range; formally independent of the Vatican, they are inevitably looked upon with favor by it and they harbor among their supporters an unknown segment of conservative opinion which regards them as insurance against too drastic change while feeling that a vote for reaction would be merely wasted in the present Italy.

While Italy was thus reviving the forms and practice of democratic parliamentarism under an Assembly charged with the triple task of drafting a constitution, carrying on the current business of government, and making peace, the terms of the peace settlement were under discussion among the Allies. The task of establishing these terms did not prove easy.

The process of the restoration of peace following the Second World War differs radically from the procedure adopted after the First. To a certain extent the difference is the result of the earlier experience and of lessons supposedly learned from it. In both cases Germany is the chief enemy, but, whereas in 1919 peace was first made with her and subsequently with the minor enemies, the procedure now is exactly the reverse. This is due to the greater difficulty of agreement among the present Allies and to the fact that it was felt by many that the Treaty of Versailles had been too hastily drawn up, whence its faults, real and supposed, of which far too much was heard during the inter-war period. Of the subsidiary treaties, the Italian is clearly the most significant, both because of the relative importance of Italy and because that country lies outside the area in which all the Allies had come to recognize that Soviet wishes and interests were paramount.

Departing again from the procedure of 1919, the task of peacemaking was not undertaken this time by the heads of governments but was entrusted to the Foreign Ministers instead. These began their consultations in London in the autumn of 1945. It would take us too far afield to survey the details of these negotiations which were resumed in Paris in the following spring. It will suffice to say at this point that the main difficulty where Italy was concerned was the same as in 1919, namely the frontier between her and Yugoslavia. But, whereas in 1919 this issue took the form of a clash between Italy and

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the United States, more specifically Wilson, in the present instance Yugoslavia's main supporter has been the Soviet Union, with the United States, Great Britain and France, in that decreasing order of earnestness, defending Italian interests. The Italo-Yugoslav frontier represents the extreme western limit of Soviet influence—or dominance—and, while the issue was eventually compromised, the elaboration of this compromise served in itself to harden the clash between East and West, more specifically between the Soviet Union on one side and the Anglo-American combination on the other, with France, in this instance, in the rôle of successful mediator between the two.

The London and Paris meetings of the Foreign Ministers produced sufficient agreement on the Italian and the other satellite treaties to make possible the gathering of a full peace conference which met in the latter city from the end of July to the middle of October 1946. This gathering was attended by much legalistic haggling and jockeying for position and served to bring out with increasing clarity the emergence of Two Worlds instead of the hoped-for One. The Italians were allowed to state their case before the Paris assemblage; the quiet and dignified statement of De Gasperi made a very favorable impression on the conference but had no effect on ultimate decisions. It may be said, in fact, that the whole meeting had little value other than that of enabling various nations to air their views before the forum of world opinion. A further meeting of the Foreign Ministers in New York in November-December 1946 finally produced agreement among the Big Four; the texts of the treaties were then drafted and these were signed in Paris on February 10, 1947. They were promptly ratified by the western allies. The Italians showed some hesitation and reluctance; for the treaty was not liked by them (as indeed it could hardly have been), there was considerable feeling in Italy that she had not been given sufficient credit for having worked her passage home and been accepted as a co-belligerent, and the situation was further complicated by the shifts and vagaries of the Communists reflecting the delay in Russian ratification and the uncertainties over Russian action. But in the end Italy had little choice in the matter and the

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Communists were not strong enough to hold the power of decision in any event. Italian ratification was forthcoming at the end of July.

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We may now proceed to examine the terms of the treaty itself. The document opens with a preamble which is significant, for it describes with accuracy—and fairness—the exact position in which Italy found herself. On the one hand, states the treaty,

> Whereas Italy under the Fascist régime became a party to the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Japan, undertook a war of aggression and thereby provoked a state of war with all the Allied and Associated Powers and with other United Nations, and bears her share of responsibility for the war; and

on the other hand, in recognition of Italy's about-face, it goes on to say,

> Whereas in consequence of the victory of the Allied forces, and with the assistance of the democratic elements of the Italian people, the Fascist régime in Italy was overthrown on July 23, 1943, and Italy, having surrendered unconditionally, signed terms of Armistice on September 3 and 29 of the same year; and
>
> Whereas after the said Armistice Italian armed forces, both of the Government and of the Resistance Movement, took an active part in the war against Germany as from October 13, 1943, and thereby became a co-belligerent against Germany. . . .

The Italians, understandably seeking to draw a veil over fascism and the consequent responsibility for its deeds, would have liked to have substituted the phrasing " Italy had been led by the Fascist régime. . . " for " Italy under the Fascist régime became a party ". In this attempt they were not successful.

The treaty then proceeds to redefine the frontiers of continental Italy. These involve three of her neighbors, France, Austria and Yugoslavia.

France claimed and received four very small areas, which may be described as in the nature of minor frontier rectifications. The most significant aspect of these changes lies in the existence

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of hydroelectric installations in the Mont Cenis and Briga-Tenda regions; these are of importance to Italy and are the object of bilateral arrangements between the two countries whereby France guarantees the power and water supply formerly derived by Italy from these sources. The frontier zone to a depth of 20 kilometers on the Italian side is to be demilitarized.

There was much uncertainty as to what the Allies would decide for the South Tyrol. The region is incontestably of German character, despite the emigration which had taken place as a result of the direct agreement between Hitler and Mussolini in 1939 and a certain amount of Italian immigration. The issue could or might have been, settled on its local merits, all the more as it was not a case of dealing with an ally on one side and an enemy on the other. The Italian case for the maintenance of the 1939 frontiers was weakest at this point. However, the decision of the Allies was to leave that frontier unchanged. Meantime, the Italian and Austrian Foreign Ministers, Sig. de Gasperi and Dr. Gruber, came to a direct and amicable arrangement insuring cultural rights and a degree of local autonomy to the German-speaking population of the South Tyrol as well as facilities for communication. Despite a certain amount of Russian opposition, the De Gasperi-Gruber agreement was incorporated into the final treaty with Italy.

The frontier with Yugoslavia was by far the greatest stumbling block and the one that held up longest the making of the treaty. The facts in the case were essentially not different from what they had been in 1919 and there is no cause to rehearse them at this point. It was clear from the outset that Italy could not retain her pre-war frontier in this region. The situation was also complicated, as mentioned before, by the Yugoslav occupation of the whole of Julian Venetia during the closing days of the war and the resulting compromise which had established the Morgan Line of demarcation between the occupying forces of the western allies and the Yugoslav forces.

When the issue was tackled by the Council of Foreign Ministers there appeared at once wide divergence among them. The Council sent a commission to investigate on the spot in March 1946. It is a measure of the weight of major power politics

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that the investigators failed to agree to the extent that they recommended four different lines. The American line was the most favorable to Italy, leaving her not only Trieste but also about half of the Istrian peninsula. The British line differed little from the American, running slightly to the west of it in the south. The Russians, supporting their Yugoslav protégé, proposed a line which not only excluded Trieste but, in the north, ran west of the 1914 frontier between Italy and Austria-Hungary. The French took a middle position and, after much haggling, the line they had proposed became the basis of agreement. The result is a return to something close to the 1914 frontier, but, by way of compromise, Trieste, with a small surrounding territory, is to go neither to Italy nor to Yugoslavia, but is to be constituted into a Free Territory whose " integrity and independence shall be assured by the Security Council of the United Nations ".

The result was disappointing to the Italians who had hoped at one time to obtain for their frontier the Wilson Line of 1919 and whose appeal to the Paris conference in the summer of 1946 proved barren of results. The Yugoslavs professed to be highly indignant and loudly proclaimed that they would never sign the treaty. Moreover, even the compromise just indicated did not end the matter, for the task of agreeing on the details of the statute of the Free Territory proved to be a most troublesome one.

The root of the difficulty lay in the distrust of Yugoslav and Russian intentions on the part of the western allies. Two things are clear beyond dispute: the predominantly Italian character of the city of Trieste itself, and the fact that its significance derives from its being the natural outlet for much of central European trade. The problem of Trieste, in other words, comes from the fact that the city belongs to Italy ethnographically but economically belongs to central Europe, not to Yugoslavia alone or especially, but also to Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. That Yugoslavia should put forward a claim to Trieste was only to be expected, but the claim would have been rejected out of hand had Yugoslavia been alone in making it. What gave force to the claim was the support of Russia. In

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view of the nature of the present Yugoslav régime and of Russian policy in eastern and central Europe, Trieste was a possible outpost and anchor of Russian influence corresponding to Stettin in the north. It became the testing ground of the two great rivals, the Soviet Union with its satellites and the Anglo-American combination; hence the compromise solution at this point where these two forces met and held each other in equilibrium. In this contest, Italy and Yugoslavia had almost become secondary factors. In view also of the techniques and methods used by the Soviet Union in establishing control through amenable puppets, it was felt by the Western Powers that the statute of the Free Territory should be such as to forestall the possibility of an internal coup which might in effect put it under Yugoslav—hence indirectly Russian—control. That is why the provisions regarding the Free Territory take up so much space (about a quarter of the text of the whole treaty is devoted to them) and why it took so long and proved so difficult to reach agreement on them.

The dispute centered for a long time on the powers of the Governor, and there was humor in the fact that it was the Americans and the British who were most insistent on giving him wide latitude while the Russians took the more "democratic"—if perhaps disingenuous in this instance—position that the elected representative body should have the greater powers. The technique of manufacturing elections had been developed into a fine art in Moscow.

Eventually agreement was reached and the Free Territory is to have a Governor appointed by the Security Council "after consultation with the Governments of Yugoslavia and Italy." He may not, however, be a citizen of either Italy, Yugoslavia, or the Free Territory. The Governor may, "in cases which in *his opinion* permit of no delay, threatening the independence or integrity of the Free Territory, public order, or respect of human rights, directly order and require the execution of appropriate measures. . . . In such circumstances the Governor may *himself assume, if he deems it necessary, control of the security services.*" This is the clause that gave rise to such pro-

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tracted debate before it was adopted. The significance of it is obvious; it represents the extent of the victory of the Western Powers, or conversely the extent of Soviet concessions. Now that the treaty has been drawn up, signed and ratified, the deadlock has been transferred to the choice of a specific individual for the position of Governor; no agreement on this has taken place as this is being written (November).

In addition to the Governor, the Free Territory is to be ruled by a popularly elected single chamber assembly chosen according to the system of proportional representation. From this assembly, to which it will be responsible, is to issue the Executive Council of Government. For the transitional period, the Governor, upon assuming office, is to organize a Provisional Council of Government in consultation with which elections for a constituent assembly (to take place within four months of the Governor's assumption of office) are to be arranged. From the time of the coming into force of the treaty, occupying forces are not to exceed 15,000 men, apportioned equally between Americans, British and Yugoslavs. These troops are to be at the disposal of the Governor for a period of 90 days, after which they are to be withdrawn within an additional 45 days. There are further detailed provisions in the statute dealing with economic and financial matters, water and electricity supply, and, above all, the organization of the free port.

The rest of the territorial provisions of the treaty did not present too much difficulty. Italy does not retain her foothold in Zara on the Dalmatian mainland, nor any of the islands on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Albania regains her sovereignty and is to have the island of Saseno which Italy had acquired as the result of the First World War. The Dodecanese and the small island of Castellorizzo, which are to be demilitarized, are turned over to Greece in accordance with the wishes of their population, despite a momentary Russian objection in this case also.

In regard to the Italian possessions in Africa, no final decision has been reached with the exception of Abyssinia where, naturally and properly, the effects of the Italian aggression of

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1935 are simply undone. For the rest of the older, pre-fascist, Italian colonies the treaty merely states that the four Powers "agree that they will, within one year of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Italy . . . jointly determine the final disposal of Italy's territorial possessions in Africa, to which . . . Italy renounces all right and title." Pending this final decision, these territories are to continue under their present British administration.

Following the pattern of the settlements with the enemy after the First World War, the treaty with Italy provides for her disarmament. Like the frontier with France, that with Yugoslavia is to be demilitarized and restrictions are placed on military establishments in the islands of Sicily and Sardinia as well as in some other areas of the mainland. The land armed forces may not exceed 250,000 men, including *carabinieri;* the naval and air personnel 25,000 each. Except for two battleships, four cruisers, and smaller craft, the rest of the Italian navy is to be turned over to the four Allies for division among them. Italy may also retain 200 heavy and medium tanks, 200 fighter and reconnaissance, and 150 transport and other planes.

Italy is also required to pay reparation to the victims of her aggression, but the painful lesson learned from the failure of the fanciful economics of 1919 seems to have borne some useful fruit in this case. The amounts due by her are as follows: $100,000,000 to the Soviet Union, $125,000,000 to Yugoslavia, $105,000,000 to Greece, $25,000,000 to Abyssinia, and $5,000,000 to Albania. The western allies, the United States, Britain and France, renounced like claims, but in all cases Italian property in Allied territory may be used to offset claims and damages. In addition, no part of the above-mentioned reparation is to come from current industrial production for the first two years, and thereafter those countries entitled to reparation are to furnish Italy the raw materials for the manufactures to be used as reparation. The whole account is to be liquidated within seven years.

Italy also undertakes to recognize in advance the peace treaties and other arrangements between the Allies and all the other enemy countries. Occupying forces are to be withdrawn from

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Italy within not more than ninety days from the coming into force of the treaty.

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How is this peace to be appraised? Let us examine the territorial clauses first. These are in a sense the most fundamental; for, even though economic conditions may be paramount at the moment, such conditions are susceptible of far easier change than are frontiers. The history of the Treaty of Versailles is a good illustration. After several modifications and revisions, the attempt to collect reparation from Germany was finally abandoned in 1932; but frontiers are seldom altered save as the result of war. The whole discussion may be prefaced by the remark that, in view of what Italy did to other countries and in the light of what fascism would have done had it emerged triumphant from the war (and that without serious objection from the Italian people), Italians have a weak case in complaining of retaliation, if retaliation there be, toward their country. Having said this, the fact remains that the Allies stand committed to the principle of justice in general, and more specifically of the self-determination of peoples, just as they were in 1918. This moral obligation is inescapable, having been freely undertaken on their part. Moreover, from the mere standpoint of expediency and practicality, retaliation, however understandable it might be at the moment, if it takes the form of creating territorial grievances, can only serve to impede in the long run the process of reconciliation, stability and durable peace.

All these considerations pointed to the desirability of drawing the new frontiers of Italy with fairness, and the case of Italy is among the easiest because of the definiteness of these frontiers. The territories annexed by France are in themselves minute and of little significance, save in the matter of power supply. For that reason, the Italian territorial loss being so negligible in this case might be said not to be worth discussing. But the argument cuts both ways; if these annexations are so insignificant, they serve little purpose other than that of pinpricks and symbols of defeat. The strategic argument, valid as it may be on the local scale, cannot be entertained seriously, for the French have on the whole the advantage throughout

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the length of their Italian frontier in this respect. While, therefore, it may be said that Italy has cause to congratulate herself in this case at the smallness of her loss, it is equally true that an attitude of generosity on the part of France would also have been one of wisdom. It is of interest that on the occasion of the ratification of the treaty by the Italian Constituent Assembly on July 31, 1947 a unanimous appeal was made to the French people not to annex the territories in question. It would be pleasant if, on the Italian side, there could be an equally unanimous acknowledgment of the aggression of June 10, 1940 for the sort of thing that it was. Of such an attitude, so far, there have been occasional individual instances only.

As to the question of the South Tyrol, it can only be said that an opportunity was missed. There is reason to believe that the loss would have been taken in good part in Italy and the case is unusually clear. The strategic argument, the only valid one for the Brenner frontier, is insufficient even if one disregard the significance of modern weapons of warfare. Barring change, however, what was done in the form of a direct Austro-Italian agreement is undoubtedly the next best solution.

The frontier with Yugoslavia presented unquestionably the most difficult problem. The whole of Julian Venetia has long been a pressure point of Europe, meeting ground as it is of the three great European ethnic groups, Latin, Slav and Germanic. Some compromise between ethnic, economic and strategic considerations is the best that can be done in such a case. The frontier drawn in 1920, which gave the advantage to Italy in all three respects, is a good illustration of the point previously made that a bad frontier is merely a source of future trouble—although in the context of the whole situation at the time it could be considered a reasonable compromise.

In 1919, a good compromise in this region was suggested in the form of the American or Wilson Line. Italy could not be coerced or induced to accept this solution and, in a sense, she may be said to be now reaping the fruits of her earlier intransigeance; for the tables are now turned and it is Yugoslavia which is highly uncompromising at present. In so far as national feeling is involved, the attitude of Yugoslavia toward Italy is

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wholly understandable and rather more justified than was that of the Italians toward the Croats and Slovenes in 1919. But these are not sound bases for the drawing of frontiers. In 1947, as in 1919, the American line would probably have been the best compromise; however, the solution adopted has been different. There is this to be said for the present frontier, and it is a strong argument, that it is closer to the ethnic line than was the Wilson Line. On that score the Italians may become reconciled to it, although it will be difficult to forget such things as the voluntary mass migration of the population of Pola. The western coast of Istria is predominantly Italian, and certainly Yugoslavia does not need it on any plea of naval strategy, the advantage in this respect being wholly on her side owing to the nature of the Adriatic shores.

The great stumbling block, as indicated before, was Trieste, and the solution adopted in the erection of the Free Territory was the result of the impact of extraneous forces, greater than the merely Yugoslav and Italian. This is not a good solution. The statute of the Free Territory has been elaborated with great care and in minutest detail. But one can only take a dim view of the prospects of the new creation. There was far more justification for the creation of the Free City of Danzig in 1919 than for that of the Free Territory of Trieste in 1946. We know the fate of Danzig; ultimately, Danzig was the pretext, not the cause, for German aggression. If the relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, or rather between the Western and the Russian blocs, become tolerable, the Free Territory may prove a viable creation. But in that event it will also be a superfluous one. In the opposite case, it is to be feared that no amount of legal forethought in the form of detailed provisions will be a satisfactory substitute for sincerity of intent; it may be said in fact that the very complexity and elaborateness of the statute will in itself provide all the more grounds for chicanery—if such is the desire. Yugoslavia has it in her power to render the economic as well as the political life of the Free Territory untenable and there are already reports of the sad economic condition of Trieste.

To sum up, then, it would have been better if France had

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eschewed annexations, if the South Tyrol had rejoined Austria, if Trieste had remained unqualifiedly Italian, and if the whole frontier with Yugoslavia had been drawn somewhat further east. Yet ideal solutions cannot be produced in vacuo; it would be merely unrealistic and utopian to ignore the stresses that the war has brought to the surface, and if it is regrettable that a perhaps transitory relationship of feeling and of power should determine such presumably permanent matters as frontiers, the fact is that it does. Considering all this, it may be said that Italy has not been treated with undue harshness. She may indeed congratulate herself that the Allies espoused principles —even though the application of them is at times qualified in practice—so radically different from those which animated her régime when she made the mistake of abandoning her neutrality.

Italian interests in the Adriatic are bound to remain important, but there is no reason why the Adriatic should be an Italian lake, and it is therefore well, on the whole, that Italy should retain no foothold on the Dalmatian coast or in Albania. The same applies to the Dodecanese, save that perhaps the isolated outpost of Castellorizzo might better have been turned over to Turkey.

The colonial question remains unsettled. That Abyssinia should be restored goes without saying. There is no issue there. That leaves the question of the colonies in existence before the days of fascism: Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya. These colonies have never been assets to Italy though the military significance of Libya in the Second World War was considerable. The simple fact is that Italy cannot aspire to an imperial rôle. When it is at present a question how far much older, more important and better-established empires can continue to preserve themselves, it would be a bold but a sensible gesture if the Italian people took the position that they are well rid of their colonies. But it would be unreasonable to look for such reasonableness on the part of national feeling; power, however onerous and futile, seldom abdicates of its own free choice. In all likelihood, the former Italian colonies will become mandates or trusteeships. They could be made joint trusteeships of the United Nations, but condominiums are not in general

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desirable solutions. Taking all factors into account, it might therefore be the part of wisdom to make Italy the trustee of her former possessions. If not Italy, Britain would be the next most logical candidate, at least for the East African possessions. Libya will be more troublesome; for the unrest which pervades the whole Arab world is equally at work there, and Britain, like France, is facing a difficult future in her relations with that world. Libya alone hardly offers the basis for a separate and independent political entity. The matter of the disposition of Libya is further complicated by the wartime British promise to the Senussi that they would not again be placed under Italian rule. This, to be sure, might fit to a nicety with the desires of Egyptian imperialism, the manifestations of which we have only begun to witness. It is also possible that the French may make some demands for frontier changes along the Tunisian border and in the Fezzan. As to the suggestion, made at one time, of a Russian trusteeship for Libya, it does not deserve serious consideration; it has far less foundation than a German establishment in Morocco would have had before 1914. The subject of Italian colonies was taken up in London following the coming into force of the treaty. Discussions proceeded in the labored and slow fashion characteristic of all peace negotiations, and the only decision, so far, has been to send an investigating commission to report upon the situation in the territories involved.

Taken by themselves, the disarmament clauses are justified, or they would be if one had assurance that none of Italy's neighbors has designs upon her. All depends upon the intentions of Yugoslavia. In view of her claims, her intransigeance and the position that that country has taken with respect to the Free Territory of Trieste, an element of doubt subsists. The incidents which attended the withdrawal of the Anglo-American forces from the Morgan Line after the coming into force of the peace treaty would seem to have been in the nature of a testing by Yugoslavia of the intentions and determination of the United States and Britain. Yugoslavia maintains an unnecessarily large military establishment. Should untoward developments occur in the Free Territory, Italy is powerless to take action and would have to rely upon the United Nations, or,

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more immediately and concretely, upon the western allies. This is in reality an issue between the two great blocs in process of crystallization, for Yugoslavia is unlikely to take action save in the prior knowledge of support from other quarters.

Despite much recrimination in Italy, it may also be said that the total of reparation is not exorbitant, especially when account is taken of the initial two-year moratorium and of the provision for the delivery of raw materials to Italy by the countries entitled to receive reparation. It may be pointed out that Finland, for example, with a population less than one tenth that of Italy and subject to serious territorial and economic amputations, is required to pay $300,000,000 in reparation to the Soviet Union. Taken as a whole, in fact, the Italian treaty, while susceptible of improvement, may be described as a not unreasonable settlement. It is a reflection of the fact that the Western countries especially are not fearful of Italian power, actual or potential, and have been inclined to leniency toward Italy. This tendency is increasing with the passage of time and the desire, especially on America's part, to secure Italy for the western European bloc. It is of interest, in this connection, to note Secretary Marshall's message to Foreign Minister Sforza on the occasion of the ratification of the treaty by the Italian Assembly. This communication implied American sympathy for Italian efforts to secure some revision of the terms of the treaty, particularly in regard to Trieste, colonies, reparation and the surrender of naval units. Further evidence of the American disposition was provided by Foreign Minister Sforza's announcement in the Assembly at the beginning of October that the United States had renounced her share of the Italian fleet. The British seem to have taken a similar position. Also, the issue of revision of the treaty has been placed on the agenda of the current meeting of the Assembly of the United Nations.

A treaty of peace, however, like an alliance or any other international instrument, is after all but the expression of a momentary state of affairs, a balance of forces existing at the time of its making. It should not be mistaken for the expression of a status that will be frozen for time everlasting. Bearing

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this in mind, it is well that reparation is to be liquidated within a few years. The fate of the disarmament clauses is obviously linked with the broader issue of the power situation in Europe and in the world as a whole. It should be clear that a nation of 45,000,000, placed in a central position in Europe and especially in the Mediterranean, is bound to play a rôle of importance on that continent and in that sea. Just as the fascist bubble managed to produce for a time an exaggerated and misleading picture of Italian power, so, conversely, the performance of Italian arms during the war and the present state of complete impotence of the country are no true measure of Italian potentialities. If and when some sort of equilibrium and normality becomes reëstablished in Europe, the defeat of Italy may well turn out to have served to clarify her true and proper position.

Until the advent of fascism, and even for a good while under fascism, Italian foreign policy was characterized by a moderation born of the sane appraisal of the ends that could be achieved with the means available for the pursuit of these ends. Italy had always sought, and had managed with success, to find herself on the side of the strongest Power or combination of Powers. Judged by this guiding criterion of her policy, her association with Nazi Germany would have been both understandable and legitimate on grounds of national interest alone. Or at least such would have been the case had it not been for the peculiar nature of the Nazi régime; for, even had Germany been successful in her bid for power—and the bid was by no means a senseless one—there is every reason to believe that Italy would have found herself relegated to the position of a complete dependent for whose interests her ally would have shown scant consideration. If an Italian bid for empire in the form of riding the coattails of a victorious Germany was based on illusion, an attempt to play a major imperial rôle unassisted was merely ludicrous. Had Mussolini not lost all sense of proportion, he would have abided by his own declaration that Italy was a satisfied Power after the Abyssinian success and he would have thrown his influence on the side of the forces of conserva-

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tion, deeming himself fortunate to have got away with more than Italy had a right normally to expect. It is the folly and the guilt of fascism to have pursued thereafter a reckless and irresponsible policy. The fascist dream of falling heir to the French empire was a senseless vision, and with the current intensification of nationalism in colonial areas, which renders the position of even the older empires a precarious one, imperial dreams for Italy must be decidedly written off.

The war has also brought out in full the weaknesses of the Italian economic structure. The fascist attempt at economic self-sufficiency was in a category with its absurd bombast about imperial Rome, and the cost of failure is being visited on Italy with a vengeance. In fact, the precariousness of the Italian economy makes the details of the peace settlement of secondary importance for the moment. That is why we hear so much at the present time about Marshall plans and the need for immediate assistance. The chief merit of the Marshall proposal is the recognition of the fact that what is needed in Italy, as in the rest of Europe for that matter, is not American charity, on however generous a scale (and America has been more generous than any nation has ever been), but some device whereby economic equilibrium can be restored.

At this point one cannot leave out of account the rôle of the Communist party. There are only 104 Communists in the Italian Assembly, not an overwhelming number, and it is often said that the Italian people, like the French, are not by temperament inclined toward communism. This is probably true and a substantial portion of the communist vote is in all likelihood a protest vote against intolerably difficult conditions of existence. But precisely in this lies the best asset of communism in western Europe, for the Communists there, unlike other parties, the Socialists for example, are not saddled with the record of past failure in office—a failure which was particularly inept in pre-fascist Italy—and can therefore pose as the heralds of the bright promise of the future. Communism in western Europe also benefits from the fact that it has not been hampered by the physical presence of Russian occupation forces, and it has been said, with probably equal humor and truth, that genu-

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ine Communists in the original sense are likely to be found in Paris, in Rome or in Prague rather than in Moscow. Italian Communists have been ably led and, while, like others, occasionally embarrassed by the gyrations of the Kremlin, they have shown suppleness and have known how to defer to both national and religious feeling. Finally, Italy has physical contact with the Russian-dominated area of Europe, which is why the issue of her eastern frontier has been so bitterly fought out, is in fact still being fought out; for, despite the ratification of the Italian treaty by all the parties concerned and the impending removal of the occupation forces, the Allies have not yet been able to agree on the choice of a Governor for the Free Territory of Trieste. Until January of this year, the Communists participated in the coalition government and on the whole, as in France, used their great power in the labor unions to hold the workers in line and to further reconstruction instead of exploiting this power to embarrass the government. Since January, they have been excluded from the government and have been maintaining an attitude of watchful waiting, veering of late toward more determined opposition. Some of the recent strikes which have plagued the country, especially among the agricultural and metal workers, as well as the much heralded "hunger march" late in September, would seem to have been at least in part political in their motivation and to be but another aspect of the policy which has also taken the form of increasingly outspoken attacks against the United States. However, the government managed to survive another test in the Assembly at the beginning of October.

Defeated and economically wrecked, living a hand-to-mouth existence, Italy stands precariously poised at the moment. If peace and normalcy, political and economic, can be restored she will have a rôle to play in Europe. Pending this restoration, she is largely a pawn in the rivalries of greater Powers, and not until Europe has found her new balance can the real significance of the peace be properly assessed.

René Albrecht-Carrié

Barnard College

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THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA

THE supreme law of Yugoslavia at present is the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia adopted on January 31, 1946. The embodiment of the many arduous achievements of the struggle for national liberation begun in 1941, this constitution marks the end of the first great stage in the development of the Yugoslav Republic. When the Constituent Assembly met in Belgrade on January 31, 1946 to adopt a constitution, it merely registered its unanimous approval of the actual Yugoslav government as it had developed since 1941. A review of that development and of the conditions under which it took place is necessary to an understanding of the present form of government in Yugoslavia.

I

The earliest Partisan organization took the form of a Military Committee secretly organized by the Communists as early as the autumn of 1940 nearly six months before the German attack on Yugoslavia. According to official Partisan accounts, "This Committee was charged with the task of fostering a spirit of resistance among soldiers and officers of the Yugoslav Army in case of foreign attack and with taking over military leadership if the country should surrender."[1] It was not until the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, two months after the fall of Yugoslavia, that this Military Committee went into action after transforming itself into the General Headquarters for the Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia. This nuclear organization of the Partisans made no distinction between political and military matters. By the

[1] Josip Broz-Tito, "Borba naroda porobljene Jugoslavije" ("The Struggle of the Peoples of Enslaved Yugoslavia"), *Borba za oslobodjenje Jugoslavije, 1941-1944* (*The Struggle for the Liberation of Yugoslavia, 1941-1944*) (Belgrade, 1944), p. 192.

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latter part of 1942, however, as the Partisans were temporarily successful in liberating parts of Yugoslavia, a division between military and political functions was necessitated.

The first national civil authority within the National Liberation Movement was established on November 26, 1942 when over two hundred Partisan representatives of various parties, organizations, and ethnic or religious groups met in the Bosnian stronghold of Bihać to form themselves into a Yugoslav Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation, known by its initials as AVNOJ (*Antifašističko Veće Narodnog Oslobodjenja Jugoslavije*). A smaller operating unit known as the Executive Committee was also organized with Dr. Ivan Ribar as president. At that time no claim was advanced by this body for recognition as a legal government. Its leaders frankly recognized that such pretensions were premature.[2] A central government was created, nevertheless, with the force necessary to render it effective in all areas under the control of the Partisan army.

The Bihać Declaration promulgated by AVNOJ on November 26, 1942 may be considered the first predecessor of the present Yugoslav constitution as it established the organization and the fundamental principles of the National Liberation Movement in its first stage. In brief, this program declared (1) that the liberation of Yugoslavia from its oppressors together with the winning of democratic rights for all the peoples of Yugoslavia was the principal aim of the National Liberation Movement; (2) that the right of private property, individual inititative and economic enterprise would be preserved; (3) that no radical social changes would be effected except to replace reactionary local authorities and gendarmes with popularly elected representatives; (4) that the National Liberation Movement renounced coercion or lawlessness; (5) that officers who joined the National Liberation Army would receive ranks commensurate with their experience; and (6) that the national rights of all the peoples of Yugoslavia would be respected and achieved.

[2] Tito, "Govor na prvom zasjedanju AVNOJ-a" ("Address to the First Session of AVNOJ"), *ibid.*, p. 101.

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It is noteworthy that this Bihać Declaration is generally ignored in Yugoslavia today, partly because it marks the nadir of Partisan political power and prestige. It seems understandable why the powerful Communist leaders of the present Yugoslav Republic should prefer to forget the tactics of darker days when they felt constrained to issue declarations of capitalist bourgeois rights to attract adherents. The Bihać Declaration has been violated by its framers since its inception in a planned attempt to realize the far more radical program of the Communist core of the movement.

The second historic document which precedes the present constitution, the Jajce Declaration of November 29, 1943, certainly indicates that as the Partisans became stronger, their program grew increasingly radical. A year following the first session of AVNOJ at Bihać, a second plenary session met in Jajce, the new Bosnian headquarters of the National Liberation Army. The principal purpose of this second session was clearly stated in the report of the supreme commander of the National Liberation Army, the still little-known Josip Broz-Tito: "Today the time has come to create an executive organ in the form of a provisional government capable of conducting all of the affairs which a real national government must direct."[3] A formal declaration was adopted by the second session of AVNOJ which ended with the following resolutions:

> 1. That the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia be constituted as the supreme legislative and executive representative body of Yugoslavia as the supreme representative of the sovereignty of the peoples and of the State of Yugoslavia as a whole, and that a National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia be established as an organ with all of the features of a national government, through which the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia will realize its executive functions;

[3] Tito, "Razvitak oslobodilačke borbe naroda Jugoslavije u vezi s medjunarodnim dogadjajima" ("Development of the Liberation Struggle of the Peoples of Yugoslavia in Connection with International Events"), *Drugo zasjedanje Antifašističkog Vijeća Narodnog Oslobodjenja Jugoslavije* (*Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia*) (Zagreb, 1945), p. 13.

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2. That the traitorous " government " in exile be deprived of all rights as the legal government of Yugoslavia, particularly of the right to represent the peoples of Yugoslavia anywhere or before anyone;

3. That all international treaties and obligations concluded abroad in the name of Yugoslavia by the " government " in exile be reviewed with a view to their invalidation or renewal or approval, and that all international treaties and obligations which the so-called " government " in exile may eventually conclude abroad in the future receive no recognition;

4. That Yugoslavia be established on a democratic federal principle as a state of equal peoples;

5. That all these resolutions be formulated in separate decisions by AVNOJ.[4]

The second session of AVNOJ accordingly passed six decrees and the Presidium of AVNOJ passed four decisions which together comprised the actual constitution of Yugoslavia as the country gradually fell under the control of the National Liberation Movement. The first series of six decrees passed by the entire AVNOJ established the Yugoslav Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation as the supreme legislative and executive representative body in Yugoslavia, and the National Committee of Liberation as a provisional cabinet; it deprived the royal government-in-exile of its legality and forbade King Peter II to return to Yugoslavia against the will of the people; it adopted the federal principle as a basis of government; it approved the work of the Executive Committee of AVNOJ and the General Staff of the National Liberation Army since the first session at Bihać; it gave a vote of thanks to the Army; and, finally, it introduced the title of Marshal of Yugoslavia.

In a second series of four decrees, the newly established Presidium of AVNOJ conferred the title of Marshal upon Tito. On November 30, 1943 the Presidium appointed a National Committee to act as the executive arm of AVNOJ. Marshal

[4] " Deklaracija drugog zasjedanja Antifašističkog Veća Narodnog Oslobodjenja Jugoslavije (29-XI-1943) " (" Declaration of the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia [29-XI-1943] "), *Službeni List* (*Official Gazette*), No. 1, February 1, 1945.

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Tito was made president or acting premier as well as acting minister of national defense. Three vice-presidents and thirteen acting ministers were also appointed, holding nineteen portfolios in all.

From November 29, 1943 to the adoption of the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia on January 31, 1946, this pattern constituted the fundamental law by which all territories of Yugoslavia were governed as they were liberated by the Partisans.

II

The position of Tito's government was considerably strengthened by an agreement reached on June 16, 1944 on the liberated Adriatic island of Vis between the Marshal and Dr. Ivan Šubašić, then premier of the royal government-in-exile. At the behest of the British, Premier Šubašić promised Tito to organize a more progressive cabinet which would cooperate with the National Committee. In exchange, Tito offered to postpone the question of the future of the monarchy for the duration of the war if the royal government in London would publicly order all Yugoslavs to join forces with Tito's army. [5]

In realization of the need to preserve the forms of legal continuity of the new state, particularly for purposes of international recognition, a second Tito-Šubašić agreement was concluded in Belgrade on November 1, 1944, less than a week following the liberation of the Yugoslav capital. [6] As a result, several basic changes were made in the central government of Yugoslavia.

On January 29, 1945 King Peter II issued a decree from London transferring his royal powers to a regency until a final

[5] "Sporazum Nacionalnog Komiteta Oslobodjenja Jugoslavije i Kraljevske Jugoslovenske Vlade od 16 juna 1944 godine" ("Agreement between the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia and the Royal Yugoslav Government of June 16, 1944"), *Službeni List* (*Official Gazette*), No. 133, March 9, 1945.

[6] "Sporazum Nacionalnog Komiteta Oslobodjenja Jugoslavije i Kraljevske Jugoslovenske Vlade od 1 novembra 1944 godine" ("Agreement between the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia and the Royal Yugoslav Government of November 1, 1944"), *Službeni List* (*Official Gazette*), No. 134, March 9, 1945.

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decision by a constituent assembly be made regarding the monarchy.[7] A temporary deadlock caused by the inability of the royal government and the National Committee to agree on details and personalities was broken by the "recommendation" of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at Yalta on February 11, 1945 to Marshal Tito and Premier Šubašić "that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately and that a new government should be formed on the basis of that agreement."[8] As the result of negotiation with Tito, King Peter, by a decree of March 2, 1945, named three regents—a Serb, a Croat and a Slovene—to represent the monarchy in Yugoslavia.[9] Three days later Premier Šubašić formally submitted his government's resignation to the regents according to plan.[10] Marshal Tito likewise submitted the resignation of the National Committee to the Presidium of AVNOJ.[11] On March 7, 1945 the National Committee was dissolved as a government agency and a new council of ministers was appointed by the regents on the recommendation of the Presidium of AVNOJ. Headed by Marshal Tito, the new cabinet consisted of twenty-eight ministers of whom only five were not Partisans.[12]

This compromise resulted in a certain dualism in the government under which the National Liberation Movement enjoyed a much stronger position than did the king as represented by a completely ineffectual regency. Though the compromise stemmed from the desire to maintain the legal continuity of the Yugoslav state, neither the royal constitution nor the Partisan government operated in its original form. Despite the existence of a royal regency, the Tito government continued to use the revolutionary name "Democratic Federal Yugoslavia". The Tito Šubašić agreements, in the final analysis,

[7] *Službeni List* (*Official Gazette*), No. 135.

[8] Joint Communiqué on Crimea Conference, February 12, 1945.

[9] *Službeni List* (*Official Gazette*), No. 136, March 9, 1945.

[10] *Ibid.*, No. 137.

[11] *Ibid.*, No. 138.

[12] *Ibid.*, No. 139.

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served only to strengthen Tito's hand by giving him virtually full control over the now only legal government of Yugoslavia in exchange for the mere promise to postpone the question of the monarchy until after the war.

In addition to the above basic changes, several additional institutions became a part of the Yugoslav central government after the liberation of Belgrade on October 20, 1944. By a decree of December 14, 1944 the National Committee established under its jurisdiction an Economic Council consisting of the economic ministries and the ministry of national defense. This Economic Council has since become a permanent agency coördinating all the economic functions of the government through its decisions. A decree of February 3, 1945 (effective February 13) issued by the Presidium of AVNOJ established a Supreme Court and the office of Public Prosecutor, both on the Soviet model. A decree of April 2, 1945 (effective April 10) established a Legislative Council consisting of the minister for the constituent assembly, the minister of justice, and the ministers of state for the six federal units (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia) with the task of formulating and interpreting the ordinances and decrees of the council of ministers. These agencies have likewise become permanent parts of the government.

This, in brief, constituted the central government of Yugoslavia, with one major exception, until the proclamation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia on November 29, 1945 and the adoption of the present constitution. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia had still another "recommendation" of the Big Three at Yalta to fulfill. Besides urging the formation of a new Yugoslav government, the joint communiqué of the Crimean Conference further declared the following with respect to Yugoslavia:

> (1) The anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) should be extended to include members of the last Jugoslav Parliament (*Skupščhina*) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and,

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(2) Legislative acts passed by the anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a constituent assembly.[13]

One may presume that the intent of this proposal was to democratize AVNOJ by increasing the number and validity of its representatives. An investigation of the proposal, however, leads to the conclusion that its authors were badly advised. To begin with, the Stojadinović *Skupština* of 1939 was elected under the notorious electoral laws of 1931 and 1933 passed during the personal dictatorship of the late King Alexander I. These laws were so framed and weighted that government candidates with only fifteen votes sometimes succeeded in defeating opposition candidates who received as many as twelve thousand votes. The law of 1931, for example, gave the party winning only a relative majority two thirds of the seats in parliament, and then allowed that same party to take a proportional share of the remaining third! Besides, the elections were carried out with more than the usual amount of Balkan terrorism and corruption under the régime of Axis-courting Milan Stojadinović. The resulting parliament was, therefore, so unrepresentative of the country at large that Stojadinović's successor, Dragiša Cvetković, was forced to dissolve it at Maček's request of August 26, 1939. From that time until the fall of Yugoslavia in April 1941, there was no parliament at all. The impossibility of following the Yalta stipulations to the letter resulted in a compromise.

On August 7, 1945, twenty months after the second session of AVNOJ at Jajce and three months following the end of the war, the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation met in Belgrade for its third plenary session. One of its first acts was unanimously to adopt the proposal of the council of ministers to enlarge AVNOJ by the coöptation of additional members. The result of two months of investigation and negotiation with the leaders of various parties, this proposal recommended that AVNOJ coöpt thirty-nine members of the 1938 parliament. As this number constituted only one tenth of that parliament,

[13] Joint Communiqué on Crimea Conference, February 12, 1945.

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the proposal further offered the names of sixty-nine representatives of six political parties with six additional seats held in reserve for future appointments. In addition to the above groups, a third category of thirteen individuals with some distinction in public life was added, thus making a total of 121 additions to AVNOJ with six seats held in reserve. Presumably none of these additional members was Communist, although some were Partisans. Though the letter of the Yalta recommendation was not fulfilled, an impressive gesture had been made by AVNOJ which only served as a further testimonial of its strength.

On August 9, the third day of the third session of AVNOJ, a Presidium consisting of a president, six vice-presidents (one for each of the federal units), two secretaries and sixty-nine members was elected in accord with an already established pattern. On the following day the representatives of AVNOJ unanimously adopted the resolution of their president that the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation be henceforth known as the National Provisional Parliament.

III

Until its adjournment on August 26, 1945, the National Provisional Parliament passed a series of laws the most important of which, with regard to the development of the organization of the central government, were the following: the Law on Electoral Lists, August 10; the Law on the Constituent Assembly, August 21; and the Law on the Election of People's Representatives, August 22. Not only did this triad of laws provide for the election and organization of the Constituent Assembly, but it thereby laid the groundwork for permanent government forms and procedures.

The Law on Electoral Lists was passed first in order to provide immediate machinery for local elections being held in various places throughout the country. The immediate purpose of the law was to establish an official register of citizens eligible to vote or to be elected to the Constituent Assembly or to other national and local agencies of the government.

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Among the innovations which this law introduced in Yugoslav practice were woman suffrage, universal active and passive electoral rights for all citizens over eighteen years of age, the participation of the army as the " armed people " in all elections, and the eligibility of minors of any age to vote if they had been soldiers in the National Liberation Army or Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, eight categories of those considered to have betrayed the people were deprived of electoral rights. Thus, although the law disfranchised 253,108 persons or 3.06 per cent of the electorate, it more than doubled the number of voters by enfranchising women, citizens between eighteen and twenty-one years, and certain minors.[14]

The Law on the Constituent Assembly passed on August 21, 1945 provided for the following in its first article:

> That the peoples of new Yugoslavia might express their sovereign will regarding the basic question of form of government, they will elect at free elections, by direct and secret ballot, representatives to a Constituent Assembly, the supreme representative body of Democratic, Federal Yugoslavia. The Constituent Assembly will establish the Constitution of New Yugoslavia, laws in connection with the Constitution, and decisions on all business concluded by the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia and its Presidium or the National Provisional Parliament of Democratic, Federal Yugoslavia.[15]

It was generally assumed when the Law on the Constituent Assembly was passed that the forms established for that body would became a permanent feature of the People's Assembly which it was to establish.

The Law on the Election of People's Representatives passed on the following day was a complex and detailed statute which specified the procedure for the election of representatives to the Constituent Assembly.[16] The first article of this law guar-

[14] *Borba*, Organ of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, October 11, 1945, p. 1, Official statistics of the Federal Electoral Commission.

[15] *Službeni List* (*Official Gazette*), No. 594, August 24, 1945.

[16] *Ibid.*, No. 595.

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anteed free, universal, equal and direct electoral rights and the secret ballot. In general, electoral districts were to coincide with administrative districts whenever possible. The law also provided for federal, regional, district, county and municipal electoral commissions, each under the supervision of the next higher body. As for election tickets, the law stipulated that any group, political or otherwise, of one hundred citizens could submit a federal list of candidates within ten days of the election decrees. For local tickets in district elections, one hundred and fifty citizens were required to present a list; at least twenty of this number had to represent half of the electoral wards within that district. Candidates for the Assembly of Nationalities could be nominated only within the federal unit in which they resided. Tickets were differentiated by the names of "bearers of lists" whose names appeared first.

The election procedure perpetuated the primitive system of ballots in the form of rubber balls which have been traditional in east European countries such as Yugoslavia, where the rate of illiteracy is high. Sealed wooden boxes were provided for each ticket for both houses of the Constituent Assembly. Each voter was required to present himself at the polls before the local electoral commission, state his name, profession and residence, and identify himself as an eligible voter. Upon verifying his eligibility, the president of the local commission then explained the procedure for voting and gave the voter a ball for each house of the Constituent Assembly. Taking a ball at a time, the voter then inserted his right hand into each of several boxes and silently dropped the ball into the box of his choice so as to safeguard the secrecy of his choice.[17] In the case of illiterates, a member of the electoral commission was required to read the designations and names of candidates on each box upon request. The law forbade political agitation on voting premises. In general, the Law on the Election of People's Representatives for the Constituent Assembly promised

[17] Ostensibly because of the scarcity of materials, wooden balls and plain, unlined wooden boxes were used in many polls, thus making silence difficult. On the other hand, not a few voters chose to disregard secrecy by demonstratively inserting their hand in only the government box.

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in theory, at least, elections which could be expected to show the true will of the people. In practice, however, several important considerations militated against this expectation.

Although not capable of measurement, the psychological make-up of the Yugoslav people could be considered the principal hindrance to fair elections. A tradition of corrupt elections held under duress during the monarchy, coupled with a profound fear of the new régime's secret police, convinced most citizens that the coming elections would differ little from previous ones. The highly threatening tone of many campaign speeches of the government's Popular Front, slogans such as "Ballots for Tito, Bullets for Grol" (leader of the Democratic party), and the unmistakable impression that all who voted against the government would be considered traitors only helped to create an atmosphere of widespread fear. To this was added a powerful undercurrent of fatalism and defeatism engendered by extreme war-weariness, disappointment in the western allies, and almost complete dependence on the existing government for a livelihood, thanks largely to UNRRA. A general respect for the exploits of the National Liberation Army and the impression that the Tito government was being supported by the Soviet Union involved a traditional admiration for heroism and solidarity with Mother Russia in some quarters. Finally, a hidden but very real fear of a bloody civil war of retribution, particularly between the Serbs and the Croats, inspired many to vote for the Popular Front which supported a vigorous policy of reconciliation between these two Yugoslav peoples.

Probably the most material obstacle to an election which would truly demonstrate the general will was the abstinence of the opposition parties from the electoral contest. The pitiful disunity of these parties was manifested by their inability to agree on the most essential points of a common program and electoral ticket in the eleventh hour, though their leaders must have been aware that their disunity would lead to liquidation. The realization of opposition leaders that they could not hope to defeat the Popular Front under prevailing conditions and

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their hope that their abstinence from the elections would invalidate the results and thus justify foreign intervention appear to have inspired their decision not to participate. Such incidents as the ban on both opposition newspapers—*Demokratija* in Belgrade, and *Narodni Glas* in Zagreb—during the first week of the election month of November only served to confirm the opposition's fears. Following the resignation on August 18 of Vice-Premier Milan Grol from the cabinet, Communist-instigated attacks on the leader of the Democratic party reached such a high pitch that many of his followers were intimidated and molested. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Ivan Šubašić, ranking member of the Croatian Peasant party in the government, had been held incommunicado since September 10, 1945, officially for reasons of health. Thus the leader of the most powerful opposition group in Yugoslavia was completely prevented from directing his opposition for a good part of the pre-election period. There is no doubt that Dr. Šubašić was a sick man, though the extent of his illness is questionable; what appeared strange, however, was the extreme zeal with which the government guarded him from any visitors for some time. Finally on September 20, 1945, the opposition parties of Serbia issued a communiqué declaring the abstinence of the Democrats, Radicals and Agrarians from the elections. The decision of the powerful Croatian Peasant party to abstain was accompanied by the resignation on October 8 of both ranking leaders of that party in the cabinet, Dr. Ivan Šubašić and Dr. Juraj Šutej.

Meanwhile, preparations for the coming elections were being carried out by the government and the Popular Front. At its meeting of September 11 the Federal Electoral Commission formally confirmed the ticket of the Popular Front of Yugoslavia headed by Marshal Tito and signed by nearly all the members of the cabinet, the central committee of the Anti-Fascist Women (AFŽ) and the United Alliance of Anti-Fascist Youth of Yugoslavia (USAOJ), officials of the National Provisional Parliament, the Public Prosecutor, the General Staff of the Army, and three more newspaper columns of names representing corresponding organizations in all the federal units. Of

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great significance is the fact that the list of candidates bore no separate party designations. All Popular Front candidates ran, not as the representatives of their own parties or groups within the Front, but in the name of the Popular Front itself. This procedure naturally precluded the possibility of testing the real strength of the various parties within the Front at the polls and generally favored the Communists. On the following day Marshal Tito delivered a campaign speech over Radio Belgrade in which he summarized the achievements of the National Liberation Movement and excoriated the opposition as traitors who sought to create a crisis in Yugoslavia through foreign intervention.[18]

Countering the opposition's attempt to invalidate the elections by their abstinence, Vice-Premier Edvard Kardelj proposed on October 26 that a special ballot box be established at all polls to register the choice of voters who did not care to cast their ballot for the Popular Front ticket. This was an effective reply to any attempt to discredit the elections through boycott. This motion was unanimously carried by the National Provisional Parliament as an amendment to the Law on the Election of People's Representatives to the Constituent Assembly.[19] This box became popularly known as "the widow" since it belonged to no party.

Following a vigorous Popular Front campaign in which a spirit of competition was conspicuously lacking, the national elections were held on November 11, 1945 in exemplary order despite the holiday mood which prevailed throughout the country. To the Western observer, the sight of whole columns of voters and even regiments of soldiers being marched to the polls amid flag-waving and cheering was startling. As conspicuous as the enthusiasm was, it was by no means universal. Of special interest was the zeal with which citizens were reminded in a variety of ways, including door-to-door canvassing, of their duty to vote. Even invalids were transported to the polls, while veiled Moslem women left the seclusion of their

[18] *Borba*, September 12, 1945, p. 2.

[19] *Politika*, Belgrade, October 27, 1945, p. 2.

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homes to vote for the first time in Yugoslav history. Not many dared to abstain from voting.

Immediately following the elections, the press began to report partial returns district for district. For some unstated reason, however, this practice was suddenly discontinued. Not until November 24, thirteen days after the elections, were the final results tabulated. According to the official bulletin of the Federal Electoral Commission published in the daily press of that day, of the total number of 8,383,455 registered voters, 7,413,214 voters or 88.43 per cent participated in the elections. Of the total ballots cast, the Popular Front received 88.69 per cent in the elections for the Assembly of Nationalities and 90.48 per cent in the elections for the Federal Assembly. It must be pointed out that no opposition members were present at the counting of votes. Supporters of the new Yugoslavia hailed the results as a victory for the forces of popular democracy. More sober observers only found in these legally correct elections another indication that constitutionalism is not in itself a guaranty of free expression.

IV

The newly elected Constituent Assembly convened in Belgrade on November 29, 1945, exactly two years after the historic second session of AVNOJ in Jajce, to vote by acclamation for the proclamation of a republic. The declaration, which enumerated the past wrongs of the monarchy and which condemned King Peter for his support of collaborationists during the war, ended as follows:

> I. Democratic Federal Yugoslavia is proclaimed a people's republic under the name of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.
>
> The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's state republican in form, a community of equal peoples who have freely expressed their will to remain united within Yugoslavia.
>
> II. With this resolution the monarchy in Yugoslavia is finally disestablished in the name of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, while Peter II Karadjordjević with the whole Karadjordje dynasty is divested of all rights appertaining to him and the Karadjordje dynasty.[20]

[20] *Politika*, November 30, 1945, p. 1.

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The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was now the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (*Federativna narodna republika Jugoslavije*).

A second joint session of the Constituent Assembly reconvened on the morning of December 1 to reject the formal resignation of Marshal Tito's provisional government and to authorize its continued existence with a vote of confidence. The Assembly then approved the work of the Presidium since the second session of AVNOJ held in Jajce on November 29, 1943. Finally a Law on the Presidium of the Constituent Assembly was passed and officers were elected. As before, the newly elected Presidium was headed by Dr. Ivan Ribar, six vice-presidents represented the federal units, and twenty-five members were elected including Marshal Tito.

On December 2, 1945 a discussion of a new constitution began with a report by Edvard Kardelj, Minister for the Constituent Assembly and Vice-Premier, on a proposed draft which had been accepted in principle by the council of ministers. In his report Vice-Premier Kardelj explained the principles underlying the draft as follows:

> First, the whole draft has been worked out on the assumption that a constitution is not and should not be a program and a declaration, nor a prophecy of what should be or shall be in the future. A constitution is basically a legal record of the social, economic and political actualities within a state. . . .[21]
>
> Second, none can deny that fundamental changes have occurred within our state organism in the relations among our peoples . . . . Thus the draft of the constitution legally confirms the new state as a voluntary community of equal peoples in which the nationalities question has been completely solved on the basis of the free self-determination of our peoples. . . .
>
> Third, in the draft are to be found legally expressed fundamental principles of economic and social life. In this our constitutional draft differs from the majority of existing constitutions which generally deal only with the political and legal order. . . .
>
> Fourth, the relationship between people and government in new Yugoslavia has so changed that there is no longer conflict between them, but political and organizational unity. . . .

[21] *Cf.* Stalin's report of November 25, 1936 before the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets on the draft of the 1936 Soviet Constitution.

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> Fifth, the basic principle of state organization is the principle of unity of government. . . .This unified government is made possible by the realization of an economic and political alliance among the basic popular masses—the workers, peasants, progressive intelligentsia and working middle-class—in the life of the people of new Yugoslavia. . . .
>
> Sixth, our constitutional draft is distinguished by a series of new and significant institutions . . . the republican form of government . . . the separation of church and state . . . basic civil rights, not only individual and political, but social and cultural . . . all organs of state authority are to be subordinate to the constitution and the law . . . courts are elective. . . .
>
> Seventh, finally, a vital characteristic of the draft of the constitution of the FPRY is the assured right and freedom for the constitutions of our people's republics to work out their own organization within the framework of their own sovereignty and jurisdiction, to suit the special conditions of individual peoples and people's republics.[22]

On December 6 both chambers of the Constituent Assembly elected constitutional committees which, four days later, began a study of the proposed draft. Meanwhile, literally the entire population of Yugoslavia was likewise engaged in a discussion of the constitution reminiscent of the popular campaign which swept the Soviet Union when the Stalin Constitution was adopted in 1936. Public meetings, political lectures, editorials and radio talks by members of the government inspired thousands of Yugoslav citizens to submit their approval or criticism of the draft. On December 13 the constitutional committee approved the draft in principle and took up the task of emendation on January 2. In mid-January the Constituent Assembly as a whole began a discussion of the draft which resulted in a unanimous vote of approval in principle on January 24. Five days later the discussion on details came to a close, and on January 30 a joint session of both houses of the Constituent Assembly resolved "that the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, enacted by the Federal Assembly and the Assembly of Nationalities, be promulgated and proclaimed

[22] *Politika*, December 3, 1945, p. 1.

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to the peoples and citizens of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." [23]

The Constituent Assembly thereupon approved a motion to transform itself into the People's Assembly of the FPRY. The first extraordinary session accepted the resignation of Marshal Tito's government, a necessary formality, and entrusted him with the formation of a new cabinet. The following day Marshal Tito proposed a new council of ministers of twenty-one men of whom one more than half were Communists while the remaining ten, nearly all obedient fellow travelers, owed nominal allegiance to six various parties. On February 2 the People's Assembly named Marshal Tito commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav Army. Finally both the Federal Council and the Council of Nationalities elected their own committees on legislation, economic planning and finance, credentials and immunities, administration, and petitions and appeals.

The Yugoslavs were now to live under their third constitution since the First World War. For the Serbian part of the population, the relative majority, it was their tenth constitution in 111 years. Few Yugoslavs felt that the new constitution would outlast the ten-year average set by tradition. While the opponents of the new régime prayed for deliverance by the West, even if in the form of a third world war, the Communist rulers of Yugoslavia were already planning their next gigantic strike forward to the " higher democracy of the Soviet Union."

V

The framers of the present Yugoslav constitution regard it as a record of three basic revolutionary achievements of the struggle for national liberation: the republic, the federation, and popular sovereignty. It is these changes which they seek to perpetuate by insisting on the use of the full official title of their new state—the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The first article of the new constitution proclaims: " The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's state, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights

[23] *Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia*, Embassy of the FPRY, Washington, D. C., 1946, p. 3.

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who, on the basis of the right to self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state."

There can be no doubt, of course, that Yugoslavia is no longer a monarchy. How much of a republic it is, however, is a doubtful matter for many Yugoslavs used to the ways of monarchy as well as for many Westerners who find little in Yugoslav republicanism to remind them of their own. Tito is more glorified than any Yugoslav ruler before him. The magnificence of his receptions in the White Palace, the luxurious home of the exiled Prince Paul, the extravagance of Tito's gaudy wardrobe, and the cult of the little father (*Stari*, literally "the old man") built about him quite successfully compete with the royal trappings of the Karadjordje dynasty. Of course, this cult of the glorified leader is in itself but an indication of more fundamental limitations on Yugoslav republicanism.

The present constitution of Yugoslavia places considerable stress on "the people" as the ultimate repository of all power. Although this proposition is a highly questionable one, and perhaps for that very reason, the rulers of Yugoslavia constantly exert themselves to show that their government enjoys mass approval and participation. The word "people" has become a magic formula used by the new régime to buttress its every act. Those who oppose the government soon find themselves in the most uncomfortable position of "enemies of the people" and are treated according to the slogan "No freedom for the enemies of freedom". Not content with formulating the sovereignty of the people in its political abstract sense, the new régime has encouraged elaborate and amazingly frequent mass "conferences", congresses, "manifestations" and "demonstrations" in support of its policies. When Tito returns from Moscow after having signed a treaty of amity and collaboration, thousands of Yugoslavs are to be found at the railroad station welcoming his return. If a law against economic sabotage and speculation is passed, mobs of "patriotic citizens" pillage the shops of unfortunate suspects. Whenever an opposi-

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tion newspaper appeared on the newstands, "spontaneous" groups of irate citizens were soon on the spot to make bonfires of the issue. Since the November 1945 elections, no real opposition paper has appeared. The number of Yugoslavs elected or appointed as local committee members, "street secretaries", trade-union delegates, deputies of the Public Prosecutor, lay judges, and so on, defies calculation. It is this myth of popular genesis and mass participation which the present constitution establishes in the following article:

> Article 6. All authority in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia derives from the people and belongs to the people. The people exercise their authority through freely elected representative organs of state authority, the people's committees, which, from local people's committees up to the assemblies of the people's republics and the People's Assembly of the FPRY, originated and developed during the struggle for national liberation against Fascism and reaction, and are the fundamental achievements of that struggle.

To what extent the above provisions are observed in practice has been partially seen in the manner in which the elections for the Constituent Assembly were conducted.

Finally, the third achievement of the struggle for national liberation, the federation of six republics, must also undergo critical analysis. Although the problems of Yugoslav federalism cannot be dealt with in greater detail here, it is sufficient to point out that the six republics of Yugoslavia are, in all matters of consequence, under the complete control of the omnipotent central government. The government in Belgrade is exercising its powers in such a manner as to make political local autonomy practically meaningless in Yugoslavia.

The highest legislative authority in Yugoslavia is vested by the constitution in the People's Assembly (*Narodna skupština*) which consists of the Federal Council (*Savezno veće*) and the Council of Nationalities (*Veće naroda*). Representatives to the Federal Council are elected at a ratio of one representative for each fifty thousand inhabitants. If the last Yugoslav census, that of 1931, be used, as it was for the elections to the

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Constituent Assembly, this would give the Federal Council about 275 representatives for somewhat less than a population of fourteen millions. As the Federal Assembly of the Constituent Assembly, which transformed itself into the present Federal Council, had 348 members elected at a ratio of one representative for every forty thousand inhabitants according to the 1931 census, the constitutional ratio will not go into effect until a new People's Assembly is elected.

It is in the Council of Nationalities that the principle of federation is observed by apportioning to each of the six republics—Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro — thirty representatives. The autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous region of Kosovo-Metohija, both a part of the Serbian republic, send twenty and fifteen representatives respectively. Thus the Council of Nationalities includes 215 representatives. Both houses are elected for four years. They sit separately and enjoy equal rights, no distinction being made, for example, as to the right to initiate or to consider certain kinds of bills. Joint sessions are held on special state occasions or to fulfill certain constitutional functions such as the election of a Presidium or the adoption of an amendment to the constitution. Although extraordinary sessions may be convened whenever the Presidium, one of the republics, or one third of either chamber requests it, the People's Assembly meets regularly only on April 15 and on October 15 of each year. The main work of the People's Assembly at these times is to review the work of the Presidium and the cabinet as well as to approve a new budget. A study of the work of the People's Assembly thus far indicates an ever-growing degree of unanimity on even the most vital questions of policy as presented by the Presidium or the cabinet for its approval. This unanimity is all the more remarkable inasmuch as it involves nearly five hundred individual minds. Because the People's Assembly meets so rarely and for only short sessions, and as it has demonstrated that its main rôle is that of a rubber stamp, one must look elsewhere for the real source of political power in the new Yugoslavia.

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Of far greater importance as a lawmaking body is the Presidium of the People's Assembly. The constitution specifies that, with each change of the People's Assembly, a joint session of the two councils must elect a Presidium from among its own members. This Presidium includes a president, six vice-presidents (traditionally one for each of the republics), a secretary and not more than thirty members. This Presidium is, in effect, the collegiate ruler of Yugoslavia, and its president, Dr. Ivan Ribar, is considered the president of the country. His functions, however, are practically limited to presiding at meetings and conferring decorations. His unimportance in the present Yugoslav scheme is indicated by the fact that he is not even a Communist although a veteran Partisan. Though the Presidium ostensibly includes all the various political groups represented in the Assembly, such as there are, there is no doubt that it is controlled by the Communist party, most of whose ranking leaders, including Tito, are members of the Presidium. In general, the Presidium is invested with the powers and functions of the People's Assembly while that body is not in session. It may appoint or relieve members of the cabinet, thus asserting the supreme sovereignty of the People's Assembly over all the other branches of the government. Of great interest is the Presidium's monopoly over the right of judicial review which, according to American practice, would belong to the Supreme Court. In Yugoslavia, however, as in most European countries, only the supreme legislative body can theoretically declare its own laws unconstitutional. The Presidium of the FPRY also reviews the constitutions of the six constituent republics and issues binding interpretations of federal laws. Above all, the Presidium necessarily issues the main bulk of legislation, subject to the approval of the People's Assembly. As this approval is almost certain, it may be asserted that the Presidium is the actual lawmaking body of Yugoslavia. It is by no means the only federal lawmaking organ in the central government. Even here it must share its prerogatives with the most powerful government organ in the country—the cabinet.

The highest executive and administrative body in Yugoslavia is the cabinet or the council of ministers, officially known as

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the "government" (*vlada*). Consisting of a premier, two vice-premiers and about twenty ministers, the cabinet is appointed or dismissed by the Presidium. When the People's Assembly is not in session, the cabinet is responsible for its work to the Presidium. The constitution grants such vast powers to the cabinet that there are hardly any functions which it may not assume. Its federal ministries—those concerned with foreign affairs, national defense, communications, shipping, posts, and foreign trade—directly control these activities throughout the country. Its federal-republican ministries—those dealing with finance, the interior, justice, industry, mines, commerce and supplies, agriculture and forestry, labor, and public works — control these phases of activity indirectly through the corresponding ministries of the six republics. Through such agencies as the Federal Planning Commission, the Federal Control Commission, and committees on education, religious affairs, social welfare, culture and art, and similar agencies, the cabinet wields complete control over the entire life of the country. As the executive branch of the government, the cabinet is charged with enforcing the legislation of the People's Assembly or its Presidium. Of great significance is the fact that, besides being able to initiate legislation in the People's Assembly, it also issues a great deal of legislation of its own in the form of ordinances and decrees. Although this legislation is theoretically subject to the final approval of the People's Assembly, practice shows that this provision offers no real limitation on the power of the cabinet.

While the constitution stipulates that the cabinet shall be responsible to the Presidium, this apparent check on the executive is nullified in actual practice by the existence of an "interlocking directorate" in all branches of the government. The principal fact of Yugoslav political life is that a Communist party, relatively small in numbers but extremely powerful, dominates the entire government through the strategic placement of its personnel. The preponderance of Communists and fellow travelers in the People's Assembly assures Communist power in both the Presidium and the cabinet. The present

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cabinet, for example, includes some six parties beside the Communist. Yet many of these parties are hardly more than nominal entities or rump groups. The docility or impotence of the disunited non-Communists in the cabinet sharply contrasts with the numerical and political superiority of the Communist members. But the Communist party is evidently not content with numerical superiority. A tradition of extreme discipline and cohesion in the party has given rise to the skillful establishment of an interlocking directorate which binds all the branches of the government under the direct control of the Yugoslav Communist party. For example, Josip Broz-Tito is not only premier of Yugoslavia but minister of national defense, commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav Army, Marshal of Yugoslavia, representative to the People's Assembly, member of the Presidium, as well as the head of the Popular Front of Yugoslavia and chief of the Communist party. His Communist comrades are similarly distributed in proportionally subordinate positions in all of these and other organizations. Thus, in a country so completely dominated by a single party, a Communist-controlled cabinet can hardly expect, nor does it receive, any opposition from a Communist-dominated Presidium elected by a Communist-dominated People's Assembly consisting of representatives of a Communist-dominated Popular Front. There is little doubt that the cabinet's real power is derived not so much from the constitution as from the strength of the Communist party. Thus it is the cabinet, headed by Tito, which governs Yugoslavia, and it is the Politburo of the Yugoslav Communist party, again headed by Tito, which rules the cabinet as well as all the other branches of the government.

Few organizations illustrate the complete centralism of the Yugoslav government as the Federal Planning Commission and the Federal Control Commission. Through these two agencies the cabinet is able to direct and to control the entire life of the country. A further source of control by the central government is the office of Public Prosecutor (*Javni tužilac*), borrowed from the Soviet Union, whose network of agents constitutes "the eyes and ears of the people". Still another weapon of

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centralism is the Supreme Court which is appointed by a joint meeting of the People's Assembly to review all lower court decisions, for the purpose of ascertaining their conformity with federal law. It does not, however, have the right to declare federal laws unconstitutional. Thus a system of " checks and balances " in the American sense does not operate in Yugoslavia, where the watchers watch themselves.

VI

It is apparent from this brief survey of the central government in the new Yugoslavia that its origins and development are not so much the result of improvisation as of planning. The debt of the leaders of the Yugoslav revolution to the leaders of the Russian revolution is indisputable. If the Yugoslav leaders were able to establish a full-fledged government in a remarkably short time, it is because they had the Soviet government as a model. In matters of administration the present Yugoslav constitution is but a paraphrase of the Stalin Constitution of 1936. It may be maintained that, were it necessary, Yugoslavia could today become a part of the Soviet Union administratively without any but the most minor changes in its government. The People's Assembly of the FPRY corresponds in both theoretical importance and practical insignificance to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Yugoslav Federal Council and Council of Nationalities are but smaller counterparts of the Soviet Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities. The Presidium is a complete innovation in Yugoslavia whose Soviet origin is unmistakable. President Ribar is much the same type of façade that the late Soviet President Kalinin was. The unquestionable supremacy of the cabinet and its complete domination by the Politburo of the Communist party are common to both Tito's Yugoslavia and Stalin's Soviet Union. Even the division of the ministries into federal and federal-republican is an imitation of Soviet practice. The Federal Planning Commission, the Federal Control Commission, and the Public Prosecutor are also innovations in Yugoslav administration which hail directly from Moscow.

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Yugoslav imitation of the Soviet Union does not, however, confine itself to administration. The similarities of the two governments in more basic considerations are even more striking. There can be no doubt that the fundamental principles which underlie the existing order in Yugoslavia are Marxist in their Soviet interpretation. This observation naturally provokes the question: Why is not Yugoslavia a "soviet democracy" instead of just a "people's democracy"? Perhaps the answer is to be found in the word *tempo*. A great lesson taught by the Russian Revolution is that haste is costly. Yugoslav Communists have by no means demonstrated any reluctance to use brute force whenever essential plans called for it. They evidently realize, however, that some processes cannot be hurried. This refers not only to the tedious physical reconstruction of a war-torn country, but to the political education of a bewildered and apathetic peasant people. The Communists of Yugoslavia can now afford literally to take their own time in this task, for their control of the country is indisputable. Thus, for example, they can even share their power to an unimportant degree with certain select political parties. In fact, it is to their advantage to divide the allegiance of the opposition by keeping alive insignificant parties while liquidating the important historic parties. Considerations of foreign policy also make such a move desirable for the moment. Current indications suggest, however, that, as the government becomes increasingly entrenched, it will dispense with this strategy.

Perhaps the decisive reason for not instituting Soviet democracy in Yugoslavia immediately is economic. Marxist doctrine makes political democracy dependent on economic democracy. As there are still classes in Yugoslavia, and as the constitution recognizes the right of private property, the state does not yet exert complete control over all sectors of its economy. In a country eighty per cent of which consists of traditionally landowning peasants, the present régime cannot yet afford to undertake collectivization at one stroke. At present the peasantry is politically inert, being almost exclusively concerned with making a living off its own land. Suddenly to dispossess this class

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of proprietors would court almost certain violent opposition. A more gradual process, however, requires a special form of transitional government which approximates the Soviet government in every way except the abolition of classes. How much the new Yugoslav régime will continue to pattern itself on the Soviet model and how much it will seek to adapt its techniques to those circumstances peculiar to Yugoslavia remain to be seen.

Michael Boro Petrovich

New York City

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HOW BAD IS CONGRESS?

CONGRESS is today, as it has been intermittently throughout its existence, under attack. Charges are made that the national legislative body is incapable, unrepresentative, poor in caliber, even venal. Perhaps the key point which this situation brings into focus is, simply, the efficiency of Congress. This paper is an attempt to appraise briefly the responsibility of Congress in the legislative field and then to evaluate its assumption of that responsibility in terms of its past actions.

Historically, two general theories of representative government have been discussed since the concept was formulated. Under the first, an electorate chooses its wisest men with the understanding that they will legislate for the general welfare. In the United States, however, evolution has produced a government which is representative in form but directly antithetical to this first theory. It is the American understanding that the people, as a whole, are in the long run far more trustworthy as judges of the legislation which molds their lives than can be any small group, no matter how gifted intellectually or how lofty of principle, which acts in their interest but not in direct accord, necessarily, with their wishes. In a phrase, the determinant of American legislation is public opinion.

Such, then, is the theory. Its contemporary validity must be based on the answers to two key questions: Is Congress guided in its lawmaking by the wishes of the people? Are the people satisfied with the legislation enacted in their name? If the answers are in the affirmative, the blame for legislation that is pernicious, ill-considered or selfish lies not exclusively with Congress but far more with the people whose point of view Congress reflects. If, on the other hand, it can be demonstrated

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that Congress is acting contrary to the wishes of the people or is being subverted, a fundamental failing may be said to have been found in the framework of the American republic.

For the purpose of investigating whether Congress is motivated by public opinion and acts in the light of it, no period in American history is quite so satisfactory, with reference to current problems, as that of the presidential administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. During its twelve-year span, the nation successively went through economic catastrophe, partial recovery, recession, recovery again, preparation for war and, finally, war itself. The only two "normal" phases of our society that were not experienced were those of peacemaking and full, peacetime employment.

Probably a valid objection to fixing attention on the Roosevelt administration, as a proper period for study of Congress, lies in the fact that during these twelve years many considered Congress to have played a very subordinate rôle. The answer to this criticism lies in the fact that whenever Congress subordinated itself it did so deliberately, in accordance with what it interpreted as the popular will, and that Congressional influence played a far more important part in the Roosevelt era than those who would build up the late Chief Executive as a solitary champion of the right are inclined to admit. Moreover, far outweighing any other factors in the selection of a period for consideration is the Roosevelt administration's position as the first that can be studied accurately in terms of public opinion, for it was during the first two terms of President Roosevelt that scientific surveys of public opinion achieved relative exactitude and swept away the delusions fostered by earlier methods.

It is not the purpose of the writer to attempt to analyze in detail every bill presented to Congress during the twelve years of the Roosevelt régime. Rather, various representative pieces and programs of legislation will be considered as indicative of the manner in which Congress does or does not respond to the wishes of the public. Moreover, since economic crisis, international strain and war all produce distinctive legislation, evalu-

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ation is needed of the action of Congress while working under these specific circumstances. Finally, it is necessary to consider the general run of legislation as divided into two categories: bills in which the public has an obvious interest and bills concerning which the public is uninformed.

When the Roosevelt administration began, there was no leadership in the country and, in its lack, there were no issues. The people had no specific ideas about legislation to relieve their desperate needs but, rather, knew only that the needs were desperate. In his inaugural address, the new President promised a "disciplined attack upon our common problems". Calling a special session of Congress, he requested passage of an emergency bill to handle the banking crisis. Seven hours later, his signature was on the completed act. To the millions of people whose savings had seemed lost just prior to the inauguration, needed help had been given.

With comparative speed, the Chief Executive requested and Congress passed legislation striking at many of the other problems confronting the nation. In the securities collapse which had accompanied the depression, many had seen their investments dissipated. To prevent further misconduct by financiers and issuers of stock, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933. To meet the demand for the basic requirements of life expressed by the thirteen million unemployed, Congress enacted the Emergency Relief Law of 1933, making available half a billion dollars to be used in aiding the states to cope with their relief obligations. The Unemployment Relief Act of 1933 authorized a large public works program. For the relief of the farm population, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was written into law, a measure which sought to enlarge farm buying power by adjusting prices and production. After its fashion, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 struck directly at the problems besetting business and industry and, in so doing, struck at the problems of the greater part of the American public. The needs of a particular segment of the public, organized or potentially organizable labor, were also treated in the N.I.R.A. Under the famous Section 7a, the

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requirement was made that every code covering industrial workers include clauses granting them the right to organize and bargain collectively, to designate their own representatives and to be free from management interference in the selection of agents.

Credit, for the homeowners and farmers whose mortgages were threatened with foreclosure, was made available under the terms of the acts which established the Home Owners Loan Corporation and authorized federal land banks to purchase farm mortgages. Finally, security was afforded depositors in the nation's banks by the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, an agency which, as its title indicates, guaranteed all deposits in banks subscribing to its plan, up to a maximum of $5,000.

Such, in terse outline, was the legislative program which Congress passed during the early months of the New Deal. The people had asked for leadership and the leadership had asked for empowering legislation. Appreciating the temper of the public, Congress rushed through emergency bills with such speed that detractors referred to it as "the rubber stamp on Capitol Hill". But there was little opposition to the legislation itself. The people were in a mood to experiment; and Congress furnished the means. Later, some of those measures came under severe criticism. But, for the moment, acting in a period of economic crisis, Congress had complied with the wishes of the people.

After the New Deal came into being, as might have been anticipated, the legislative pace slowed down. The emergency needs of the people were gratified, and, accordingly, to test the reaction of Congress to public opinion, attention must now be directed to the development of individual pieces of legislation in varied fields. Each year, Congress considers a number of bills of which most people have at least a hazy knowledge—bills alike in that action on them affects virtually every person in the country. When the legislature debates this type of measure, the spotlight is on Capitol Hill. Aware of the attention focused on its actions, does Congress act in accordance with the desire of the public, in response to the demands of

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pressure groups, or in no categorizable fashion? In an attempt to answer this question, a few items of what might be termed "spotlight legislation" will now be considered.

From 1934 until the looming war drove all other thoughts from their minds, the American people consistently reported to the Gallup Poll that their chief interests were the interrelated problems of unemployment and government expenditures. As previously noted, the Roosevelt administration, with Congressional sanction, early launched an attack on unemployment with two weapons: direct relief and job development. In January 1934, Congress authorized $3,000,000,000 for relief and public works. A poll taken in February showed that 46 per cent of the people felt that government expenditures for relief were "about right", 17 per cent found them "too little" and 37 per cent thought them excessive. By October 1935, the sentiment had definitely switched. Having virtually finished spending a record $4,800,000,000, President Roosevelt announced that the federal government would have to reduce relief expenditures as swiftly as humanely possible. That the people backed him up is shown by the poll of that date which had 60 per cent convinced that expenditures were "too great", 30 per cent believing them to be "about right" and only 9 per cent holding out for even greater outlays.

From 1933 to 1939, the public demand for economy in government grew almost regularly, but Congress found difficulty in keeping up with it. Gradually, the sums appropriated declined, but in April 1937 a Gallup Poll still found 56 per cent of the people favoring further cuts in relief expenditures despite the fact that the sums appropriated in that year were the lowest since the inception of the program. The reasons for Congressional reluctance were threefold. First, the President, then at the zenith of his personal popularity, regularly requested large appropriations, declaring that the country was far from recovered from its economic setback. Second, many Congressmen realized that in appropriating money for relief they were voting in accordance with an economic philosophy with which much of the country was unfamiliar. They were benefiting the people who received the money, and, perhaps

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even more important, the entire national economy through which the money filtered. And, finally, most members of Congress realized that so far as the people were concerned economies were things to be inflicted on the fellow next door.

The old saw that the national legislature will never raise taxes or lower expenditures, then, has a certain validity, but from 1934 to 1939 the President ran into increasing difficulty in Congress in securing passage of his appropriations—Congress attempting to navigate a course between the puplic's demand for economies and its strong support of the President—while it generally went along with him on raising taxes.

The Revenue Acts of 1935 and 1936 were not altogether what the President asked for in terms of either economic philosophy or money-raising, while the Act of 1938 was viewed so unfavorably by Roosevelt that he allowed it to become law without his signature and criticized its provisions severely. All three bills, however, were far ahead of any earlier legislation. Congress was attempting to tax in accordance with the desires of the people for stiffer legislation as expressed in the Gallup Poll of 1934 which showed 74 per cent favoring upward revision. But Congress also had to consider, throughout the period, the unfamiliarity of the general public with the provisions of the Revenue Acts.

Perhaps the best illustration of the national lack of information on revenue legislation is that of a Gallup Poll of March 1939. Taking the case of a married man with two children, earning $5,000 annually, the Poll found that the public believed him to be paying a $100 tax, and thought that he should pay $150, while actually he paid $90. At the $10,000 level, the public thought he paid $400, and wanted him to pay $500, while his actual tax was $590. Of a man in the $100,000 class, the people both thought he paid and believed he should pay $9,000, while the government, under the terms of the 1938 Revenue Act, thought in terms of a check for $40,000. Moreover, the public did not believe, by a 64-36 per cent count, that a single man earning $2,500 annually should pay any tax. Congress, in its legislation, apparently took the only action

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commensurate with the need for revenue and the opinion of the public. The rich were soaked a little more than the public expected and the vaster numbers of the poor left alone in accordance with the wishes of the great majority.

Thus, in examining the expenditure and revenue programs adopted by Congress during the peaceful years of the Roosevelt administration, the conclusion can fairly be drawn that Congress did a rather good job of reflecting public opinion in its legislation. Expenditures were somewhat more than the people claimed to want, but, as the needs of the times permitted, the halter was put on. Taxes were distributed a bit differently from the manner which the public deemed equitable, but the disparity was the obvious result of public ignorance of the minimal requirements. The line was hewn by Congress somewhere between the general outcry for a " balanced budget "—which persisted throughout the period—and the public concept of suitable taxes, the end result being that most frequently experienced, under our form of government, a compromise acceptable to the great majority.

Security was the need of the times and the demand of the people. Dr. Francis E. Townsend stumped the country on behalf of his Plan, which would give $200 monthly to each person over 60 years of age. While he never succeeded in convincing many people, other than the hundreds of thousands of potentially direct beneficiaries who paid his expenses, of the necessity of such large pensions, Townsend and adherents of credos similar to his managed to make old-age pensions a national issue. Polling the nation in January 1935, the Gallup Institute found 73 per cent of the people in favor of the principle of old-age pensions. Well aware of this feeling, Congress wrote into law the Social Security Act of 1935 which provided for a rather broad system of unemployment and old-age insurance. In November 1936, a Gallup Poll found 68 per cent of the people in favor of the Social Security Act.

Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act came to be regarded by organized labor as its " Magna Charta ". As chairman of the Labor Board of the N.I.R.A., Senator Robert

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F. Wagner became familiar with the implications and effect of Section 7a, became, in fact, one of the nation's leading authorities on the subject. And so, when the Supreme Court, in May 1935, threw out the entire N.I.R.A., Wagner strove to write back into the law guarantees similar to those given labor under Section 7a. With little support from a skittish President, he nonetheless succeeded in getting through Congress the Labor Relations Act of 1935 which bears his name. At the time of its passage, the general public was largely unfamiliar with the Wagner Act's provisions, but, as labor unions began to use aggressively the rights guaranteed them, the public became deeply interested. During the first four years of the Act's existence, sentiment for its repeal never rose beyond 19 per cent in the public polls; but, evidently in a vague way, about half of the people believed that the Act should in some way be revised.

Wagner stuck to his guns, contending in repeated Congressional battles that a period of labor strife was not a time to enact labor law. That organized labor was staunchly behind him was unquestionable and, believing that the weight of feeling of that group was more important than the vague thoughts of the multitude, Congress did not amend the law in the period under consideration. It may be said that the maintenance of the Wagner Act on the books in unamended form for so long a time was a triumph for the labor lobby, but certainly its original passage was to a great extent a result of the desire of Congress to keep in effect that part of the original New Deal program which was directed at meeting the needs of organized labor.

Shortly after the Supreme Court, in 1935, unanimously ruled that the N.I.R.A. was unconstitutional, the Gallup Institute found only 38 per cent of the people desirous of bringing N.I.R.A back to life in some acceptable form. On first being passed, the bill was overwhelmingly popular. But after two years the people appeared relieved that the Blue Eagle had been thrown from its perch. No immediate attempt was made, in consequence, to bring back N.I.R.A. In September 1936, 56 per cent of the people wanted to leave it dead. In his annual

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address at the opening of Congress in January 1937, President Roosevelt made a small bid for reënactment of the N.I.R.A. by saying that its "broad objectives were sound. The statute of N.I.R.A. has been outlawed. The problems have not. They are still with us." And while 53 per cent of the people, in March of that year, wanted to bring the law back, Congress doubtless felt correctly that this was merely a yearning in a vacuum and that, were the legislation revived, its stringent controls would swiftly bring mass public sentiment to demand its death again. Accordingly, no resurrection was attempted.

A keystone of the New Deal emergency program enacted in 1933 was the Agricultural Adjustment Act which had as its purpose the amelioration of the lot of the farming population. In August 1935, despite the danger signal that had been flashed the New Deal by the Supreme Court decision on the N.I.R.A., Congress added new strength to the A.A.A. On January 6, 1936, however, the judicial axe was again wielded and the A.A.A. fell by a 6-3 decision. Two days later, the Gallup Poll found that the Court had gratified the wishes of 59 per cent of the public.

Despite this feeling, Congress waited only six weeks to write A.A.A. back into existence under a new name, the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. The people, unquestionably, were opposed to the A.A.A. For them the program meant the slaughter and burial of millions of hogs while millions of people were hungry. But, once again, Congress viewed this sentiment as merely academic and voted to satisfy the wishes of the farmers, who informed Gallup that they favored the legislation by better than 2 to 1.

Through the broad front of New Deal legislation, the Supreme Court cut a wide swath. Presumably, the public might have been expected to object strongly to what many termed judicial usurpation of legislative authority. In November 1935, the Gallup Institute asked the people: "As a general principle, would you favor limiting the power of the Supreme Court to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional?" Sixty-seven per cent said "No." A year later, the percentage had dropped to 59 per cent.

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President Roosevelt made no secret of his opinion of the Court's decision; but he waited until the landslide results of the 1936 elections were in to take action. On February 5, 1937, he sent a message to Congress requesting the passage of a bill which would enable him to appoint a new federal judge whenever an incumbent failed to resign or retire within six months after his seventieth birthday. If passed, the bill would have permitted the President to appoint six new justices to the Supreme Court, assuring the New Deal of Court support.

The debate precipitated by the "Court-packing bill" was the greatest of the Roosevelt administration. Perhaps influenced by the furore, the Court reversed previous decisions in April 1937 by holding the Wagner Act constitutional. In June, Justice Van Devanter announced his impending departure from the bench, and the President, for the first time since his entry into the White House, had an opportunity to appoint a Supreme Court justice, an opportunity which might reverse the Court's tendencies. A day later, the Senate Judiciary Committee, after hearings which had lasted throughout the spring of the year, reported the bill out unfavorably. And "court-packing" became a dead issue, in accord, as of June 20, with the wishes of 59 per cent of the people.

Under the N.I.R.A., codes had set wages and hours within virtually all industries. As a result, despite the death of the Act, strong sentiment still existed, in 1936, for federal regulation of these two items. Not too much was made by either Democrats or Republicans, during the campaign, of their platform wage-hour pledges, but by June 1937, with the Court fight dying down, Gallup found 59 per cent of the public favoring federal wage-hour regulation. In March 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act was written into law. Sometime after its passage, another poll found 63 per cent of the public approving the Act.

From this quick survey of "spotlight legislation", two conclusions may immediately be drawn. First, Congress overrode public opinion, usually, on labor and agricultural questions, giving to both farmers and organized workers more than the general public would have let them have. In the cases of the

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A.A.A. and the Wagner Acts, as well as others not considered, public opinion was in opposition. The public wanted no new A.A.A. and it wanted the Wagner Act amended. Yet Congress flouted these desires, enacted a new A.A.A. and left the Wagner Act alone, in the belief that the desire of the farmers for the A.A.A. and the insistence of the labor unions upon continuation of the Wagner Act in its original form were more durable and demanding than the ordinary vagaries of the public mind. Thus, Congress evidently recognizes two types of opinion, the insistent, unrelenting demand of large parts of the population, well aware of their needs and the specific legislation they desire, and the more common opinion of the average American, who has beliefs as to the desirability of legislation but is not too insistent upon their recognition.

In this connection, it must be noted that, since the time of Congress is short, allowance is made for the *intensity* of public opinion in determining which among many possible subjects to consider. Measurement of the intensity factor is difficult. Study of the period 1933-45 shows, however, that whatever two or three subjects were paramount in the public mind, as revealed to Mr. Gallup's investigators, were debated zealously in Congress. But many items on which there was a preponderance of favorable opinion, for example, the federal divorce law proposal, were ignored or deferred until such time as sufficient intensity of opinion would develop to demand their consideration.

The second, and, perhaps, eventually more important, conclusion that may be drawn from this survey of " spotlight legislation " is that when Congress concerns itself with such broad questions as taxation, expenditures, social legislation and changes in the governmental structure, it will hew closely to the line indicated for it by public opinion. On the first of these major subjects, taxation, legislation is undeniably a job for experts but, particularly in this field, Congress attempts to please the public without insisting that the public understand precisely why it is gratified. For one reason or another, the average member of Congress desires reëlection. And one of the important criteria by which he is judged is his performance on those bills which become national questions, his voting record on " spotlight legislation ".

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Despite its prominence in the press, "spotlight legislation" occupies but a portion of the Congressional calendar. Of at least equal significance, in terms of the time put in by the members of Congress, are the bills enacted to deal with the problems of comparatively small groups or interests. To Congressional activity on these questions, the general public pays little attention. Accordingly, some authorities criticize the theory of public opinion as the primary determinant of legislation, alleging that Congress frequently cannot and does not reflect public opinion, for on many issues there is nothing to reflect. But that is merely the other side of the coin. In establishing a representative government whose policies are to be set by public opinion, it must be accepted that the absence of public opinion will frequently be encountered and must, in itself, be considered a normal state.

It would be difficult to justify in terms of the public welfare much of the legislation enacted by Congress when it works in a black-out of public opinion. Lobbyists have their innings, Congressmen exchange votes to get their special measures passed, and Congress is accused of venality and worse. It is necessary to cite only such measures as the Silver Purchase Act of 1934 and the Sugar Act of 1937, in addition to the report of the Senate Committee headed by Senator Black which investigated lobbies in 1936, to confirm the point that when Congress is dealing with the problems of special groups, the general practice is to heed the urgings of those groups, with the interests of the general public considered secondarily.

At this late date, it has generally been accepted that the United States can scarcely cut itself off from the world at large and go its own, lonely way. The American policy between the wars which saw the country attempt that lonesome peregrination has been almost universally damned. The attempt must then be made to ascertain whether Congress, in legislating the signposts, was responsive to the temper of the public or merely catering to its own desires or fancied slights.

Early in 1935, the question of America's joining the World Court was still alive. Polling the nation, the Gallup Institute found the people to be against the move by a 73-27 per cent

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margin. When the Senate voted on the project, the count did not reflect the strength of public opinion arrayed against the Court; but there was never any question that the Senate would ignore it.

Later in the same year, 71 per cent of the people opposed the principle of collective action to prevent war, a sentiment which was accurately reflected by the refusal of Congress to have anything to do with the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy, then engaged in its assault on Ethiopia. Moreover, Congress enacted the Neutrality Act of 1935, which, among other provisions, directed the President, when he should find a state of war to exist, to declare an embargo on the export of arms and munitions to either belligerent.

During the Spanish civil war, Congress itself enacted an embargo on arms shipments which was apparently in keeping with the wishes of the people, 68 per cent of whom either refused to take sides in the controversy or had no opinion.

By the early months of 1939, the people of the United States were beginning to come awake to the danger that threatened. The Neutrality Act of 1935 had been rewritten in 1937 to give the President a bit more leeway and he had seen fit to treat the Sino-Japanese war as an " incident " rather than a " threat to peace ", but the European war which seemed inevitable could not be treated so lightly. Under the terms of the Act, an embargo by presidential order appeared a foregone conclusion. But 57 per cent of the people told the Gallup Institute that they would like to see the Act changed so as to permit the sale of war materials to England and France, should they fight Germany.

After the war began and the Germans had invaded Poland, 62 per cent of the people wanted neutrality to mean something other than what it had meant in 1935. Congress complied by passing the " cash and carry " Neutrality Act of 1939.

In June 1940, the first Gallup Poll on compulsory military training for one year for all men aged 20 showed only half of the country supporting such a measure. By the end of June, with Paris fallen, the support jumped to 64 per cent and in July the national ratio in favor was 2 to 1. Admittedly, Congress, in passing the Austin-Wadsworth Bill, conscripting men

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between 20 and 28, went somewhat beyond the limits of the Gallup question, but popular support of the measure, as evidenced by the press and the Congressional hearings, was overwhelming.

Congress also authorized the President to call up the National Guard for service in the emergency, an action which 85 per cent of the people approved. A few months later, after extended debate, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Bill, a measure which 58 per cent of the people backed, 20 per cent disapproved and the balance wanted to see qualified in one way or another.

Perhaps no action of Congress brought forth such head shaking on the part of the critics of the national legislature as the House's approving the extension of the draft, in August 1941, by a vote of 203 to 202. At the time, and still more in retrospect, many men wondered how the Representatives could be so blind to the imperatives of the country's safety. Yet, two days before the House vote, a Gallup Poll showed only 50 per cent of the nation in favor of the extension, a solid 45 per cent opposed and the balance undecided.

Closely allied with neutrality and other facets of American policy with reference to the world at large is the question of national defense. And in it can be found another of the paradoxes which beset legislation in a country where the electorate is so rarely familiar with the details involved in implementing its desires; for the American people rather consistently from 1935 to 1941 desired increases in their armed forces but, simultaneously, regularly rated economy in government as one of their chief objectives. In order of preference, according to Gallup, the people wanted the Air Force, the Navy and the Army increased—reflecting, of course, their desire to keep war as far away from the front doorstep as possible.

On naval appropriations, Congress went along with a nautical President, passing regularly-increasing appropriations from 1934 on, the biggest boost being recorded in the Act of 1938. In keeping with the temper of the people, Congress also raised army expenditures.

There is one black mark on the record, however, to which the critics of Congress and the men of the Army Air Forces will

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never cease drawing attention. In its special armaments legislation of the summer of 1939, Congress appropriated only enough money to build 59 planes for the A.A.F. That this was in contravention of the wishes of the public cannot be gainsaid. The only possible apology that can be entered is that Congress was again trying to reconcile interests, attempting to please both the military-minded and the economizers. In retrospect, it would be simple to point out a few places in the national budget where economy would have been more warranted and less a cause for questioning Congressional sanity.

With the exception of this one serious blunder, however, little can be found to criticize in the Congressional record on the twin subjects of neutrality and military expenditures. As sentiment changed, Congress acted upon the public's desire to take more interventionist measures; and, in spending money for expansion of the armed forces, it was regularly in step with public opinion, except for the gross underestimate of the nation's impending need for military aviation. Little comment was made on this poor guess at that time, except by professionals of the A.A.F. whom both the people and Congress were only beginning to transform from members of the despised, if necessary, warrior class to idols of the nation.

The strains and stresses of war produce in most people a demand for action analogous to that of the military. The general desire is to do everything necessary for the speedy achievement of victory and to do it in a hurry. The final type of legislation to be considered—or, rather, the final climate for legislation and its effect upon the responsiveness of Congress to public opinion—is that of war. Striving to act swiftly to meet the demands of war, does Congress cease heeding public opinion?

In the field of military expenditures, Congress, throughout the war, was completely in accord with the public. Neither the legislative body nor the people understood too well the complexity of modern warfare and its multitudinous needs. Realizing its comparative inadequacy to handle the problem in detail, Congress consistently accepted the recommendations of the executive branch concerning military appropriations,

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voting them through immediately to the accompaniment of overwhelming approval from the people.

The most significant aspect of wartime public opinion was the desire of the people to be controlled. Generally, throughout the war, civilians felt that they were not making sacrifices at home commensurate with the efforts of the troops overseas. This guilt complex was reflected in strong popular support of virtually all types of governmental control.

One month after the war began, 69 per cent of the people informed the Gallup Institute of their support of legislation fixing wages and prices. Through the course of the war, as the O.P.A. came into being and wages were somewhat frozen, popular support remained behind the enabling legislation consistently. In theory, the people wanted to go even farther. Gallup polled them on national service legislation regularly, inquiring whether the government should have the power to tell each citizen what to do as his part in the war effort. And the people regularly supported the measure, the approving vote ranging from 53 to 69 per cent. But Gallup inserted a revelatory additional question which indicated that the majority of the people never felt that there was an immediate need for such legislation. They never credited very strongly the War Manpower Commission's statements about labor shortages in critical areas and, accordingly, while they believed in the principle of total mobilization, always believed it to be something that could be put off. Evidently, while the people desired controls if controls were necessary, they were never in a masochistic mood about the subject. Considerately, Congress did nothing.

In broad terms, Congressional action during the war was characterized by a reluctance to regiment American life. Particularly was this noticeable in its handling of the labor problem. As early as April 1941, 63 per cent of the people supported a bill making striking in a defense industry a crime, punishable by a year's imprisonment. In March 1942, 86 per cent of the people wanted strikes outlawed in war industries. In June 1943, 85 per cent believed all labor unions should be required to register with the federal government and to report income and expenditures. In comparison with these measures,

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anathema to organized labor, the Smith-Connally Act of 1943 was a polite gesture at controlling labor actions which the general public regarded as outrages.

Customary Congressional obeisances were made to farming interests. In April 1942, 43 per cent of the public wanted farm benefits abolished for the duration of the war; 40 per cent thought they should be continued, with the balance undecided. Congress kept the program in effect.

Institution of a sales tax to help pay the costs of the war was constantly before Congresss and, at one point, July 1942, 58 per cent of the people favored a 2 per cent tax. Congress, however, refused to enact such a measure and had its judgment indirectly verified by a Gallup Poll of March 1943, which showed that 85 per cent of the people believed their income tax to be fair. In April 1943, when Congress was considering adoption of a pay-as-you-go tax plan, Gallup figures showed 79 per cent of the public in favor of a change from the prevailing system of lump-sum or periodic payment. The withholding tax was written into the law shortly thereafter. In March 1945, 85 per cent of the people answered in the affirmative the question: "Do you regard the amount of tax you had to pay on your 1944 income as fair?" Apparently, Congress had seen correctly that the sales tax was something America wanted but not too desperately.

In the field of international relations, one of the most important moves which Congress made during the war was its adoption of the Fulbright Resolution in 1943, committing the United States to a post-war policy of international coöperation. Seventy-eight per cent of the people favored the Resolution, 9 per cent were opposed and 13 per cent undecided. In April 1945, just prior to the opening of the San Francisco Conference, 81 per cent of the people favored the entrance of the United States into a world organization to maintain peace. The overwhelming Congressional vote to adopt the United Nations Charter reflected this sentiment.

The conclusions that can be drawn from this brief survey of Congressional action in time of war are comparatively obvious. Congress was reluctant to impose stringent controls on

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the people, believing that tempered judgment would support its stand. This gave it a poorer record than usual as a reflector of public opinion during the war, but certainly gave it a claim to consideration as a mature legislative body not overly influenced by the hysteria of the moment. The two "sacred cows" of Congress, labor and farming, maintained their sanctity despite public demand for legislation affecting them. In terms of public opinion, then, Congress kept on a comparatively even keel during the war, following the line indicated for it with a fair degree of regularity but deviating from that line occasionally in the interests of reason, the labor movement and the farm bloc. To the charge that Congress was not so responsive to public opinion during the war as customarily, many Congressmen would be inclined to answer that public opinion was not so responsible as in normal times.

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The purpose of this study has been to determine the extent to which Congress is responsive to public opinion. The over-all answer must be that Congress does a rather good job. What the people want, Congress does, with a fairly high batting average. On what was termed "spotlight legislation", the record was virtually flawless. When acting with direct bearing on special groups and interests, Congress frequently put those groups and interests ahead of the general public, acceding to their wishes at the expense of the welfare or desires of the people as a whole. And, when legislating under the emergency conditions of war, Congress generally followed the desires of the public but at times lagged behind the demands of the majority.

Five conclusions are inherent in these statements:

(1) The government of the United States is one of compromise. Theoretically, it is the objective of Congress to reconcile the interests of the varied groups composing the population and, having secured that reconciliation, to legislate into being the common desire. The legislation thus enacted will rarely be exactly what is desired by many of the groups asking legislative action, but it will be a rough approximation of the desires of the vast majority. With this theory, in the case of "spot-

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light legislation", Congress complies closely. On legislation that is in the limelight, on which its vote will be scrutinized closely, Congress usually votes the way the general public desires, aware that the feeling of the general public will determine the make-up of the next Congress.

(2) Congress recognizes two types of opinion: the first, that of the man in the street who has opinions that should not be dignified by the term convictions, and the second, that of members of the "sacred cow" groups. During the Roosevelt administration, these special groups were organized labor and the farm interests. In other administrations, there have been other cows. The particular breed is comparatively unimportant. The principle, however, is of vital significance. Congress is convinced that it stands or falls, in the eyes of the cows, on the record it makes in legislation dealing with cattle. Congress is, accordingly, willing to sacrifice public esteem on these issues, figuring on picking it up on others, to make sure of pleasing the sacred cows. The mechanics of this maneuvering, the vote trading and the deals that make it possible, need not here be considered. But the recognition that Congress will frequently, even on "spotlight legislation", flout the public and nuzzle the sacred cows is of vital concern.

(3) What might be termed "legislative lag" characterizes Congressional action. Thus, on important legislation such as the Social Security Act and some of the wartime control bills, Congress was somewhat slow in recognizing the wishes of the majority. Evidently, the national legislature, on such national issues, will not act merely because a majority of the people favors a particular bill but will wait until the majority becomes sufficiently demonstrative of its desires.

(4) In handling "black-out legislation", Congress has virtually no guide for its actions in terms of general opinion. In consequence, it has only to gratify the group or interest specifically concerned, often at the expense of the unknowing public. There are some—many might be substituted—members of Congress who put principle above policy consistently, who regularly vote on legislation exclusively in terms of its effect on the general welfare. Far more common, however, is the horse trade which

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sees Congressmen voting for each other's pet projects as a matter of reciprocity. Defenders of the practice call it an extension of government by compromise, an extension whereby each group within the public as a whole has an opportunity to have its special needs met. Opponents, however, state that much of the rapaciousness would be taken out of the process, many of the unwarranted excesses halted, and a more even break secured for those whose interests are unrepresented if a little more light, in the form of public knowledge, were cast into the darkened precincts of "black-out legislation".

(5) The final, over-all conclusion that can be reached is that the American people get from their Congress just about what they deserve. When they insist upon the enactment of legislation, it is enacted. When they pay little or no attention, almost anything can happen. And it is a strange quirk of the American temperment that that is, evidently, good enough. Certainly the fact that, over the course of six elections between 1934 and 1944, the House of Representatives averaged 75 per cent repeaters is in itself strong evidence of grass-roots satisfaction with action in Washington.

Such, then, are the conclusions. The question, of course, is what to do with them. While this study has demonstrated that Congress does a relatively good job of reflecting public opinion, it has not been the intention of the author to justify the legislation on any other grounds. Congress stands justified in that it is largely capable of reflecting the expressed desires of the people. The task of improving the quality of Congressional legislation, in consequence, is one of improving the tastes of the people in legislation.

As more "black-out legislation" is transformed into "spotlight legislation", through development of public interest in the activities of Congress, the qualitative index of legislation as a whole will rise. As the people increase their knowledge of the effects on their welfare of legislation in behalf of the "sacred cows", those animals will be turned out to pasture, for they can exist only in an atmosphere of apathetic annoyance at their activities.

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As Walter Lippmann, in his treatise on public opinion, put it: "The troubles of representative government go back . . . to the failure of self-governing people to transcend their casual experience and their prejudice by inventing, creating and organizing a machinery of knowledge." As that "machinery of knowledge" comes to function with increasing efficiency, popular myths, delusions and misconceptions will begin to disappear. The American people will demand legislation—the legislation they will want—and their demand will be granted, just as the Congresses of the Roosevelt administration satisfied the expressed demands of the people of the United States at that time. For the Congress of the United States is, after all, nothing more and nothing less than what the people of the United States require it to be.

JAY H. TOPKIS

NEW YORK CITY

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ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A PROBLEM IN TEACHING

DOES the teaching of economics to international relations (IR) students, as practiced at most American colleges and universities, maximize the possible contribution which training in this subsidiary field can make to a more than superficial understanding of international relations or politics? [1] The present memorandum is prompted by the belief that the answer to this question must be in the negative, because IR curricula and teaching practice have from their beginning been rarely based on a clear conception of exactly what benefits IR students can derive from classwork dealing with economic issues. As a result, such training has been deficient in scope and approach.

I

The first point to be considered is the general relation of all subsidiary disciplines, including economics, to the study of IR. The field of IR, it is commonly recognized, derives integration only from its topical unity. It commands no methodology of its own. A "fact" in international politics is likely to contain more than any single social science discipline is prepared to grapple with. Each of these disciplines selects from factual material those elements that are susceptible to its peculiar methods and standards of inquiry. The IR specialist is a specialist in one of the basic fields, ordinarily political science, who is compelled to draw upon the relevant research work of specialists in other subsidiary fields. Obviously, the student of IR cannot be expected to obtain methodological mastery of all

[1] This paper is concerned with the *usual* institution, curriculum and faculty. Lacking first-hand knowledge of more than a small number of institutions, the writer has regarded textbooks in the field as supplementary evidence of what is taught and how.

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the social sciences. It is far better that he be well trained in one discipline than partially trained in several. What he does need and can be expected to acquire is some familiarity with the methods of inquiry and the types of questions posed in the chief subsidiary fields. Such familiarity should inform him concerning the kind of assistance which he can hope to secure from the work of specialists in the subsidiary disciplines; it should teach him how to read their studies critically; and it should enable him to suggest to the sociologists, geographers, historians, and so on, how they could contribute to a better understanding of IR.

Needless to emphasize, the IR student should become acquainted not only with the conceptual tools employed in these fields but also with those results of their employment which have stood the test of internal consistency and are of general significance to the study of IR. For example, if the psychologist can throw light upon the evolution of nationalism or the economist upon the causes of war, the IR student would gain greatly by studying these contributions. It is here, however, that a great deal of discrimination must be exercised, since the scholars in the various disciplines have amassed huge quantities of factual knowledge and interpretative hypotheses—all more or less relevant to IR problems—which the IR student cannot possibly absorb *in toto*. Indeed, what is, in this respect, required of the graduate student in the disciplines concerned is likely to be distinctly wasteful for the IR student. If proper selectivity is not ordinarily practiced, this results from two difficulties. Frequently, the specialists in the several subsidiary fields are insufficiently apprised of the kinds of problems and questions relevant to the IR student. At the same time, considerations of budgetary economy, whether unavoidable or not, usually relegate the IR student to courses designed not for his peculiar needs but for those of the graduate students in the various fields. A specific course in diplomatic history or psychology may be excellent for graduate students in history or psychology and yet rather unprofitable for IR students because the instructor fails to concentrate on the questions significant to the study of IR.

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All these considerations apply to the teaching of economics as much as to the teaching of other subsidiary disciplines. The object of instructing the IR student in the economic field is not to make him an economist or even a hybrid combination of political scientist and economist. The proper object is to make him a better political scientist, well equipped to deal with IR problems by drawing upon the assistance of the economist. The IR student should be acquainted with the chief concepts and methods of inquiry used by economists. He should be taught how to recognize economic problems and how to search for, read and utilize the non-theoretical findings of the economist. He should survey the economists' conclusions on major economic problems widely applicable to his work in IR. Finally, these purposes should be achieved without rendering the student overconfident of his competence to appraise economic data and problems in the absence or lack of help from the economist.

This is an important point. Many studies written by political scientists are forced to deal with economic matters, a necessity which will become increasingly common. In the great majority of cases, an otherwise admirable book or article is marred by the inadequacy with which the economic aspects are discussed. This deficiency may remain unrecognized as long as the study is read and reviewed only by other political scientists, and, owing to a deplorable conspiracy of circumstances, such books are rarely reviewed by economists. The deficiency, however, is still there, and its consequences may be all the worse for its immunity against detection. The surprising thing is not that the capable political scientist was unable to do better in this respect. The surprising thing is that he thought he was doing all right. He did not know enough to perceive the limits of his competence and hence failed to consult the specialist.

Introducing IR students into the methodology of the several subsidiary disciplines does not call for an equal allotment of pedagogical resources. Training in some fields proves more difficult to the recipients than training in others. Law and economics are less susceptible to swift comprehension than, for example, history or anthropology. This statement, to be sure,

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is offered as no more than a considered hypothesis which might be tested by the examination of a sufficiently large sample of student response. What renders economics a pedagogically difficult field is a very high degree of conceptual sophistication. Economic theory operates with a prodigious number of abstract concepts and principles, and the analytical advantages and limitations of these abstractions are not readily grasped by the novice. The wide use of algebraic symbols and diagrams illustrates the exacting standards observed in correlative analysis. It is not contended, of course, that IR students must be taught how to master these techniques; but they indicate the degree of rigor which the IR student cannot fail to encounter in economics training.

II

The customary teaching of economics to IR students shares one deficiency with the teaching of the entire IR program and this can best be appraised when preceded by a discussion of the over-all failing. Curricula, courses and teaching practice tend to lay undue stress on what are formally *international* problems. In part, this may be a consequence of overemphasizing the legal and other ceremonial aspects of interstate relations, of overstressing the instrumentalities of law and diplomacy, and the forms of international organizations at the expense (in terms of the total of teaching hours available) of the concrete problems to which these implements are applied. The primary reason for this shortcoming, however, is the one-sided way in which teaching practice focuses on the concrete problems themselves. There is a notable propensity to discuss international politics as if its processes were not only distinguishable but also separable from the domestic politics of the various states. The study of international politics must predominantly deal with national foreign policies in conflict, adjustment and agreement. In very large measure, it must therefore deal with the genesis of national foreign policies as well as their impact upon each other. To be sure, the quality of the nation's external environment enters this genesis. But there are distinctly national forces at play

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which determine how this environment is appraised and which shape the nation's reaction to this appraisal. National foreign policies should not be taken as given data from which analysis departs but must be subjected to thorough analysis themselves, and this calls for more than passing reference to domestic politics. Only if teaching practice focuses on the complex interdependence of domestic and international politics can the IR student understand the flux of national foreign policies in juxtaposition, their diverse elements of insistence, vacillation and contradiction, and their capacity for adaptive response. This demonstrates how important a place in teaching program and practice should be accorded to the analysis of domestic politics. To state the argument most forcefully: one should expect a student versed in Russian, British and American politics to exhibit a better understanding of present international politics than a student whose training has been confined to international law, diplomacy and diplomatic history. This is not to say that these latter subjects are irrelevant or unimportant. But, as a matter of emphasis, one should plead for a far greater concern with domestic policies than is ordinarily observed.

The IR student cannot, of course, acquire an intimate knowledge of internal politics the world over. Yet he can study domestic politics in the major Powers and, perhaps, in the chief intermediate zones where their interests are most likely to clash and call for adjustment. Above all, the student can be assisted in obtaining some proficiency of analytical approach to questions of domestic politics abroad, and such facility—divested of provincialist prejudices—will permit a relatively quick appraisal of areas which his subsequent work may call him to investigate. Extended training in comparative government is not necessarily the proper remedy for the deficiency under discussion. To judge from the standard textbooks in the field, such courses are frequently overconcerned with constitutional paraphernalia and administrative forms, and an arid history of these institutions. Courses in comparative parties come closer to the realities of politics, but, again, teaching practice seems to focus excessively on party structures and platforms, and a mere chronology of party histories—to indulge in description rather than in analysis.

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There is too little emphasis on major national and group problems—problems of poverty, economic instability, conflicting religious loyalties, political inequality and class dominance—in response to which parties organize and compete, and rise and fall. There also is an undue disposition—particularly unfortunate for IR students—to discuss parties in rigid isolation, country by country, while neglecting comparative description and analysis by studying, for example, Socialist, Communist and Catholic parties as European phenomena.

Area specialization is clearly not an answer to the need here discussed. Familiarity with *one* area is not enough for the IR student. There rather is great need for an analytical course dealing with political groups and trends in the major countries and regions, a course which might profitably be made obligatory for all IR students. Reconstituted courses in comparative government and comparative parties are called for. What is still more important, however, is that instructors in international politics, diplomacy, and diplomatic history discuss their subjects with continuous emphasis on the basic realities of domestic politics. Indeed, they should focus on the roots of foreign policies rather than on their mere identification and implementation or on giving a mere record of their clashes and adjustments.

III

Returning to the problem of teaching economics to IR students, the first fact to be noted is the increasingly overt significance of economic phenomena to the student of politics. During the last three decades, political and economic conditions and problems have become more directly interdependent, in both domestic and international affairs, than they were before. It is only necessary to peruse the *Congressional Record* or British *Parliamentary Debates* to see that the larger part of the legislator's time is devoted to problems that either are of an essentially economic nature or have significant economic connotations. To be sure, this overt interaction of politics and economics appears more striking in domestic than in international affairs because the issue of physical war or peace is ordinarily absent or

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dormant in national politics while it is still supreme in external politics. This issue has, of course, its economic significance. Indeed, even a cursory study of the foreign activities of the state reveals clearly the importance of economic problems, no matter whether they appear as the substance, the causes, or the effects of such activities. It is not accidental that all but one of President Wilson's Fourteen Points were political in substance while most points of the Atlantic Charter concerned economic problems; that, unlike the League of Nations, the United Nations plan to maintain a large number of international agencies dealing with economic problems; or that Soviet political propaganda abroad consistently stresses economic matters. This waxing incidence of economic factors simply reflects the progressive abandonment of the former laissez-faire position. As government control over economic affairs expands in all its diverse forms, politics and economics become naturally more interconnected, and over a widening range of problems an understanding of their political aspects presupposes a minimum comprehension of their economic aspects, and vice versa. If this conjunction is not always evident as long as political scientist talks to political scientist, or economist to economist, the reason lies simply in a culture lag on academically rarefied levels. Eventually, the artificiality of the previous separation of politics and economics is bound to disappear—except for the training of specialists in these fields—with the disappearance of the very special conditions prevailing during the second half of the nineteenth century. It may be contended that all issues of policy, including economic policy, are ultimately *political* issues. That is quite true. Yet it is also true that these issues can be neither comprehended nor decided intelligently unless the economic problems are properly appraised.

This trend away from laissez faire affects the study of IR in three ways. (1) The bulk of interstate relations directly concerned with commercial, financial and monetary matters has expanded enormously. (2) International politics in general cannot be properly studied without a constant evaluation of its economic components. This is true of nearly every major issue

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in international politics today, and to cite examples would be to belabor the obvious. (3) What is not so clearly realized is that a grasp of *domestic economic* problems and policies in foreign countries is frequently essential to a full understanding of *international political* problems. This conclusion follows from the two premises already stated: first, that economic and political problems are interdependent in *domestic* as well as international affairs; and, secondly, that international politics must be studied largely in terms of the foreign policies of states and these in terms of *domestic* politics as well as the state's external environment. Domestic politics can rarely be discussed realistically if discussion abstracts from the economic issues upon which most politics turns. Thus, their stand on economic problems may affect the success or failure of political parties which are bearers of specific foreign policies. It is a demonstrable fact that, as societies reject the working of free anonymous market forces, it becomes fatal for political analysis to touch economic implications lightly or not at all.

This growing importance of economic factors in the study of IR should be allowed to find expression in the teaching program. Regardless of whether the student prepares for a teaching, research or government position, his future usefulness will be conditioned by the degree and success with which colleges and universities make this adjustment. The civil servant has long been compelled to adapt himself to the interrelatedness of politics and economics. In the academic world, such adjustment has been retarded. Where progress has been made, it has depended largely on the chance availability of suitable personnel rather than on curricular and departmental recognition.

This twin emphasis on the interdependence of foreign policies and the domestic situation and of economic and political problems should not be misunderstood to mean that analysis can or should forego the patent advantage of segregating and examining specific aspects of a complex problem. This is an indispensable phase of all thorough research. The teaching effort, however, should not stop there. Whatever insights are gained should be applied to the wider problem.

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IV

The crucial problem, hitherto inadequately explored, relates to the extent and nature of the terrain to be covered by IR instruction in this field, as well as to the proper methods of approach. Past practice usually commenced with the pure theory of international trade, including the balance-of-payments mechanism, and ended with examining *types* of commercial treaties and *types* of such national policies as tariffs, import quotas and foreign-exchange control. The course or courses were offered by departments of economics, and, throughout, the emphasis was on economic theorizing. It would be extremely careless judgment if more economics teaching to IR students would be understood simply to mean more teaching of this kind; for its approach and scope, while excellent for training economists, is of very limited usefulness in the training of IR students. This inadequacy becomes immediately apparent in the light of the effects, already discussed, which the emergence of the interventionist economy must be expected to register on the teaching of IR. Except for a few narrowly restricted segments or incidental comment, the traditional economics course for IR students has ignored both the interdependence of domestic and international problems and the interdependence of economics and politics. Furthermore, it has focused on type analysis and it has disregarded entire problem areas of great interest to the IR specialist.

To some extent, the customary concentration on *international* matters proper bespeaks the disposition observed in the teaching of international politics: to focus attention on what are formally international issues while largely neglecting domestic politics, without an understanding of which, international issues cannot be fully appreciated. For two reasons, however, this one-sided orientation was plausible for courses in international economics. In the first place, it appeared as a sensible approach for economics students for whom this course was primarily designed. They would also take courses on money and banking, business-cycle theory, public finance, and so on, and thus eventually become familiar with all aspects of economic life. The IR student, however, would become acquainted with only one segment

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artificially separated from the rest. Secondly, this orientation was plausible as long as the international economic order rested substantially on free-market processes, relatively undisturbed by public policy. Yet this order is now defunct. International economic processes and relations are decisively shaped not only by foreign economic policies but also by a vast array of domestic economic policies. The American proposals for an international trade charter and organization reflect this change in the character of international economic affairs brought about by the demise of laissez faire. This document, to be sure, explicitly deals with foreign economic policies but the text is also replete with references to domestic policies such as " full-employment " policy, monetary policy, agricultural policy, wage and social policies, and plans for economic development. The essential interdependence of all economic policies, internal and external, is registered faithfully—and it should also be registered in IR instruction. How is American agricultural policy, or British full-employment policy, or Indian industrialization policy reflected in the foreign economic problems and policies of the countries concerned? Such questions are relevant to the training of IR students.

Most economics instructors will give no more than minor attention to the political aspects of the problems they dicsuss in international economics courses. Indeed, if they abstract from these political aspects as much as possible, this may be an admirable procedure for training technical economists. To the IR student, however, the interaction of economic and political problems and policies is of prime interest. He can ignore or slight neither the political roots or effects of economic policy nor the economic roots or effects of political policy. On the contrary, his training should make him constantly alert to such relationships. Now that the modern state is equipped with a rich armory of controls over economic processes, there are vast possibilities for commercial and financial concessions to be granted or withheld for political reasons and for political pressures to be exerted in support of commercial aims. The prewar policy of Nazi Germany or the current policies of the United States and Argentina afford instructive examples of such action.

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Economics instruction commonly focuses on *types* of problems and policies which are of great pedagogical value to both economics and IR students. To the latter, this approach is no doubt valuable, and it would be a mistake to minimize the pedagogical significance of theoretical analysis. As commonly practiced, however, this approach is not enough. The *problem* approach should be succeeded by or alternated with what might be called the *country* approach. Thus, it is excellent teaching to analyze specific tariff or import-quota policies; but it is also important that the foreign economic policies of countries, such as the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia, are studied as changing ensembles of more or less consistent policy elements pursued simultaneously.

To serve the special needs of IR students, instruction in the economic field must deal more than incidentally with a variety of problems not usually included in courses on international trade. Some of these problems have been touched upon in the foregoing emphasis on the need of exploring the interdependence of politics and economics and of domestic and foreign problems and policies. Thus, the interrelation of a nation's foreign and foreign economic policy deserves examination. Also, IR students require demonstrations by suitable case studies of how a country's economic problems and program affect its foreign economic and its foreign policies or, vice versa, of how a country's foreign or foreign economic policies affect its domestic economic problems and program. The present diminution of British political and military commitments in the Eastern Mediterranean and elsewhere, in large part compelled by British shortages of manpower and foreign exchange, affords a pertinent example. Again, it is difficult to see how the activities and projects of, say, Italian political parties can be assessed without appraising the major economic problems confronting the Italian people. There is the obvious need for analyzing the disparate economic systems built up in different countries: the totalitarian-socialist system of Soviet Russia, the predominantly free-enterprise régime of the United States, and the variously "mixed systems" of most other countries. This survey would naturally depart from a comparative study of how economic resources are

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and can be allocated under different forms of political and economic organization. In this connection, an examination of conflicting socio-economic theories, especially of mercantilism, economic liberalism and Marxism, should not be shunned. Instruction will benefit greatly if it considers theory as well as practice.

As far as statistical data are available, it would seem useful to make broad international comparisons of national outputs and their composition, of national incomes and their distribution, and of consumption levels and planes of living. Such surveys will elucidate factors entering any evaluation of the world political scene. A general canvass of major economic problems and policies the world over might be undertaken by distinguishing between the highly industrialized and the underdeveloped nations and regions. What are the typical problems which the economically advanced countries are chiefly concerned with today? Here problems such as that of full employment, comprehensive social security, and labor organization merit attention, since their repercussions do not stop at the national boundaries. Many IR students specialize or intend to specialize on economically backward regions in Latin America or Asia and should therefore study the economic and political implications of poverty and economic development. Striking differences in the conditions, methods and results of economic progress can be demonstrated by referring to such dissimilar countries as Japan, Soviet Russia, Mexico, Argentina and India. Attention to demographic issues can scarcely be avoided. The student of international politics is interested in exploring the economic sources of military power and diplomatic influence. This vitally important subject, if dealt with at all before the war, was covered rather inadequately by offering overelaborate surveys of access to raw materials combined with a few vague references to industrial and technological capacity. The problems of economic imperialism in all its protean forms and of the economic causes of war should not be neglected. Even in the field of international trade itself, hitherto stressed to the exclusion of other problem areas, there are gaps to be filled in a

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revised teaching program. With all instruction on trade theory and policies, students are rarely given a survey, which can be brief and general, of the changing magnitude, composition and direction of world commerce. They should become familiar with the chief types of imports and exports of the larger countries and distinguishable regions and with their differing dependence upon foreign trade. Very much the same comment is apposite with respect to international lending.

All this is not to say that the traditional concept of teaching international-trade theory is useless for the IR student. No doubt, he should be taught the essentials of this theory. He must be made to grasp the balance-of-payments mechanism and international monetary problems. These are indispensable prerequisites for much subsequent instruction. The IR student also must comprehend the techniques involved in the use of different commercial and monetary policies and their economic effects, and these subjects can be taught best when separate problems and policies are studied as *types*. In fact, he should be made familiar with fundamental principles of economic theory that are excluded by customary IR curricula. But any teaching program stopping at this point or not going far beyond it does not serve the needs of IR students. Since the total time of instruction is limited, it may indeed prove necessary to compress the traditional course work by sacrificing many niceties of the theory of international trade—not because they are irrelevant or uninteresting but because, analogous to the law of diminishing marginal utility, the optimum point is reached at an early phase and thereafter every additional hour of instruction would yield greater benefits if assigned to a different subject matter or approach. Nor should this retrenchment be unduly regretted. The precise formulation and appraisal of international economic problems as well as the technical details of international economic transactions are within the province of the professional economist and should remain there.

The desirable improvements can be summarized as follows: (1) Once a minimum foundation of economic theory has been laid, instruction on international economic matters should

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persistently follow up the close interconnection of politics and economics and of domestic and international problems and policies. (2) The traditional emphasis on international economics should be discarded. It is somewhat of a mystery to the present writer why the IR student was ever directed toward international trade, if work in economics was considered desirable. There was probably no better reason than that the term "international" appeared in the title description of the course. Is a course in comparative economic systems less important to the IR student than a course in international-trade theory? The new problem areas outlined above should make it clear that what the IR student needs is not more *international* economics but more *economics*. (3) Instruction should be flexible in alternating the "problem" and the "country" approach in dealing with many of the subjects. The nature of the subject matter will often dictate the choice of the proper focus and in many instances no doubt it will be sufficient to resort to the "country" approach when discussing types of problems. On balance, the new course work should not be predominantly descriptive.

V

A revision of IR teaching programs along the lines recommended will call for curricular, budgetary and personnel adjustments. While these changes are bound to vary from institution to institution, and cannot therefore be examined here, it may be worth while to mention some of the general difficulties of implementation.

One obvious impediment to change is universally present and universally understood. Change is painful and will often be resisted, and resistance will be rationalized in academically plausible ways. This obstacle must be acknowledged; but it does not require further discussion.

It should not be lightly assumed that the projected areas of new instruction are too vast to be manageable within the ordinary IR curriculum. Rich as the ingredients are, they are all interrelated. The explanation of one problem will often en-

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compass or facilitate the explanation of others, and some suggestions refer to a change of approach rather than add to the problem areas to be examined. It will also be remembered that the over-all purpose is not to turn out specialists in economics and that instruction can avoid many time-consuming demonstrations which would otherwise be necessary. Virtually all graduate students in the field have taken a course in elementary economics as undergraduates. It should prove possible to give all the necessary instruction if the equivalent of three or four semester courses is devoted to it and if the most is made of the aggregate number of hours available. Problems of personnel aside, this condition can be satisfied only by courses built around the special needs of IR students. This means that the bulk of the program must rest on courses and personnel specifically provided for these students.

Economics departments may often be unable to make more than a small contribution. They are set up and equipped to train the economics not the IR student, and there are few courses, if any, which could be made equally profitable for both. Customary economics courses simply do not meet most of the requirements set forth. They do not, or do not sufficiently, focus on the interdependence of politics and economics and of domestic and international problems and policies. They disregard many of the problem areas of prime importance to IR students. They rarely go beyond type analysis. Indeed, they cannot even supply the IR student with all the basic training in economics, except in a manner distinctly wasteful from his point of view. The time he can allot to training in economics is severely limited. He cannot take a series of courses in money and banking, business cycle, public finance, and so on, which would give him sufficient, and far more than sufficient, familiarity with basic economic concepts and principles. Assuming that the IR student cannot possibly allocate more than the equivalent of two semester courses to this type of general and preliminary work, there is no possible combination of two courses that would not leave him with a fragmentary training, excessive in a few problem areas and deficient in many others.

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And he would have little time to devote to the range of problems in which his main interest lies.

This is not to say that the resources of economics departments could not be drawn upon in the training of IR students. In the first place, these students should hardly be admitted to graduate work unless they have had at least a course in elementary economics. Secondly, it might be possible to require all IR students, or all such students desiring work in economics, to take a one-semester course in international-trade theory, as offered by economics departments. This course would instruct them in the essentials of this body of theory, including the balance-of-payments mechanism. However, it belongs to the very essence of these recommendations that the core of the program is organized specifically for IR students. This program, requiring the equivalent of two or three semester courses, would encompass foreign economic policies as well as the various subjects outlined. Interspersed throughout this course must be an explanation of basic economic concepts, the understanding of which is indispensable to the analysis of the problems on hand. Thus, a discussion of economic development requires a digression on the principles of capital formation; an inquiry into raw-materials problems a digression on the variability of the demand for and supply of primary commodities; and an investigation of the economic ingredients of military power a digression on the concept of the national income. According to the experience of this writer, students are apt to be greatly stimulated by such alternating discussion of theory and its practical application.

The question of teaching personnel is admittedly difficult since there have been, thus far, few attempts to train the kind of personnel required, adept in analyzing both the economic and political aspects of international relations. At this time, the problem is one of attracting such economists and political scientists as have shown inclination and talent for cultivating the borderline area between the two disciplines and who are willing to invest the effort necessary for developing the kind of proficiency required. Temporary work with the government

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during the war years has surely widened the horizon of many an economist and political scientist. This should facilitate recruitment. To train suitable teachers for a subsequent period, it might be advisable that some institution permit a small number of IR students to combine graduate work in economics and IR on a basis of approximate parity. Owing to the rigorous nature of economics, probably only students with considerable undergraduate work in this field should be admitted to the program. Again, it would be unfortunate to make them concentrate on international economics on the graduate level. For reasons already stated, courses in labor economics, comparative economic systems, and so on, are equally pertinent. On the IR side, their program might be selected with emphasis on political analysis rather than on law, history and other subsidiary fields.

The range and quality of reading material now available indicate another difficulty. It is a laborious but by no means impossible task to assemble an adequate literature. Yet a multiplicity of scattered sources would have to be drawn upon, and regarding some problem areas there still is a paucity of basic research. A shift in the focus of teaching, however, would doubtless help to stimulate a parallel shift in research and writing.

It may seem to the reader, as it did to this writer, that some of the points made in this paper are obvious. But it also seems that the obvious is not always noticed and, if noticed, often forgotten or disregarded. The fact is that curricula and teaching practices in IR have for more than twenty years followed a different course. They are sorely in need of overhauling if the above criticisms are cogent and the above recommendations reasonably acceptable.

Klaus Knorr

Institute of International Studies
Yale University

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DID LABOR SUPPORT ANDREW JACKSON?

AS a result of the investigations of John R. Commons and his associates into the impact of labor on the politics of the nation, the year 1827 has been generally accepted as marking the first appearance of labor as an articulate and active force in politics.[1] That year witnessed, too, the full blossoming of the campaign of Jacksonian partisans to ensure victory for their candidates in the next presidential election. Their success is a matter of history. In the election of 1828 Jackson won an overwhelming triumph and the Democratic party was installed in power for twelve years.

What were the forces that made this victory possible? Numerous historians have sought to delineate the forces responsible for the Democratic triumph. It has been generally recognized that the extension of the franchise to thousands of new voters enhanced the Democratic majority. To some students the Jacksonian triumph was a victory for the frontier and the West, while to others it was a far more significant and radical departure from the traditional party alignments which heretofore dominated the political life of the nation. By the latter, the Democratic party was regarded as representing the interests of the " toiling masses ".

John Bach McMaster envisioned the Jacksonian victory as a " triumph of Democracy, another great political revolution, the like of which the country has not seen since 1800." [2] And Richard T. Ely, when commenting on the twelve-year reign of the Democrats, stated that " there can scarcely be a doubt that the Democratic party from 1829 to 1841 was more truly a Workingman's party than has been the case with any other great political party in our country or with that party either before or since." [3] A more recent student looking at the same period wrote that " during the Bank War, labouring men began

[1] John R. Commons and Associates, *History of Labour in the United States* (New York, 1926-35), I, 169.

[2] John Bach McMaster, *History of the People of the United States* (New York, 1900), V, 518.

[3] R. T. Ely, *The Labor Movement in America* (New York and London, 1905), p. 42.

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slowly to turn to Jackson as their leader, and to his party as their party." [4]

What are the facts? In this paper the writer has focused his attention upon labor and politics in the city of Philadelphia during the Jacksonian era in order to ascertain to what extent labor aligned itself with the Democratic party in local, state and national elections. Philadelphia may well be considered the most significant location for the student of labor and politics in that period. The second largest city in the nation, it had a sufficient aggregation of workers to make a labor movement possible. Here labor first became vocal. The "first continuous organization of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or advancing wages" [5] was organized in Philadelphia in 1792, and that city furnished the site for the first Workingmen's party in the history of the United States.[6]

The story of the emergence and growth of that Workingmen's party in Philadelphia has been treated summarily by Helen Sumner in the first volume of the *History of Labour in the United States* and needs only brief mention here. In the summer of 1827 the journeymen carpenters of the city struck for a ten-hour day, and their efforts culminated in the formation of the Mechanics' Union of Trade Associations.[7] The following year the trade unions of the city endorsed a proposition initiated by the central organization to nominate candidates "to represent the interest of the working classes" in the city councils and the state legislature.[8]

The thesis has been advanced that part of the success of the Democratic party from 1828 to 1840 can be attributed to the support given it by the mechanics and workers of the cities.[9] To test accurately the validity of this thesis two questions must be answered. First, did the Workingmen's party, the only organization purporting to speak solely for the cause of the workingmen, manifest, during its four years of existence, any preference for the Jacksonian candidates? And,

[4] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (Boston, 1945), p. 143.

[5] Commons, *et al.*, *History of Labour*, I, 109.

[6] *Ibid.*, I, 191.

[7] From the *Philadelphia Freeman's Journal*, June 1827, as cited in John R. Commons, *et al.* (eds.), *Documentary History of American Industrial Society* (Cleveland, 1910-11), V, 83.

[8] From the *Mechanic's Free Press*, as reported in the *Working Man's Advocate*, November 1829.

[9] Arthur M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History* (New York, 1922), p. 209. Schlesinger, *The Age of Jackson*, p. 143.

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secondly, since only through an empirical examination of the distribution of votes in the working-class districts of the cities can one determine the accuracy of the above proposition, is there sufficient evidence to indicate that within Philadelphia the working-class wards aligned themselves with the Jacksonians in this period?

In view of the generally accepted notion that the mechanics and workers of the cities gave their support to the Jackson Democrats, one might assume that the Workingmen's party would have exerted its influence in behalf of the Democratic candidates whenever possible. But a critical analysis of those elections in which the Workingmen's party participated will disabuse us of this idea. Not only was the *Mechanic's Free Press* repetitious in its denials of association with either of the two older parties, but it was vehement in its attacks upon the Democratic party. "At present our danger", warned this paper, "is from our old master, the Democrats, for as most of us are deserters from their ranks they view us with the same sensation as the mighty lord would the revolt of his vassals: there cannot be so much danger from the Federalists as, generally speaking, we were never inclined to trust them." [10]

The election of 1828 was marked by an eager contest for the votes of the workers. Not only was there a party officially designated as the Workingmen's party, but also the two major parties displayed a novel respect for the workingman's vote. On the eve of the election the *Mechanic's Free Press* reported "that both great parties had attached to their carriages . . . these words 'the Workingman's Ticket' coupled with the names of Jackson and Adams." [11]

The national triumph of Jackson in 1828 was also repeated in the local elections of Philadelphia which swept into office every candidate of the Democratic party for the various elective posts.[12] But one can scarcely attribute the success of the Democrats to the efforts and influence of the Workingmen's party. Although the Jacksonians did nominate three candidates for the City Assembly and twelve for the Common Council [13] who were also on the Workingmen's ticket, one cannot ascribe their success to the votes gained through their association with that party. The candidates of the Democratic party won over their opponents by an average majority of one thousand votes

[10] *Mechanic's Free Press*, April 12, 1828.

[11] *Ibid.*, Oct. 18, 1828.

[12] Hazard, Samuel, *The Register of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1828-35), II, 224.

[13] *Mechanic's Free Press*, Oct. 4, 1828.

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while the Workingmen's party was able to capture an average of only 314 votes in the city.[14]

Undaunted by the poor showing in its first attempt, the Workingmen's party immediately made plans for the next election.[15] Political clubs were organized and the workers were advised to "go to the assessor" and "have themselves duly assessed," in order to be "eligible to the right of Franchise."[16] The party was cautioned by the *Mechanic's Free Press* "not to give [its] strength as a party to any candidate for governor" because of the danger of splitting its ranks.[17]

Thus, while the Workingmen's party failed to hold the balance of power in 1828 when the Jacksonians won, it played a decisive rôle the following year when many Democrats were thrown out. After the results of the election of 1829 were published, the *Mechanic's Free Press* declared: "The balance of power has at length got into the hands of the working people, where it properly belongs, and it will be used, in future, for the general weal."[18] In the city elections that year candidates of the Anti-Jackson party won a decisive victory. A great part of their success can be credited to the Workingmen's party for the substantial aid it gave to their ticket.

All the seats of the City Assembly passed into the hands of the Federalists, who were elected by an average majority of 515 votes.[19] One candidate of the Workingmen's party was endorsed by the Anti-Jackson party, but none was nominated by the Jacksonians.[20] The Workingmen's party controlled an average of 860 votes, which gave it an enviable position of power in that election.[21]

In the Select Council the Jacksonian Democrats retained a slim majority. Here again the hand of the Workingmen's party is seen. Two of the successful Democratic candidates were also endorsed by the Workingmen's party while none of the Workingmen's candidates were represented on the Federalist ticket. The Jacksonians held three of the five seats and succeeded over their opponents by a majority of 482 votes. The Workingmen's party polled an average of 870 votes.[22]

[14] Hazard's *Register*, II, 224. Votes for the Workingmen's candidates ranged from a low of 239 to a high of 539.

[15] *Mechanic's Free Press*, Nov. 1, 1828.

[16] *Ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1828, as quoted in Commons, *et al.*, *History of Labour*, I, 200.

[17] *Mechanic's Free Press*, Dec. 27, 1828.

[18] *Ibid.*, Oct. 17, 1829.

[19] Hazard's *Register*, IV, 256.

[20] *Ibid.* [21] *Ibid.* [22] *Ibid.*

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It was in the Common Council that the Anti-Jacksonians won their most striking victory. They now held fifteen of the twenty available seats; the Jacksonians held only four, and one seat was held by a candidate of both parties.[23] The Federalists succeeded over their opponents by a scant majority of 363 votes, while the Workingmen's party drew an average of 862 votes.[24] Eight of the successful Federalist candidates were nominated by the Workingmen's party while only one Jackson candidate was endorsed by them.[25] During this one year, the only year in which the Workingmen's party held the balance of power in the city elections, the Anti-Jacksonians benefited most.

Encouraged by their successes in 1829, the Workingmen's party eagerly made preparations for the next year's campaign. Meetings were held, and there was a determined effort to build a more efficient vote-gathering organization in the city. At the same time that the party was attempting to spread and consolidate its influence in Philadelphia, it was being destroyed by the infiltration of political opportunists into its ranks. The *Saturday Evening Post* warned the workers in the fall of 1830 that they ought not to support any candidate unless " he pledges himself . . . to reform or endeavor to reform certain abuses." [26]

The party was never again to achieve the same degree of success which it attained in the election of 1829. Although its candidates received a substantial number of votes in the election of 1830, it lost the balance of power which it held in 1829.[27] Ten candidates of the Federalist party were also on the Workingmen's ticket.[28] One of the candidates supported by the Workingmen's party was the publisher of the conservative, Anti-Jackson *Daily Chronicle*,[29] and another was an attorney.[30]

Prior to the election the *Mechanic's Free Press* had charged that the Federalist party was made up of lawyers and aristocrats, and that the

[23] *The National Gazette and Literary Register*, Oct. 15, 1829.

[24] Hazard's *Register*, IV, 256.

[25] *Mechanic's Free Press*, Oct. 3, 1829.

[26] From the *Saturday Evening Post*, as reported in the *Working Man's Advocate*, Oct. 23, 1830.

[27] Hazard's *Register*, VIII, 256.

[28] *Mechanic's Free Press*, Oct. 12, 1836.

[29] Desilvers, *Philadelphia Directory and Stranger's Guide, 1830* (Philadelphia, 1831), p. 2.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

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Jackson party was composed of bank speculators and office hunters.[31] At the same time it piously claimed that "on the Working Men's ticket we have no attornies; the candidates from first to last have been taken from the ranks of the people, and are pledged to support the Working Men's interests." [32]

The returns of the election of 1830 pleased no one but the Jacksonian Democrats. One Jackson paper stated that the Democrats had "carried the Senator and eight members of the Assembly, over the united forces of Federalism and Workeyism." [33] Discouraged with the results of the elections, the *Mechanic's Free Press* wrote: "The election of 1830 adds another instance of the blindness of the workingmen to their own interests and exhibits in bold and striking color how easily the public liberties may be endangered by the supineness of the peoples themselves." [34] Seeping into this workingman's paper were words of discontent from the workers themselves. One worker, greatly alarmed by the character of a number of the candidates of the Workingmen's party, wrote a disturbing letter to the *Mechanic's Free Press* questioning the sagacity of "selecting men (to represent you) whose interests are to grant bank charters and all kinds of monopolies." [35]

A feeble gesture was made by the Workingmen's party again in 1831. It nominated candidates for the various city posts and proclaimed itself as the sole representative of the true interests of the working classes. No copies of the *Mechanic's Free Press* are in existence to reveal the reaction of the Workingmen's party to that election, but the results disclose that the party had lost its ability to capture the votes of any large number of the Philadelphia workingmen. Discouraged by its poor showing in the election and by its inability to cope with the practices of the professional politician, the Workingmen's party disappeared from the Philadelphia political scene.

Why after such an auspicious beginning did this movement fail? Miss Sumner says that "it did not fail as a result of legitimate internal dissensions based on differences of principle", but that "its failure was primarily due to a combination of purely political causes, namely, the

[31] *Mechanic's Free Press*, Oct. 10, 1829.

[32] *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1830.

[33] From the *American Sentinel*, Oct. 13, 1830, as quoted in Commons, *et al.*, *History of Labour*, I, 211.

[34] *Mechanic's Free Press*, Oct. 12, 1830.

[35] *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1831.

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workers' inability to 'play the game of politics' and the all too excellent acquaintance of the old party politicians with the 'tricks of the game'." [36] But the evidence would indicate that it was destroyed by more than the machinations of professional politicians. It was the very nature of the party itself and the candidates it supported for office that contributed to the downfall of the Workingmen's party.

During the four years of its existence the Workingmen's party nominated and supported one hundred candidates for the elective office of Philadelphia. A tabulation of these candidates reveals their occupations, according to the official listing, as follows: [37] ten workingmen,[38] twenty-three professional men,[39] fifty-three merchants and manufacturers, eleven gentlemen and three for whom no occupation was recorded.

Among these candidates there were some men of great wealth and affluence in the city. Charles Alexander, publisher of the conservative *Daily Chronicle*,[40] and Joseph Chandler, editor of the *United States Gazette*,[41] were nominees of the Workingmen's party. There were other men important enough to have their names recorded in a biography of wealthy citizens of Philadelphia. Elhanan Keyser and John Moss, candidates of the party for the Common Council, were listed as possessing fortunes of $150,000 each. Two other candidates, Henry Horn and Henry Troth, were both reputed to be worth $50,000.[42]

Despite the protestations of the Workingmen's party against the abuses of the other two major parties, and its support of the many social and political reforms desired by the workmen, this party can scarcely be recognized as a true workingmen's party. To believe that a party composed largely of merchants, manufacturers and professional men, plus a few persons of considerable wealth, was really devoted to

[36] Commons, *et. al.*, *History of Labour*, I, 215, 216.

[37] The information regarding the occupation of the Workingmen's candidates was obtained from Desilvers, *Philadelphia Directory*.

[38] The *Directory* makes no distinction between master carpenters, shoemakers, etc. and the corresponding journeymen and therefore makes it impossible to determine whether these men were bona fide workingmen.

[39] In the classification designated as professional men are included lawyers, doctors, teachers, druggists and artists.

[40] Desilvers, *Philadelphia Directory, 1830*, p. 2.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[42] Anonymous, *Wealth and Biography of Wealthy Citizens of Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 1845), pp. 4, 18.

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solving working-class problems in the interest of the workers would seem to lay a heavy tax on credulity.[42a]

The lack of class consciousness among the workers was another contributing factor which brought about the disintegration of this party. As long as the laborer felt that his status as such was a temporary one, he was reluctant to identify himself with a movement which at some future date might be directed against himself. The *Mechanic's Free Press* lucidly outlined the difficulties confronting the Workingmen's party when it wrote the following:

> The mechanics have been too much in the habit of looking at their fellow laborers as friends of their causes, and on all the rich as enemies. The mechanics will find in time that many of their own class are their worst enemies. Some young mechanics are actuated by this idea of setting up their businesses and living on the profits arising out of the labour of others, and this will make them try to defeat every measure calculated to better the hard conditions of that class generally.[43]

Nor can one ignore the rôle of the employers in the destruction of this political movement. Although it is impossible to measure with any degree of certainty what effect the attitude of the employing classes had on this movement, one can be assured that it was a debilitating one. "It was said", reported the *Mechanic's Free Press*, "that several employers had threatened their workmen with discharge in case they did not vote the ticket of the employers' choice and that 'some were driven through fear of losing their places to bow to this galling yoke'."[44]

[42a] Foner, Philip S., *History of the Labor Movement in the United States* (New York, 1947), "But after July 10, 1832, American workers wanted only one man for President—'Old Hickory'..." (p. 144). Despite Dr. Foner's assertion that "no wage earners were nominated on the Workingmen's Ticket, due largely to the fact that property qualifications existed for all offices" (p. 128), neither the Constitution of Pennsylvania, 1790, nor the laws incorporating the city of Philadelphia, 1789, substantiate this point of view.

[43] *Mechanic's Free Press*, June 6, 1829.

[44] *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1829, as quoted in Commons, *et al.*, *History of Labour*, I, 205. Norman Ware, in *The Industrial Worker* (Boston and New York, 1924), p. 127, when analyzing the failure of the ten-hour movement in Massachusetts, states: "The chief reason for the failure of the ten-hour movement is... that the corporations were able to prevent the passing of ten-hour legislation because of their control over the Massachusetts legislature and their political domination of the electorate." If the above was true in Massachusetts it is possible that the employers of Philadelphia exerted a similar influence upon their workers.

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The evidence thus far presented reveals that the Workingmen's party as a political force representing the interests of the laboring classes had no particular predilection for candidates bearing the Jackson label. It yet remains to be determined whether the workers of Philadelphia gave their overwhelming support to the nominees of the Democratic party. In order to answer this question definitively the following tables are included to give a statistical breakdown of party politics and economic interests in Philadelphia.[45]

Wards[46]	Total Assess. on Real and Personal Property in 1829[47]	Population 1830[48]	Assessment per Person
New Market	$ 604,009	7,443	$ 81
North Mulberry	700,526	5,804	121
Cedar	1,189,353	6,321	188
South Mulberry	1,101,160	5,364	189
Upper Delaware	1,195,067	5,763	208
Lower Delaware	1,499,938	6,863	212
Pine	1,178,287	5,540	213
Locust	1,547,109	7,117	217
North	1,587,919	5,796	274
Dock	1,764,243	5,378	328
Middle	1,245,625	3,632	343
South	1,335,604	3,467	385
Walnut	2,013,888	3,428	587
High	2,649,189	4,427	598
Chestnut	2,748,641	4,115	670

The tables used here reveal only the outcome of the presidential and the gubernatorial elections, since the results of the local and Congressional races follow almost identically the course set by the presidential contest.

[45] The writer must acknowledge his debt to Dixon Ryan Fox's *Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York* (New York, 1918) for the techniques therein demonstrated.

[46] As far as the writer has been able to determine, the residences of the wealthy were in those wards where the assessed valuation per person was high. The sources for this information are scattered and fragmentary. Supporting data are revealed in Matthew Carey, *A Plea for the Poor* (Philadelphia, 1829), p. 15, J. Thomas Scharf and Thompson Westcott, *History of Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 1884), II, 926, *The National Gazette and Literary Register*, June 27, 1829, and the *Mechanic's Free Press*, Feb. 7, 1829.

[47] Hazard's *Register*, IV, 265.

[48] *Ibid.*, VII, 172-173.

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	1829[49]		1829[50]		1832[51]		1832[52]		1835[53]		1836[54]		1838[55]	
	Jackson	Adams	Wolf Jackson	Ritner	Jackson	Wirt	Wolf	Ritner	Wolf	Ritner	Van Buren	Harrison	Potter	Ritner
New Market	D		D			W		W		W		W		W
No. Mulberry ...	D		D		D		D			W		W		W
Cedar	D		D			W	D			W		W		W
So. Mulberry	D		D			W		W		W		W		W
Upper Delaware .	D		D			W		W		W		W		W
Lower Delaware .		W		W		W		W		W		W		W
Pine	D		D			W		W		W		W		W
Locust	D		D			W		W		W		W		W
North		W	D			W		W		W		W		W
Dock	D		D			W		W		W		W		W
Middle	D		D			W		W		W		W		W
South		W		W		W		W		W		W		W
Walnut		W		W		W		W		W		W		W
High		W		W		W		W		W		W		W
Chestnut	D		D			W		W		W		W		W

Key: The letter "D" represents victories by the Jacksonian Democrats in the wards designated.
The letter "W" represents victories by the Anti-Jackson party, prior to 1832 and by the Whig party after 1832.

A cursory glance at the above tables will indicate that the working-men of Philadelphia gave their votes far more consistently to the Whigs than to the Jacksonian Democrats. Moreover, it was prior to the Bank War and not during it that the working-class districts revealed any inclination to follow the lead of Jackson and his party.[56] During the first four years of the Jacksonian era there does appear to be a correlation between economic interests and the ward votes. But even during these years the pattern is shattered by the returns from the Chestnut and Lower Delaware wards. Chestnut ward, one of the wealthiest wards in the city, did not, as might have been expected, cast

[49] Hazard's *Register*, II, 305.

[50] *Ibid.*, IV, 256.

[51] *Ibid.*, X, 301.

[52] *Ibid.*, X, 237.

[53] *Ibid.*, XVI, 240.

[54] *Public Ledger*, Oct. 13, 1836.

[55] *Ibid.*, Oct. 17, 1838.

[56] It must be noted that Philadelphia was the home of the Second Bank of the United States.

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its support to candidates of the Whig party. And Lower Delaware ward voted monotonously for the Anti-Jackson party, giving at the same time far more votes to the Workingmen's party than did any other ward in the city.[57]

Since it was the Jacksonians who in this period have been generally recognized as the standard-bearers of a program for progressive action, the question might properly be raised as to which factors were responsible for their repudiation. The Democrats under the leadership of Jackson had made a favorable beginning in Philadelphia, and for four years with varying degrees of success managed to win the electorate to the Democratic party. But for the remaining eight years of the Jackson era it was the Whig party which attracted to it the voters of the city.

In searching for an explanation for its lack of success in the city, the Democratic party was quick to single out the Second Bank of the United States as a force partially responsible for its defeat. *The Pennsylvanian,* an ardent Jackson paper, declared that

> among the cruel acts resorted to by the Bank of the United States, to carry on a ruthless and traitorous warfare against the mechanics and workingmen, was that of sending agents around to all the large manufacturers to urge them to discharge their hands, draw in their business, and thus force the workingmen of the country to come around and support the bank by their votes in order to regain their bread.[58]

Catterall, however, in his searching investigations into the affairs of the Second Bank of the United States states: "It may be said at once that there never has been any evidence produced to show that the bank as a national bank ever spent a dollar corruptly."[59] In another section of the book, however, he modifies the above statement when he discloses that in Pennsylvania the Bank did use its influence to secure the election of Anti-Jackson candidates.[60]

Not only did the Jacksonians ascribe their defeat to the activities of the Second Bank of the United States, but they also accused the Whigs of importing voters into the city on election day to bolster their ranks.

[57] Hazard's *Register,* VI, 268.

[58] *The Pennsylvanian,* Oct. 1, 1834.

[59] Catterall, R.C.H., *Second Bank of the United States* (Chicago, 1903), p. 243.

[60] *Ibid.,* p. 251.

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"Look out for gentlemen emigrants from neighboring wards", warned the *Pennsylvanian*. "You will know them by their hang dog faces. They will not dare to meet your eyes."[61] On the eve of an election this same pro-Jackson paper stated, "it is supposed that 400 New York Whigs, who were borrowed for the election today, are in the third District and in the city."[62] But a scrutiny of the returns does not uncover any evidence which would indicate that there was an excessive number of votes cast in any of the wards in the city.

It is impossible to determine whether it was the activities of the Second Bank of the United States or the padding of the ballot boxes by the Whigs which best explains the lack of success of the Jacksonians in Philadelphia. But one thing is certain: the inability of the Democrats to hold the labor vote which they had captured in 1828 led to their ultimate defeat in the city.

WILLIAM A. SULLIVAN

BROOKLYN, N. Y.

[61] *The Pennsylvanian*, Oct. 8, 1833.

[62] *Ibid.*, Oct. 14, 1834.

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REVIEWS

Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861. By OSCAR HANDLIN and MARY FLUG HANDLIN. New York, New York University Press, London, Oxford University Press, 1947.—xiii, 364 pp. $3.50.

The authors describe their objective to be the ascertaining of "the meaning of men's efforts to bend an immediate portion of the visible universe to their wills." More concretely, they seek to demonstrate the nature of the ideas men held about the rôle of government in the economy of Massachusetts early in the nineteenth century. As the title indicates, it is the use of common action to attain economic ends in this period which is the chief interest of the authors; and it is their thesis that in the years before the Civil War the concept of the commonwealth slowly gave way to that of the humanitarian police state.

While the Handlins concede that the transition from mercantilism to liberalism was peculiar neither to Massachusetts nor to this country, they maintain that economic intervention by government before the Civil War was principally on the state level, that the interposition of the federal government in economic affairs was largely a phenomenon of the post-bellum period, and that henceforth significant economic issues were dealt with in the national arena. Yet, with one noteworthy exception, there is no illustration of economic intervention on the part of the state in the early nineteenth century which could not be matched, and in some cases surpassed, on a colony or state level in the colonial and Revolutionary periods. Then wage and price regulatory measures covered larger areas than subsequently, licensing and inspection laws were universal—and not solely to protect producers as the Handlins imply—and franchises and bounties were the normal devices for promoting capitalistic enterprise. The single exception is the evolution of the private business corporation, which is brilliantly sketched in these pages.

When one considers the potent lever which the federal government operated in economic affairs between 1790 and 1860 through its land

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grant policy and its acquisition of new domains, through its tariffs, through its regulation of banking and bankruptcy, and through its concern in certain periods with promoting public improvements, it would seem more realistic to accord to the federal government at least parity with the states in economic matters from the days of Alexander Hamilton. Even the ten-hour movement received its impetus from President Van Buren's labor regulation. The " American system " receives short shrift in this volume, and the name of Henry Clay never appears—perhaps because he was not so fortunate as to have been a citizen of the Bay State.

While the authors have exhumed and digested an imposing bulk of personal and business papers and contemporary tracts, their chief contribution is in organizing in some systematic form the mass of petitions to the legislature found in the Massachusetts Archives. Such petitions constitute the most substantial unworked mine of historical data for the ante-bellum period. For many of the states the task is indeed a formidable one, for the petitions are normally arranged chronologically or by counties rather than topically, and the research worker does not have the advantage of systematic calendars.[1] Of course, such petitions often represent " hospital cases ", and in handling grievances of this kind the utmost discrimination must be used. Unless other background material is taken into consideration, the distorted view of the maladjusted, marginal economic person may be mistakenly accepted for the valid, representative picture. A much safer " Gallup Poll " of social and economic opinion for the ante-bellum period than petitions of isolated groups or random letters to newspapers would be the grand jury presentments, but that source of opinion was not effectively exploited by the Handlins.

The dangers of overconcentrating on grievance petitions and polemical writings are especially manifest whenever—and the occasions are frequent—the authors have occasion to deal with the law. They bemoan the fact that " American law has as yet been handled by no historians of the stature of Pollock and Maitland," but in surveying legal change they themselves give little evidence of having learned much from the British masters of legal history, or even from less accomplished American disciples. A safe rule for the neophyte in legal history is to make a systematic examination of the statutes first and then to explore the decisions of the courts. The authors dispense with both

[1] For example, the petitions from only two out of the 148 counties of Virginia have been calendared. See Virginia State Library, *Report, 1908*. Delaware and South Carolina are two of the state archives where petitions are arranged topically and chronologically.

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steps. Take the subject of equitable relief, for example. The Handlins fall into the error of attributing the hostility of the people of Massachusetts to a chancery court to some inherent hostility to equitable relief in general (pp. 147, 148). They seem blissfully unaware of the fact that throughout the colonial period common-law courts exercised a great deal of equitable jurisdiction [2] and that the opposition in Massachusetts to chancery was political and not theoretical, grounded on the deep-seated resistance of the Puritans to the activities of the king's prerogative courts and a persistent fear of executive tribunals. To substantive relief in equity the Puritans were not in the least opposed. The Handlins imply that the enormous increase of legislative business after 1780 was due to the need for equitable relief (p. 148). Yet, out of a total of some 532 private acts enacted by the legislature between 1780 and 1797, four or five at most could conceivably be categorized as equitable relief not available in common-law or probate courts.[3] Aside from a growing number of incorporations, the legislature was concerned with grants of permission to run lotteries, with ferry regulations, with eliminating obstructions to navigation, and with other issues which had previously consumed a great deal of the attention of colonial legislatures. The only general statute cited by the authors is the act of 1857, and for some unaccountable reason they fail to mention the statute of 1817, c. 87, conferring chancery jurisdiction upon the Supreme Judicial Court.

The authors imply that the codification movement in Massachusetts was frustrated because it smacked of "radicalism" (p. 213). Considering the fact that a number of the pro-codification articles in the *North American Review* were from the pen of Justice Story,[4] a pillar of social respectability and conservatism, and that men of the standing of Charles Sumner made *The American Jurist* a leading advocate of this reform, their contention seems to be an oversimplification of the reasons why codes did not achieve the same popularity in Massachusetts as in some other states.

A similar lack of realism where matters of law are concerned characterizes the authors' treatment of the movement to end imprisonment

[2] See Z. Chafee, Jr., "Introduction" to *Suffolk County Court Records*, I (Colonial Society of Massachusetts, *Publications*, XXIX), l-lvi; E. H. Woodruff, "Chancery in Massachusetts", *Law Quarterly Review*, V, 370-386; *The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts, 1648* (Cambridge, 1929), p. 32; *Mass. Col. Rec.*, IV, pt. 11, 488, V, 375.

[3] *Massachusetts Private and Special Laws, 1780-1797*, vol. I (Boston, 1805).

[4] W. W. Story (ed.), *Miscellaneous Writings* (Boston, 1852), pp. 698-734, for Story's public position on codification.

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for debt. They speak of "the total abolition" of imprisonment for debt as having been effected in 1855, an event which "ushered from the prisoner's brooding gloom the victims of a savage code" (p. 243). Not quite that fast! If you were unfortunate enough not to have been able to meet alimony payments,[5] or were in default in providing support for an illegitimate offspring,[6] or if your debt was contracted by fraud,[7] you were, and probably still are, liable to confinement in jail. There is another side of the debtor law which the Handlins overlooked. The court in 1830 referred to "the immemorial practice in this Commonwealth" of imprisoning persons for debt.[8] But servitude for debt was an even more venerable institution, persisting in sections of New England for some time after the Revolution. When did peonage disappear in the commonwealth? This book does not provide the answer.

This study might have probed more deeply the complicated problems arising from business failures, bankruptcy and indebtedness, issues of great concern to entrepreneur as well as to workman. The business man who wanted bankruptcy laws to protect risk capital had a viewpoint entirely different from, if not hostile to, that of the worker who considered the debt laws as punishing a man for his poverty.[9] By what strange alchemy were soaring commodity prices in the Revolutionary period transmuted into the "ever impending threat of debt"? How does the farmer become a debtor in a period of inflation? Were those farmers who did so by any means typical of the rural classes? Did not the whole rural economic picture change completely in the years following the Revolution, when prices contracted and surpluses piled up? It would have been revealing had the Handlins compared, for the rural counties, the common pleas judgment dockets in 1783 with those of the critical years, 1786-88, and, for the later period, if they had explored the petitions in bankruptcy before the federal courts. This would have given the problem of debts and business failures a

[5] Chase v. Ingalls, 97 Mass. 524 (1867).

[6] Young v. Makepeace, 103 Mass. 50 (1869); Leonard v. Bolton, 153 Mass. 428 (1891).

[7] In spite of the bankruptcy act of 1867, sec. 33. *In re* Devoe, Fed. Cas. No. 3, 843; 1 Lowell 251 (1868). For imprisonment of a defendant arrested on mesne process who refused to take the pauper oath or the oath that he did not plan to leave the state, see Henshaw v. Cotton, 127 Mass. 60 (1879), and, more recently, *Mass. G. L.* (Ter. Ed.), c. 224, S. 2-6, 12.

[8] Comm. v. Badlam, 26 Mass. 362 (1830).

[9] See *Workingman's Advocate*, Feb. 20, 27, March 6, 1830.

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factual frame of reference now missing in the book. Furthermore, a study of the unpublished general sessions, superior court, and county commissioners' records, abundantly available at county seats, would shed a good deal more light on the rôle of the state and its subdivisions in administering economic affairs.

This evaluation of economic thought is marked by a lack of balance. On the one side you have a heavily weighted mass of opinions of merchants, promoters and manufacturers; on the other, a surprisingly skimpy representation of the point of view of the laboring classes on economic matters. It is more than significant that the contributions of John R. Commons, Norman Ware and Walter Nelles are omitted from a lengthy bibliography, and that the so-called "labor" press, including such effusions as the *Voice of Industry*, *True Workingman*, and *The Lowell Offering*, was not examined. Issues with which labor was concerned are, as a result, distorted. For example, the arguments of manufacturers against a ten-hour law are detailed, but not those of labor in favor of it. The antimonopoly arguments advanced by the opponents of apprenticeship requirements for entering trades are marshaled (p. 223); but the workmen clung tenaciously to apprenticeship limitation, not so much to provide themselves with exclusive advantages as to avoid what they considered unfair competition by underpaid "green hands". The Handlins have a curious comment on *Commonwealth v. Hunt*, that landmark of labor law which legalized combinations of workers and permitted peaceable coercion to attain a lawful object. Our authors query: "Were not the judges clearing a path for new obstructions to the full development of the citizen?" (p. 244) Is not this judging an historic decision from the vantage point of the police strike of the Coolidge era or the Taft-Hartley generation, rather than from that of the year 1842, with its child labor, its twelve-hour working day, and its $2 weekly wage for factory girls? From competent historians we have a right to expect historical perspective.

Although Lemuel Shaw was chief justice of the commonwealth from 1830 to 1860, crucial years in the Handlins' study, and handed down a long series of decisions which influenced social and legal policy far beyond the borders of Massachusetts, this volume has only two or three scattering references to his efforts. The authors constantly show their preference for reporting the fugitive and, at times, querulous reactions of the business man to analyzing the more sober and authoritative reflections of jurists concerned with curbing corporate privileges. Thus, the constructive contributions of the Chief Justice in the field

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of public utility and railroad law, among other areas, are virtually ignored. How much weight should one give to the statement of capitalist Nathan Appleton: "I believe in the law of force . . . and that human nature . . . can be governed by no other" (p. 212)? Had the commonwealth ceased being a government of laws, and were the business interests able to negate the work of Shaw in shaping the public policy of the state? Is support for this inference found in the charge of Theodore Parker that laws prohibiting the accumulation of money by certain classes need not be kept? Did Parker's "higher law" doctrine encourage the defiance of property rights beyond property in slaves? Since the abolitionists raised the most dramatic and heated phase of the issue of government regulation of property and profits, their influence on the shaping of economic thought might well have been worth exploring.

The authors seem to be enamored of an involved, pretentious and strained literary style that does not contribute to lucidity. A typical Handlinism: "The exercise of governing powers that impinged upon private property rights, once justified by a public function, served to involve empirical injustices in the hands of groups operating for private emolument" (p. 172). John Adams would have enjoyed learning that he had spent his youth in "frontier" Worcester. Since that "heart of the commonwealth" was snugly located between Boston and Northampton (the latter settled in 1654) it hardly bespeaks a dynamic colonial penetration of the interior to consider the Worcester of 1755 a "frontier" community.

The Committee on Economic History, under whose auspices this study was undertaken, has been the recipient of a generous grant from the Social Science Research Council, and is devoting a substantial portion of it to studying the "political-economic thought and action" of three other states: Pennsylvania, Georgia and Illinois. Despite geographic and economic diversity, many parallels in the evolution of public policy on economic issues will undoubtedly be disclosed in all four states. Hence, these extended remarks are offered in a spirit of constructive criticism. While the Handlins' study is in many respects a notable synthesis of economic thought based upon wide reading, it is submitted that the forthcoming studies could have a broader measure of utility for economist, historian and public administrator were they to lay less stress on conventional state boundaries and more upon the geographic and technological organization of economic life (the regional approach to Southern history by scholars like Howard W. Odum and Rupert B. Vance and the analyses of the census returns

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of 1850 and 1860 by the Vanderbilt University group testify to the extent of economic divergence within the states and the artificialities of state boundaries even that early). More consideration might well be given, furthermore, to the impact upon the local scene of federal intervention in economic matters. Lastly, some nexus should be established between the economic views of miscellaneous private groups and interests (including labor as well as capital) and that public policy laid down in authoritative channels.

RICHARD B. MORRIS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Weimar Republic: Overture to the Third Reich. By GODFREY SCHEELE. London, Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1946.—360 pp. 18*s.* 6*d.*

Germany: From Defeat to Conquest, 1913-1933. By W. M. KNIGHT-PATTERSON. Foreword by Lord Vansittart. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1945.—622 pp. 21*s.*

Die Weimarer Republik. By FERDINAND FRIEDENSBURG. Berlin, Carl Habelsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1946.—412 pp.

The Origins of Modern Germany. By GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1946.—x, 165 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*

The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany since 1815. By A. J. P. TAYLOR. New York, Coward-McCann, Inc., 1946.—230 pp. $3.00.

These books tell us far more about the state of modern historiography than they do about Germany. In fact, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to understand the problem of Germany on the basis of these volumes.

They may be divided topically into those dealing with the Weimar Republic and those going back beyond the Weimar experiment to reach for an explanation of the failure of democracy in earlier historical periods.

Mr. Godfrey Scheele's book has a thesis. That thesis is quite difficult to isolate because of the muddy philosophy in which it is enveloped, and which the reviewer is unable to understand. It appears to be that Germany lacks the "measure" which is so beautifully represented and practiced in Latin countries (including Fascist Italy and Spain?) and in Great Britain. The German nation became "a structureless mass-collective of purposeless atoms", and, to crown the

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condemnation of the Republic, " in Berlin all manner of sexual license and aberrations could be indulged without shame or restraint. Virginity lost its esteem and contraceptive practices gained official recognition." " German moral autonomy refused to accept a moral order which it regarded as a heteronomy instituted against it by other nations." (This apparently means that the Germans considered liberalism as un-German.) Within this framework—if it is one—the author discusses three problems: the politics of the Republic (this is equivalent to the ascendance of Seeckt as the symbol of the army's power); the economics of the Weimar period, tantamount to the building up of a preparedness economy, symbolized by " the genius of Schacht "; and the diplomacy of the Republic, aiming at war and characterized by " the skill of Stresemann ". All of this is, of course, indisputable but becomes, in fact, untrue in view of the moralistic approach throughout the analysis. The three trends, however, did not result in the victory of the army, industrial leaders and other reactionary groups, according to Scheele. As he sees it, the " egalitarian Republic " resulted " in the advent of the masses . . . which had acquired a mysterious influence over public life penetrating every cultural domain and offering themselves to a leader or organizer as a raw material to be built into the foundation of the future." This development was, in turn, due to the plebiscitarian democracy. Since German unity begets this state of mind plus aggressiveness, it is obvious that the solution of the German problem lies in Germany's destruction.

This is also the thesis of W. M. Knight-Patterson's book. This is a frankly Vansittartist work. It is, however, by no means merely a diatribe against Germany but a serious, extremely well-documented analysis of all her misdeeds. Its usefulness lies in the documentation of the Achilles heel of German liberalism and social democracy, namely, their nationalism.

Friedensburg's book is the first post-Nazi German analysis of the Weimar Republic. It was written in 1934, with the exception of the last chapter (the failure of the Republic) which was added in 1945. The author, a high official in the Prussian administration of the Weimar Republic and a well-known authority on raw materials, was Chief of the German Central Administration for Fuel in the Soviet Zone, was deposed by the Soviet Military Administration for his alleged failure to denazify the lignite mines under his control, and is now, as the representative of the Christian Democratic Union, a Deputy Mayor of Berlin. As the first post-Nazi analysis of the Weimar Republic, the book deserves more serious attention than its content warrants. It is

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the familiar thesis of a " good " democrat: the collapse of the German democracy was not inevitable; German democracy was, in itself, good. That it could not maintain itself was due to the strength of internal antidemocratic forces and the harshness of her former enemies. A considerable part of the book is taken up with an analysis of the Versailles Treaty and its consequences; the rest is concerned with the political, administrative, economic and social performance of the Republic, with cultural problems receiving comparatively little attention. There is little new in the book and there are many omissions and inadequate emphases. But the general tenor is clear (and stressed by the author): greater severity on the part of democrats within Germany and more lenience on the part of the victors will give future German democracy a much better chance.

Surveying these three books, one might be impelled to reduce the history of the Republic to a simple formula: *a democracy created, maintained and destroyed by the army,* the army representing not only its own interests but those of its allied groups, big industry and finance, Junkers, and high civil service. Democracy was created by the army and not by the revolution of 1918. It was Ludendorff who in September 1918 demanded the introduction of parliamentary responsibility; it was he who thus destroyed the Bismarck constitution and achieved the enactment of the October laws which introduced the political control by the Reichstag. It was Hindenburg who saved the democracy in 1918-1919 through his famous agreement with the Social Democrat Ebert against the Bolsheviks. In their hatred of bolshevism, the army and Social Democracy found common ground. It is needless to add that the result of their alliance brought about the birth of Nazism. This intensely dramatic story has been retold with consummate skill by E. O. Volkmann in his famous *Revolution in Deutschland.* The alliance between Social Democracy and the Army High Command has been revealed by General Groener as a witness in the famous " stab in the back " trial. And it was again Hindenburg who destroyed democracy.

Perhaps this formula is too crude; but it is sufficiently true to give us an understanding that German democracy owed neither its birth nor its existence to democratic movements or to a revolution.

Do the other books help us to understand why this state of affairs came about? Professor Barraclough makes such an attempt. But it would perhaps be unfair to him to review his book under this aspect; of his 465 pages, 352 deal with German medieval history, and only 110 treat German history from 1519 to 1939. As a history of

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medieval Germany, the book is excellent throughout. As an analysis of recent German history it suffers from the author's overemphasis on the medieval period. It is of course undeniable and widely recognized that the medieval heritage—the aspirations for the Holy Roman Empire—led to the establishment of sovereign power in the principalities which, again, during the Reformation, contributed to the strengthening of all absolutistic tendencies and delayed the unification of Germany far beyond that of comparable other modern states. Yet it fails to explain the weakness of liberalism from 1812 to 1914 and the total failure of labor in and after 1918. This the author himself admits. The brief analysis of the reconstruction of a democratic state is that of a liberal Laborite: it should be done primarily on the basis of the labor movement, supported and not blocked by the victorious Powers.

The most brilliant performance is unquestionably that of A. J. P. Taylor, the young Oxford historian to whom we are already indebted for an excellent history of the Hapsburg monarchy. Although it is a brilliant analysis, it is by no means a completely satisfactory one. For Taylor, German history is unique; it is a "history of extremes". It is the very insistence on the unique quality of German history that makes his analysis unsatisfactory, for it fails to account for similar phenomena in other countries. Perhaps history as taught and practiced today is incapable of explaining historical phenomena, is capable only of partial solutions, contributions which, valuable as they may be, are untrue because they fail to stress trends transcending national boundaries, features that are common to all modern industrial nations.

True, there are unique features in German history. They may be summarized as follows: (1) The delayed unification of Germany and the dispersal of Germans in neighboring states; (2) the unification by "blood and sword" and not by a democratic movement; (3) the late entry of Germany into the world market; (4) the lack of a militant liberal movement; (5) the imposition of progressive, democratic and liberal institutions from above (the constitutions after 1848, universal franchise, parliamentary responsibility, liberation from Nazism); (6) the creation of democracy as a consequence of military defeat (1918 and 1945); (7) the short duration of German democracy; (8) the complete failure of labor as a political force.

All this is certainly unique—at least for Europe. Yet does it really "explain" Nazism? Is it really possible to gain an understanding of Germany by knowing merely her history? The failure of German labor has its counterpart. The decline of militant liberalism occurs

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even where there existed militant liberal movements. Wars have been waged by other nations, and fascism emerged in other countries before it arose in Germany.

There are trends in modern society which know no national boundaries. The increasing monopolization of economics, politics and culture has produced and is producing an ever-growing feeling of insecurity. The German nation has reacted to the fear according to its national character as formed by history. That history has been—and the eight theses may be condensed into one—a history of her ruling classes, but never of her people. The ruling classes have molded Germany and molded the subject population. A feeling of extreme insecurity gave rise to the most barbaric political system in history. Other nations may react to the profound insecurity by a revolution, some may utilize democracy to create security and freedom, still others may, however, resort to fascism.

One fact may be learned from the books. If the choice today is merely one between a new Weimar democracy and the partition of Germany, no sane politician could hesitate to choose partition. Can one, however, have more than a Weimar Republic? It is doubtful that the Germans have the desire to create a new society and it is impossible for the occupying Powers to do it. Where they attempt to do so, there is reason to believe that one repressive system is replaced by another one. This dilemma can be solved only by agreement among the occupants. But if that is so, there is perhaps no longer a German problem. The problem is larger, Germany being merely the foremost object in this wider problem.

FRANZ L. NEUMANN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Treason's Peace: German Dyes & American Dupes. By HOWARD WATSON AMBRUSTER. New York, The Beechhurst Press, 1947.—ix, 438 pp. $3.75.

During the several centuries spanning the late medieval and early modern periods the Hanseatic League of North German trading towns enjoyed a tremendous business monopoly in northern Europe. The Hansa disappeared with the shift of trade to the Atlantic and the subsequent opening of the world's highway. But that dream of successful monopoly has persisted in Germany. In its modern form the idea emerged in the *Interessen Gemeinschaft der Farben Industrie*, "Interest Group of the Dyestuff Industries", the title commonly shortened to

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"I. G. Farben" of the German chemical trust which developed into a sinister and secret world empire.

I. G. Farben, the world's most powerful chemical giant, provided the rulers of Germany, its puppets, with the idea and means of world conquest. A huge octopus, it used its restrictive power of patent tie-ups with the industrialists of other nations, including our own, to slow up production of strategic war materials in countries the Germans considered potential enemies. It aimed at an international monopoly above the law of any country. Proceeding on the assumption that money knows no patriotism, it operated through business men, lawyers and financiers in all countries, including the United States, through men who know their way into the innermost recesses of government and have an influence on policy. During its wartime peak it controlled 900 chemical factories in Germany and the occupied territories, employed 250,000 persons, supplied Hitler's Wehrmacht with 84 per cent of its explosives, turned out almost all the synthetic rubber tires that kept Germany's transport rolling, and presented an annual bill of one billion dollars to the Reich. In ten years its profits multiplied eightfold. Its foreign agents formed the core of Nazi intrigue throughout the world; ostensibly acting only as harmless business men, they carried on propaganda and espionage activities indispensable to German preparation for the waging of aggressive war. It was highly experienced in the art of controlling corporations, accumulating stocks of raw materials, and unlimited bribery.

The entire pattern of subterfuge behind which Farben has almost succeeded in veiling its identity is exposed in this book by Howard Watson Ambruster, a New Jersey chemical engineer and consultant. It is an amazing story of an industrial conspiracy which "unlike the armies and governments of Germany never dies and never surrenders, win, lose or draw, in its perpetual war of world conquest." For forty years Ambruster and a small group of American scientists and publicists have been voices crying in the wilderness about the true nature of I. G. Farben. Senators, Congressmen and governmental officials have been notoriously averse to giving them a hearing. Ambruster himself claims to be an example of the devious influence of Farben which he feels operated mysteriously to prevent the publication of his book. It was finally brought out by the forty-second publisher he approached.

Treason's Peace is a hard-hitting book and deserves wide distribution. The author does not express his accusations in vague generalities, but on the contrary names names, cites chapter and verse, and supports all his charges by quoting often disregarded official documents and court

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records. If his plainly stated declarations are untrue, then there is material here for a score of libel suits. Men now prominent in the fashioning of American foreign policy are shown to be legal, business and social fronts for the many ramifications of I. G. Farben; they emerge with tarnished reputations. The Department of Justice is accused of laxity in rooting out the Farben cartel, and the accusation appears to be backed by evidence.

The book is somewhat unevenly written. Mr. Ambruster had so many facts and ideas at his disposal that he was forced to cut a good deal of his material to keep it within the range of a usable one-volume edition. The result is an effect of choppiness. To attract a wide audience he sought to enliven his text by popular verbiage and slangy interludes, most of which fall flat. But these are minor faults.

There is some hope in the black picture. The United States has indicted twenty-four top officials of I. G. Farben at Nuremberg as war criminals, thus for the first time bringing into court the great industrial and financial forces which help to create and direct wars. It is perhaps an indication of the times, as well as historical justice, that the crusading chemical engineer from New Jersey, who was so often dismissed in Washington as a crackpot, has been requested to serve as an adviser to occupation authorities in Germany. He has shown himself to be a persistent David in his struggle against a diabolic Goliath. He well deserves the title of " good American citizen ".

LOUIS L. SNYDER

THE CITY COLLEGE OF NEW YORK

The Finances of European Liberation: With Special Reference to Italy. By FRANK A. SOUTHARD, JR. New York, King's Crown Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1946.—vi, 206 pp. $3.00.

Professor Southard, who served as a finance officer in the United States Army in World War II, has written a comprehensive account of the finances of European liberation with particular emphasis on the Italian experience. Though he admits that the explanations given for policy decisions in financial matters, either in the field or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are not always clear or defensible, he thinks that the program worked as well as it could under very trying circumstances.

Dr. Southard criticizes several of the policies followed in providing invasion currency. For example, the use of the yellow-seal dollar in Europe was not justified except in emergencies; and the refusal to

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permit the French provisional government to print its own currency for use in France was unfortunate and unnecessary. Allied military marks should have been used in Austria in place of Allied military schillings, since the population was accustomed to using the Reichsmark. The decision to reimburse the Italian government in dollars for "net troop pay" was undoubtedly justified, but it was announced without consultation with the other allied Powers fighting in Italy. The determination of exchange rates at which troops were paid seemed to be at best expedient. In North Africa and France, the franc was overvalued, which made the cost of French goods high for the American soldier, who resented it. The French later adjusted this by granting 850 francs per month to each American soldier. In Italy the lira was first undervalued at 100 to the dollar. Later, inflation made this rate an overvaluation which was ultimately corrected by making the rate 225 lire (more recently 400) to the dollar. The author fails to give any clear justification for the earlier rate (100 lire to the dollar) which was decided upon by high British and American military officials who did not consult the civilian economic experts in Washington and London who could have suggested a more realistic rate. The author underestimates the real and psychological effects of soldier spending in the liberated areas. No attempt was made by American authorities to restrict troop spending by withholding pay, as the British did. The Army Judge Advocate ruled that it was illegal to withhold soldier pay. Dr. Southard comments that, even though the original rate in Italy (100 lire to the dollar) undervalued the lira, price rises soon wiped out the undervaluation. But he fails to see that the original rate was an important factor in raising prices. Control of illegal monetary transactions by American troops was simple enough, when it was finally imposed, but it was too long delayed.

The story of the invasion currency is well told; that is, the provision of a day-to-day currency, opening banks as soon as possible, and so on. Examples of the various invasion currencies are reproduced in handsome plates. "Spearhead currency" in Sicily consisted of yellow-seal dollars and British military authority notes. Later the Allied military lire were substituted. Some difficulty was experienced in the early days of the French invasion, until the French people and bankers understood the real status of the supplemental francs. In the Balkans it was impossible to fix a satisfactory exchange rate. Therefore, yellow-seal dollars were used. Fortunately, the amounts involved were relatively small.

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The Germans had arranged to have their occupation currency charged to them on the clearings accounts in friendly countries. In occupied countries currency was drawn against an occupation-cost or indemnity account with no question of reimbursement. The Germans lived off the country and shipped back to Germany tremendous quantities of goods. The Russians also lived off the liberated area. They brought little into the area for civilian use and collected reparations in kind.

An excellent account of internal Italian finance is given by Professor Southard. Under fascism every financial and governmental function was centered in Rome. This made the financial problems of liberation difficult until Rome was liberated. Revenues were restored quickly except for the state monopolies (tobacco, salt and matches) which depended on very scarce goods. The Italian taxation system, which was extremely regressive and depended on consumption and excise taxes, was changed, where possible, and taxes collected in satisfactory amounts. Despite the success of the tax revision and the national loan (long term), more than 100 billion lire had to be provided in 1944-45 by net sales of treasury notes. Mussolini's Fascist Social Republic in the north left a staggering deficit of 310 billion lire, possibly giving the ghost of that individual the last laugh. "It is clear", says the author on page 88, "that where acute scarcity of commodities is a major factor in price increases, there are not purely monetary cures for economic instability." Professor Southard predicts that the "Italy of tomorrow, like that of yesterday, will have a state-dominated economy." This will be true at least in the short run.

Dr. Southard has done all students of this field a great service in writing the story of the finances of European liberation and in giving a keen analysis of their effects. Opinions will differ as to the wisdom of the policies pursued.

HENRY S. MILLER

QUEENS COLLEGE

Our Vichy Gamble. By WILLIAM L. LANGER. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1947.—ix, 412, xi pp. $3.75.

Professor Langer undertook this study of our relations with Vichy France "as a dispassionate scholar, not as an apologist." All relevant materials in the State Department were made available to him and he has given us an interesting and well-documented account. He has also given a more than generous interpretation to many incriminating facts.

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Four major arguments are offered to explain American recognition of the Vichy government. Our policy allowed us, says the author, to gather important information, to maintain close relations with the French people, and to help the government resist German pressure. Finally it paved the way for the landing of our troops in North Africa.

Only the first argument is above challenge—with one reservation, however. If the reader is in no position to question the importance of the military information thus obtained, he may well question the value of the political information gathered by our officials: that is, Murphy's illusions about Weygand and his entourage and the gross underestimation of De Gaulle's support in France. It was unfortunate that our sources of information were too close to Vichy France to allow an unbiased appraisal of the strength and aspirations of the other France.

The second argument is of course the least serious. It can hardly be said that our support of a fascist government could help "to keep alive the sentiment of liberty and equality" in the French people. It created confusion and discouragement, whereas a moral condemnation through nonrecognition would have helped crystallize the positions against collaboration.

Our continued recognition was a question not of ideology but of national interest: "to break with Vichy was tantamount to leaving the field to the collaborationists." On this contention stands or falls our Vichy policy. Dr. Langer admits that in 1940 the United States government wielded little weight at Vichy, and that in 1942 we were no longer in a position of direct influence. But in 1941 "our influence was real and effective." Yet in May, Darlan's deal with the Germans concerning Syria and Libya gave them military assistance that went far beyond the terms of the armistice. In July, Indo-China surrendered on Vichy's order. A few months later, Murphy's white hope, General Weygand, was recalled from North Africa. Apparently Pétain, who "reigned rather than governed", approved of Darlan's actions. All Admiral Leahy could do was to ask for "assurances that he knew in advance would be next to worthless"; yet even Laval's return to power did not appreciably chill the wishful thinking of the State Department.

If such a record leads the reader to question the effectiveness of our influence at Vichy, he still must ask whether things would not have been worse, had we not been there. But the behavior of the Vichy government was dictated by considerations of force rather than by diplomatic etiquette: in all probability nonrecognition would not have

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changed appreciably the extent of collaboration indulged in by Vichy. Concerning the French fleet, Dr. Langer agrees that the French would have sunk their fleet " at any time between 1940 and 1942 without reference to our Vichy policy." As for North Africa, if the Germans " had chosen to act in that area, neither Vichy, nor Britain, nor the United States could have stopped them at any time prior to the autumn of 1942." Admiral Leahy confessed in January 1942 that " my general impression as a result of this interview is that America cannot expect any coöperation whatever by Vichy in an effort to exclude the Axis from North Africa when and if the Germans desire to move in that direction." Our North African policy is described as " an unqualified success ". Yet the careful plans would have misfired, had it not been for the Darlan " miracle ". Our choice, General Giraud—" politically he is a child ", said Darlan—met with the chilly reception that could have been predicted.

Our Vichy gamble seems to have been less a gamble than the alternative to a gamble that our leaders were not willing to take. The breach of relations with Vichy involved taking certain risks for definite advantages. Professor Langer has emphasized the risks and minimized the advantages. The danger was that Vichy would embrace all-out collaboration, yet the author admits that " the only thing he [Pétain] was anxious to avoid . . . was being responsible for American hostility. That, he knew, the country would neither understand nor excuse."

As for De Gaulle, " a sensible, opportunistic policy " should not have been influenced either by the general's authoritarian leanings or his leftist following since it was indifferent to Vichy's fascism. That he was a stubborn and unpleasant fellow is another matter. " In regard to de Gaulle," said Roosevelt to Churchill, " I have heretofore enjoyed a quiet satisfaction in leaving him in your hands. Apparently I have a similar problem in brother Giraud." But why prefer Giraud to De Gaulle? " We distrusted them [the Free French] and we distrusted their program, such as it was. We tried to find some leader, some prominent French figure who represented more nearly the traditions of patriotic France." Such a statement is meaningless, unless one replaces the word " patriotic " by " conservative ". When the author admits that in the spring and summer of 1942 De Gaulle had a substantial following in France and had become a symbol of resistance, the reader is less convinced than ever about the wisdom of our policy. He cannot help wondering whether the political implications of resistance and collaboration were understood when he reads that " really

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about the only sincere collaborationists in France were the industrial interests like the Banque Worms group."

The advantage of the real gamble would have been the reaching of a clear-cut position against fascism, useful during the war and more so after the war. The misunderstanding created by our Vichy policy and capitalized upon by reactionaries and revolutionaries has led many to question the value of our "sensible opportunistic policy". Dr. Langer's book will not allay their misgivings.

CHARLES A. MICAUD

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

China's Destiny. By CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Authorized Translation by Wang Chung-hui. Introduction by Lin Yutang. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1947.—xi, 260 pp. $2.75.

China's Destiny & Chinese Economic Theory. By CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Notes and Commentary by Philip Jaffe. New York, Roy Publishers, 1947.—347 pp. $3.50.

In whichever translation and accompanied by whatever prolegomena and exegeses, this "message" from the head of the Chinese state is an historical curiosity rather than a contribution to an understanding of China, of the head of the Chinese state, of comparative culture or anything else. It signifies something of the spirit of contemporary Chinese politics rather than Chinese political thought.

Chiang Kai-shek wrote his "message" while the war was in progress. He intended it to be just that to his countrymen—an inspirational document, a declaration of creed, a prophet's words to his followers. How much he himself wrote, and how much a professor-disciple named Tao Hsi-sheng wrote, has never been established. The question will not agitate future scholars much, since in neither case is anything added to thought and not much credit will fall to whoever wrote it.

The book is didactic, revivalistic, declamatory, rhetorical—a succession of generalities meaning little or much according to taste. Like all sermons it begins with denunciation of sin, the sin in this case being Western, in so far as the West is guilty of all China's suffering, and Chinese only in so far as China has allowed itself to be allured by the false appeal of the West. With an historical interpretation that any moderately well-read Chinese sophomore could refute both as to factual accuracy and logic in interpretation, Chiang Kai-shek finds that China's decline in the last hundred years is attributable wholly to the unequal treaties forced on China by the West. Thus the tried and true Con-

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fucian way of life was sundered. Had he said that the impact of Western ideas, of Western institutions, and of Western applied science was responsible, a case might have been made out; though even then it would have to be added that the present downward sweep of the cycle in China began before the intrusion of the West. But to lay the cultural crisis of China or of any other land in the East wholly to Western political and military intrusion is both naïve and callow.

Essentially Chiang Kai-shek's message therefore is that his people must return to the tried and true Confucian way of life *plus* Western "technology"—railways, great factories, closely knit means of communication. The combination and inter-assimilation of the fifth century B. C. and the twentieth century A. D. so that both Confucius and Henry Ford would feel at home is a detail to be managed in the future.

One thing is revealed clearly. Chiang Kai-shek is consistent enough in that his conception of the future of his country is made clear. It is that of a country under a benevolently paternal authoritarianism, the authority being the Kuomintang. All considerations of the nature of the Kuomintang apart, the point is the paternalism. That is consistent enough: Confucianism, though without a Confucius and the Confucian code of social ethics. There are those in China who call it democracy, since the West now writes the political lexicon, but it would be democracy with peculiar inflections—inflections not so much Oriental as ante-medieval.

If Chiang Kai-shek were a senior in the Peking National University submitting this as a term paper, it would be returned for drastic revision. But he is the head of the Chinese state; hence publication, hence compulsory reading in Chinese schools, hence this review. Otherwise no one of the three would follow.

NATHANIEL PEFFER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Vtoraia Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Vospominaniia Sovremennika (*The Second State Duma, Reminiscences of a Contemporary*). By V. A. MAKLAKOV. Paris, Editions et Librairie La Renaissance, 1946. —260 pp.

The name of Vasili Alekseevich Maklakov is not likely to strike a responsive chord except among students of Russian history and the rapidly dwindling group of expatriates from tsarist Russia. These chosen few will remember him as an outstanding figure in the Russian liberal movement in the closing decades of the imperial régime.

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Maklakov, a brilliant criminal lawyer and a leading spokesman of the constitutional-democratic party in the Second, Third and Fourth Dumas, fought valiantly the losing battle for the introduction in Russia of a democratic form of government in the traditional meaning of the term. In 1917 he was appointed by the Provisional Government Russian ambassador to Paris where he has lived since. The first instalment of his memoirs, which brings the story to the end of 1905, was issued in three volumes about 1937 (publishers of Russian books in France are in the unfortunate habit of omitting the date of publication); the second instalment, devoted to the First State Duma (April-July 1906), appeared presumably during the war; the third instalment, which deals, as indicated by its title, with the Second State Duma (February-June 1907), was published in December 1946.

The memoirs of Maklakov are interesting and significant from more than one point of view. Extremely well written, they offer a vivid record of a crucial period in Russia's history. Maklakov believes, and it would seem with good reason, that the great issue of autocracy vs. representative government was decided in 1907, during the brief lifetime of the Second Duma. It will be remembered that Stolypin, then president of the council of ministers, threw in his lot with the reactionaries; the Duma was dissolved, the franchise law was drastically revised in violation of the constitution (or Fundamental Laws, as they were officially called), and the government embarked on a course which inexorably led the monarchy to its doom and to the revolution of 1917. A careful, well-documented factual analysis of the events which resulted in the dissolution of the Duma and the promulgation of the franchise law of June 3, 1907, provides the main theme of Maklakov's latest book. His detailed account of the policies pursued by the government and by the various political groups is unorthodox, penetrating and often revealing. Far from shifting the responsibility for the conflict between the Duma and the government on his political opponents, he is frankly critical of the program and tactics of the constitutional-democratic party of which he was until recently one of the acknowledged leaders.

Incidentally, Maklakov's memoirs throw much light on the difficulties inherent in the process of establishing representative government in countries, such as Russia, which lack parliamentary tradition, well-established political parties, and real experience in the exacting art of self-government. These are problems that many states in eastern Europe, and, indeed, throughout the world, are facing today. An English translation of the memoirs of Maklakov would be of real

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service not only to historians and students of Russia, but also to all those who are interested in the broader question of transplanting Western democratic institutions in the arid soil of politically backward countries.

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Defeat in Victory. By JAN CIECHANOWSKI. Garden City, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1947.—xvi, 397 pp. $3.50.

As Polish ambassador to the United States from 1941 to 1945, Mr. Ciechanowski was an active participant in many of the events which he describes. His account thus gains in vividness and immediate insight what it sacrifices in perspective. For the student of international relations it is, however, an exasperating mixture of first-hand knowledge and of hearsay.

When Mr. Ciechanowski quotes in detail from his own records of conversations with President Roosevelt, Mr. Hull, General Sikorski or Mr. Mikolajczyk, his reports, those of a highly skilled diplomat, have documentary value, despite the unilateral character of such records. Here and there an important new document is presented in full or in significant excerpts, as in the case of Mikolajczyk's letter of March 17, 1944, to Roosevelt (pp. 277-282). Much new light is thrown on General Sikorski's visit of March 1941 to Washington (pp. 18-22), on Mr. Harriman's apparent failure, in September of that year, to impress upon Marshal Stalin the American interest in an equitable solution of the disputes between the Soviet and Polish governments (pp. 61-64), and on the crucial conversations between Stalin and Sikorski in December 1941 (pp. 66-80).

In describing some other important episodes the author has relied upon third-hand reports, or even upon hearsay. More authoritative information is required before a final version can be given of the alleged Soviet proposal of January 1942 for a British-Soviet-American treaty recognizing the Soviet frontier of 1941 (p. 92), of the rôle of the same question in the negotiations for the British-Soviet alliance, signed on May 26, 1942 (pp. 104-106), or of the topics and decisions of the Quebec conference of 1943 (pp. 194-199). The rumors of a secret meeting of Molotov with Roosevelt and Churchill, alleged to have been held in August 1943, are given full credence by the author (p. 195), as are unfounded rumors about the Moscow conference of the following October (pp. 228-230). Mr. Ciechanowski's data,

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while important, do not give a conclusive answer to the question of the attitude adopted by President Roosevelt at Teheran concerning the Soviet-Polish frontier (pp. 248-249, 329-331, 341-342).

The author presents authoritative information regarding Mikolajczyk's negotiations in Moscow, in August and October 1944 (pp. 320-338). It is significant that in this final phase of negotiation the Polish premier was prepared to abandon the long-held legalistic position of his government and to accept the Curzon Line as the basis of the future frontier except for the retention of Lwów and the Drohobycz oil field by Poland (p. 336). An important letter of November 17, 1944, addressed by Roosevelt to Mikolajczyk on the eve of the latter's resignation, committed the United States to support a Polish-Soviet-British agreement on the future frontiers of Poland, both east and west (pp. 341-342). It is an interesting but futile speculation whether this modification of the American insistence on postponing territorial questions to the peace settlement might not have contributed to bringing about a solution of this problem if adopted at some earlier stage of the tug-of-war.

The main weakness of Mr. Ciechanowski's thesis, which was that of the Polish government-in-exile, lay in its refusal to recognize that the defeat of Germany was bound to lead to the emergence of a new power situation in Europe, in which purely legal arguments would play a subordinate rôle. The subsequent development of Polish events may be cited in justification of many of Mr. Ciechanowski's fears and suspicions. Yet the alternative, a direct and early territorial settlement between Poland and the Soviet Union, was not tried. Why it was not tried is made considerably clearer in Mr. Ciechanowski's absorbing account of the diplomatic efforts of the Polish government-in-exile.

PHILIP E. MOSELY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Dark Side of the Moon. ANONYMOUS. Preface by T. S. ELIOT. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947.—xvii, 299 pp. $2.75.

This volume is undoubtedly one of the most affecting and important books published in many years. It tells the story of what happened to the people of eastern Poland after their incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1939. In particular, this narrative summarizes the experiences of hundreds of thousands of these Poles, men, women and

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children, who were deported to prisons and forced labor camps in all parts of the U.S.S.R. and who there learned of the conditions under which millions of Soviet citizens are now living, working and dying. But, unlike the great majority of Soviet forced laborers, some of these Poles—over 100,000 of them—finally came back into the fold of Western civilization and were able to tell the story the Soviet government has tried so hard to hide.

Of the suffering, hunger and misery which these Poles experienced, this book tells in simple human terms, but this is not its most important aspect. Much more vital, as T. S. Eliot points out in his Preface, is the volume's revelation of how the Soviet pattern of life is imposed upon a conquered people, and of the cost that results. In recent years, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, southern Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, the Carpatho-Ukraine, Tannu Tuva, as well as eastern Poland, have gone through this experience. The present revelation is an eye-opening case history, the significance of which must be pondered by all who hope to understand the issues and conflicts of today. This case history also does much to illuminate the true nature of the much vaunted Soviet "minorities policy" in the impact of that policy upon different ethnic, cultural and religious groups in the U.S.S.R.

A basic issue, of course, is the credibility of the story this book tells. To the reader who has little or no background in Soviet affairs, much of the brutality, callousness and suffering here described will seem incredible. Yet the sad fact is that there can be but little question that the camps and horrors depicted in this volume actually exist and are an important feature of life in the contemporary Soviet Union.

This volume itself comes with the endorsement of T. S. Eliot and of Madame Helena Sikorska, widow of the former Polish leader, who testifies that the anonymous author was given access to Polish government-in-exile materials at General Sikorski's own orders. But aside from this, enough Poles released from the U.S.S.R. reached the United States so that almost every large community in this country now has some persons who went through this searing experience and who can be interviewed by anyone wishing to do so. The stories of many of these persons have been recounted in sections of the American press, and the general pattern indicated by these individual accounts confirms that sketched in this volume. Of course, our knowledge of Soviet forced labor practices goes back long before the war and is to be found in the accounts of Americans and escaped Russians who came to know this aspect of Soviet life during the twenties and thirties.

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No one can hope to understand the true nature of the present struggle between the Soviet and non-Soviet ways of life who has not taken into account the phenomena described in this volume and has not reflected upon their significance for the present and future problems we face.

HARRY SCHWARTZ

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

Americans in Persia. By ARTHUR C. MILLSPAUGH. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1946.—ix, 293 pp. $3.00.

This is a report of Dr. Millspaugh's second mission to Iran, in 1943-1945, as Administrator General of the Finances. With the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the three-Power coalition, the Trans-Iranian railway and the Persian ports, like Iran's internal stability and its coöperation with the Allied effort, became important factors in the prosecution of the war against Germany and, as was long assumed, against Japan. The question which faced American policy in Iran was whether the American interest had been enlisted "for the duration and six months" or was a continuing one, and whether it was a specific interest, realizable through steps to be taken in Iran, or a general one, to be given effect primarily through the United Nations.

While American policy did not give final answers to these questions during the war, Dr. Millspaugh has arrived at definite answers. His conclusion is that the only hope for strengthening the internal structure of the country and enabling it to withstand the pressures generated by great-Power politics lies in the continuance for twenty to fifty years of outside executive control over all activities of the Persian government except the conduct of foreign affairs (pp. 214-215, 220, footnote 14). Admitting that this arrangement would be incompatible with membership in the United Nations (p. 256), the author believes that only this program would assure the eventual realization of the substance of Iranian independence and that it could be carried out only with the sincere and enlightened coöperation of the three great Powers most directly concerned.

The difficulties which would beset such a program are well illustrated in Dr. Millspaugh's account of his mission in Iran. His penetrating analysis of the impact of domestic disorder and class interests, of Soviet interference and American indecision is basic to an understanding of the underlying problems of Iran's evolution and of the impact of great-Power rivalries. The quandary of the reformer ap-

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pears in the fact that the only political group which has advocated far-reaching internal reforms, similar in many respects to those set forth by Dr. Millspaugh, is the Soviet-sponsored Toodeh party, which was instrumental in bringing about his premature departure from Iran. This comment does not detract from the validity of the author's general contention that in countries of retarded evolution American policy should not support " standpatism " but must work to strengthen the social and economic bases of community life.

Dr. Millspaugh has, understandably, passed over a number of questions rather lightly. His account does not indicate whether the Soviet government was consulted in the decision to invite his second mission to Iran. Absence of consultation would in itself have been a sufficient stimulus to Soviet hostility, apart from other and more basic motives of Soviet action in Iran. There is only brief reference to the important rôle of General Connolly's Persian Gulf Command, which bulked large in Iranian affairs of those years, or to the applications of two American companies for oil concessions. Much remains obscure in the background of the decision to seek these concessions in time of war, when they could not have been put into operation in time to contribute to victory.

The book as a whole lifts the curtain on the play of cross-purposes in Iran. The author has, however, assumed too readily that the purity of American purposes is equally transparent in all times and places. And he is convinced that in this difficult question, the complexities of which he has set forth so well, the Department of State could have provided, if it had so willed, a final answer to the " posers " put to it by him. Finally, the author has failed both to explain how the policy recommended by him could have been enforced against Soviet inaction or opposition, and to state by what means, other than those applied in 1945 and 1946, the American government could have brought about the implementation of the promises contained in the three-Power Declaration on Iran of 1943.

PHILIP E. MOSELY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Full Production Without War. By HAROLD LOEB. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1946.—xviii, 284 pp. $3.50.

Although mass unemployment has not troubled the American economy for the past six years, numerous books and articles dealing with the problem continue to appear. Many represent studies begun before the war and neglected during the time their authors were occu-

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pied with military or government service. The present book is one of these. The author, not a professional economist, is familiar through his association with the National Survey of Potential Product Capacity sponsored by the Civil Works Administration in the middle 1930's.

Mr. Loeb believes that unemployment and instability are inherent in the present institutional structure of the economy. The chief explanation of economic breakdowns is found in the inability of the structure to accommodate itself to cost-reducing technological improvements, primarily because the economy for the most part is characterized by monopolistic, rather than price, competition.

The author's distinction between monopolistic and price competition is not clear. In considering the competitive position of the firm, economists usually distinguish between pure competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and monopoly, depending on the number and strategic positions of the firms producing a commodity or closely related group of commodities. Mr. Loeb does not consider oligopoly, and at many points in the discussion inconsistencies arise out of a tendency to confuse monopolistic competition with monopoly.

The analysis of instability runs roughly as follows: suppose a cost-reducing innovation is made in a given firm or group of firms, so that the same amount of goods can be turned out with less outlay than before, or a greater amount with the same outlay as before. The tendency of monopolistic firms (here there is some confusion between monopoly and monopolistic competition) is to hold prices up while reducing their costs of production. This means that less purchasing power is made available to buy the total product; the decrease in aggregate demand results in diminished sales, and cumulative deflationary forces are set in motion which may lead to a cyclical downturn.

The author points out that the potential "wealth increment" made possible by cost-lowering innovations might be released in three ways: (1) by lowering prices to correspond with decreased costs of production, (2) by raising wages, and (3) by the injection of new money.

The first two ways are regarded as inadequate under ordinary circumstances, partly because of the resistance of monopolistic entrepreneurs, and (by the author's analysis) not entirely satisfactory since they are likely to produce undesirable repercussions in the rest of the economy. Therefore they cannot be accepted as complete solutions. This leaves only the injection of new money through public spending. But here arises a difficulty—under conditions of monopolistic competition, cost reductions increase profit margins, thereby tempting new firms to enter the industry and creating excess capacity.

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The author's solution to the difficulty is to increase aggregate demand, when production is short of full, by spending new money on public works or other outlets which do not compete with products of private enterprise. It is suggested that the tendency of firms under monopolistic conditions to expand wastefully might be checked by imposing a tax on expansion beyond optimum capacity.

By this time, a number of difficulties will have occurred to the reader. The author concentrates upon only one aspect of instability, implying that there would be no instability except under his special conditions. The general problem of maintaining aggregate demand is ignored. How are we to account, in terms of the author's analysis, for employment created by installing new equipment? Why should the result of reducing cost inevitably be deflationary even in the case of monopolistic firms, if the monopolists promptly respend their incremental profits?

Is the real difficulty one of excess investment generally, or (as most economists believe) do we need still more capital? And supposing that taxes were to be levied to check overexpansion, by what criteria would overexpansion be defined?

Mr. Loeb deserves great credit for attempting to work out a systematic approach to the problem of unemployment? Unfortunately, he has not worked long or widely enough to be aware of the implications of his analytical tools, nor of the tools he fails to use. This reviewer, while admiring the effort, would not recommend the book for either economists or laymen.

LYLE C. FITCH

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

The Trade of Nations. By MICHAEL A. HEILPERIN. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1947.—xix, 234, vii pp. $3.00.

The United States "is the only nation that can play St. George to the deadly dragon of nationalism." In that belief, Mr. Heilperin has addressed to the public at large a clear, readable brief on why the United States should play this rôle. His publishers have treated him well in the paper, type, design and binding of the volume.

The book opens with a 70-page exposition of the mechanism of international trade, lending, investment and exchange, and the general "liberal" theory of their proper functioning. The simplicity and clarity of this section recommend it not only to persons unversed in economics, but to anyone looking for a good statement of the fundamentals. This exposition is the arms and armor of St. George. Book

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Two describes the dragon, economic nationalism, whose ensign is "Forward to the Past". Then, in just under a hundred pages, a number of the issues between the two contestants are discussed. Two final chapters set out the qualifications of the American St. George and the reasons why he should purify himself to go out and meet the dragon.

Some of the same qualities that make Mr. Heilperin's book good reading for the general public will reduce its interest for economists. It necessarily covers familiar ground with a degree of simplification that prevents novelty or close reasoning. This is particularly true, of course, in the first two parts of the book. The discussion of particular problems is more provocative but, for the professional reader, often raises more questions than it answers.

For instance, Mr. Heilperin is saddened that Lord Beveridge should now "succumb to panic" and advocate a plan "which involves a complete denial of the . . . principles" of free trade to which he held in *Tariffs: The Case Examined,* in 1931 (p. 168). The conflict between national planning and liberal foreign trade policies is certainly a real one. Mr. Heilperin has delineated the dangers well. But we cannot yet say that there is no compromise; that would foreclose a crucial issue before practical experiments have been made. Furthermore, it is dangerous doctrine for one who wants freer multilateral trade to present this issue as "either . . . or . . ." For most countries the answer to that choice would be, "National planning, and we will manage to trade somehow." The international anti-depression measures which Mr. Heilperin recommends are of the utmost importance, but they will take time to work out. If adopted they are unlikely to supplant national planning altogether, though they may lessen the conflict with liberal trade policies.

Detailed discussion of these issues and an attempt to distinguish the elements of national planning that might be made consistent with liberal trade policies would probably have frustrated Mr. Heilperin's purpose of addressing the public at large. (We look forward to the book he promises on economic nationalism.) The danger is of giving an impression of irreconcilability that will lead the general reader to call compromise failure, before it is tried.

One can quarrel on similar grounds with the treatment of some other issues. The casual reader might get the impression that the world is sharply divided between state-controlled and free-enterprise economies, ignoring the middle position occupied by most countries. Mr. Heilperin's recommendations for the conduct of trade between

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free private business and enterprises under government regulation are scattered through much of the book and no very clear prescription emerges. He endorses some jejune recommendations of the Colmer Committee regarding trade with foreign state enterprises (p. 178). He finds it "surprising and distressing" that the United States *Proposals* for an International Trade Organization permit countries in balance-of-payments difficulties to use import quotas (p. 202); there is a real danger here, but can one imagine a general agreement without such a provision? His criticism of the *Proposals* becomes rather impalpable by treating that document as a statement of ideal American policy, whereas it was put forward as a realistic basis for negotiation.

Two factual errors ought to be corrected. The $650 million credit to the United Kingdom covers not only surplus property and post-V-J Day Lend-Lease, but also the agreed peacetime value of wartime Lend-Lease goods kept by the United Kingdom (p. 169). The last renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act established January 1, 1945, not 1939, as the base date for future reductions (p. 220).

This review has concentrated on strictures. They should not be allowed to obscure the usefulness of this clear and very comprehensive book in educating the lay reader. Let us hope that it will help the American St. George to don his armor and make up his mind to brave the dragon.

WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Seen from E. A.: Three International Episodes. By HERBERT FEIS. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1947.—xi, 313, vii pp. $2.75.

Mr. Feis, the former Adviser on International Economic Affairs to the Department of State, has written a very instructive book. He gives the authoritative and intimate picture of three episodes with regard to economic warfare; in the background of each there is a keen analysis of the international situation in general and of the complex domestic problems in particular. Between the lines of these stories one might even find a philosophy of economic warfare between democracies and totalitarian régimes.

One part of the book deals with the sanctions of the League of Nations against Italy at the time of the Abyssinian campaign. The author points clearly to the half-hearted measures which were never meant by Laval to cause the defeat of Mussolini, because, while supporting sanctions, Laval had also made a secret deal with Mussolini.

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This was particularly seen in the case of oil, perhaps the crucial raw material needed by Italy. The League's committee was very reluctant to include it among the products which could not be sold to Italy, and one of the most decisive arguments was the hint that the countries which were not members of the League, especially the United States, would continue to send oil to Italy.

Mr. Feis publishes figures hitherto unknown which show that the United States export of petroleum products to Italy and Italian Africa, amounting to $480,000 monthly average in 1932-34, increased to $2,674,000 in December 1935. During the last three months of 1936 the total American petroleum exports to Italy and Italian Africa amounted to $5,442,000 as compared with $6,062,000 during the whole year of 1934. Without participation of the United States the League could hardly have succeeded in stopping oil exports to Italy. The Western democracies capitulated and the Italian conquest of Abyssinia was recognized. The reader might have this question on his mind: If, after the repudiation of the Hoare-Laval compromise by the British people, the United States had followed with an export ban on oil to Italy, how greatly different might the whole development of international politics have been? At that time, however, the democracies did not realize that the United States Neutrality Resolution indirectly helped the aggressor.

The chapter "Rubber before Pearl Harbor" deals with a problem which was of direct interest to this country. The author describes vividly how some government officials urged long before Pearl Harbor that a stock of rubber for emergency use should be accumulated. He gives many details on difficult negotiations with the International Rubber Regulation Committee regarding the increase of production quotas which would make the accumulation of strategic stocks possible; he tells a story of how difficult it was to obtain appropriations for the purchase of critical and strategic materials. Even in 1939-40 Congress was asked to authorize only $100 million for the purchase of all these materials. The outbreak of the war in Europe in September 1939 did not bring any sudden change in this attitude. The Dutch government, which had an important voice in the International Rubber Regulation Committee, refused to enter into an agreement with the United States. Only in the summer of 1940 did the situation within the Committee change.

Meanwhile in Washington one agency tried to impose on private industry the obligation of maintaining large stocks of rubber. United States government stocks began to be built in the second half of 1940 and by the end of that year they reached 113,000 tons as compared

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with 176,000 tons privately owned stocks. Supplies began to come in greater quantities only in the months just before Pearl Harbor. By the end of 1941 the United States government held 368,000 tons; private stocks were 165,000 tons; the total stocks were 533,000 tons. The production of synthetic rubber on a large scale started in the second half of 1943. How close the Allies were to an exhaustion of their supplies of rubber! And reading how long it took various government officials to persuade the proper agencies to purchase these stocks, one might speculate on whether there had been a chance to induce Congress and the Administration before Pearl Harbor to build or subsidize production of synthetic rubber.

This chapter of Mr. Feis' book should be made required reading for all college students, all politicians, business men, and public servants. From it a lesson may be drawn for economic warfare and for a basic government policy in international economic affairs.

The third chapter dealing with the oil of the Middle East does not supply evidence that we have established even now such coördination of policy in international economic affairs as the present situation urgently requires.

Lack of space makes it impossible to discuss at length the many interesting points raised in this excellent book and the political and philosophical background of these " Episodes ".

ANTONIN BASCH

WASHINGTON, D. C.

The Farmer in the Second World War. By WALTER W. WILCOX. Ames, Iowa State College Press, 1947.—xii, 410 pp. $4.00.

This useful volume is the result of a proposal of the Committee on War Studies of the Social Science Research Council and the willing and unstinting coöperation of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture. All war records of the Bureau's Division of Statistical and Historical Research and all other pertinent data in the files of other divisions were opened to Professor Wilcox. The selection and interpretation of the mass of data, however, are wholly the work of Professor Wilcox. The result is a broad, general, but well-integrated study of the important economic forces affecting the farmers of the United States during the Second World War. Much of the material presented had not previously been published or was only in mimeographed form. The study therefore makes available much important information and data which otherwise might never have been given general circulation.

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Professor Wilcox is fortunately not content with a mere historical narrative. He interprets the developments of the war period in the light of the experiences of agriculture from 1919 to 1939. He also attempts to indicate the probable longer-range effects of some of the war policies. At this point there may be some criticism, but on several important issues time alone can determine whether Professor Wilcox or the critics are correct.

The scope of the study is intriguing. The phenomenal agricultural production of the war period is described, and the proportions due to weather, increased mechanization, and harder work are estimated. Alone of all nations during the conflict, the United States on the average enjoyed a better diet than in the five years before it broke out, thanks to this combination of factors. Naturally, marketing and price policies come in for considerable attention. The war loss to our soils is estimated conservatively but soberly, and the soil conservation job ahead is made quite clear. Government management of the food supply is given twenty-four pages, which, it is to be hoped, will not be forgotten if ever again there is a crisis of such magnitude. The changes the war brought to farm families and family farms are described. World agriculture and trade developments affecting our farmers are examined, as is the effect on agriculture of wartime industrial expansion. One chapter is given over to the changing rôle of the Department of Agriculture, and one to the influence and policies of the farm organizations.

Throughout Professor Wilcox writes objectively. Praise and blame are distributed as he decides from the record they should be. The often stupid, sometimes harmful and costly interference of Congress in the formulation of details of policy, often through appropriation bills, is set down; and the American Farm Bureau Federation's willingness at times to put short-time gains ahead of national welfare and sound long-range policy is not glossed over. It is, however, stated more calmly and with more documentation than in Tolley's *Farmer Citizen at War*.

Inevitably, in covering such a large topic, Professor Wilcox has omitted items some readers would wish he had included. This reviewer, for instance, feels that the treatment of the farm labor program is less than adequate in spots. The placement of about three million persons a year in nearly twice that number of jobs at a constantly decreasing overhead cost, never as much as two per cent, and the turning back annually of a considerable number of millions of dollars of the appropriation each year, represent an achievement of some magnitude.

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This reviewer is grateful, however, among other things, for three points of emphasis:

1. That "contrary to popular opinion, there is a tendency to resist rather than seek additional business management functions on the part of most administrators in the Department of Agriculture";

2. That the huge wartime responsibilities of the Department were carried with fewer employed persons than were on the payroll at the time of Pearl Harbor;

3. That, despite the war-induced agricultural prosperity, the key problems of the American farmer are not yet solved.

EDMUND DES. BRUNNER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Wallaces of Iowa. By RUSSELL LORD. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947.—xvii, 615 pp. $5.00.

From the standpoint of a student of politics, Russell Lord's book is best considered as in the main an historical document, by a participant for one portion of the period covered, namely, the years while Henry A. Wallace was Secretary of Agriculture, especially the early years; by a very sympathetic sort of participant-observer since; and by an understanding sympathetic biographer for the period of the first two Wallaces. No doubt his evaluations as a biographer are colored by his personal attachments to the third of the Wallaces. Lord was called to Washington in March 1933, from the staff of the *Country Home,* to help on the public information part of the New Deal agricultural programs. He worked at this full-time, or nearly so, only for a few years, but was given special assignments from time to time in the years following.

The historical record presented in Lord's book is by no means a continuous record. Large segments and some important developments are passed over or scarcely mentioned. Perhaps the author had had little contact with these; or possibly they did not fit too well into his conception of the Wallace character. The result is a definite appearance of eclecticism.

The most important values that the student of politics will derive from this book are as follows:

A. An approach to an understanding of Henry A. Wallace and his performances. How important this is partly remains to be seen.
B. A reporting upon *Wallace's Farmer* as an institution.
C. Insight into the agricultural reform movement of the inter-war years.

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D. Explanation and interpretation of developments in the New Deal agricultural program from 1933 to 1940.
E. Details of how Wallace came not to be Vice President for a second term, and of the Jones-Wallace episode.

In several ways the third of the foregoing is the most important, particularly as we are now passing into a post-war, and possibly inter-war, period like that which began in 1920. The set of ideas which Henry C. Wallace brought to Washington with him in 1921 was not peculiar to him, but reflected the dominant thinking of the Mid-western farmers of the time and, for that matter, of the new farmers' organization then being formed, the American Farm Bureau Federation. This set of ideas largely dictated the agricultural legislative history of the next twenty years. It is important for us to understand the genesis of this set of ideas. Are they to be equally potent in the years following this war if we presently get another break in farm prices and land values? Or have the organized farmers attained such wealth and independence this time, after seven years of good farm prices, that they are now ready to tell Uncle Sam that they can look after themselves?

Although the second Secretary Wallace came to Washington thinking almost as narrowly and straightforwardly as his father as to what needed to be done to save agriculture, within three or four years he was thinking fully as much of the first term of the "scarcity in the midst of abundance" formula as he was of the last; and toward the end of his second term, even more about it. In so doing, he found himself increasingly out of line with the dominant motivations of the farm bloc, and less acceptable to organized agriculture in the rôle of leader. Lord performs well in tracing this developing cleavage.

The treatment of Henry A. Wallace's associates in the New Deal agricultural programs is only very mildly critical. The reader will have to go somewhere else to find out why Tugwell and some of his entourage really were misfits, performing as they did, in the Department of Agriculture of the United States of America. Tugwell himself, and some of his followers, made some important contributions to the total program of this period. The unfortunate thing is that these could all have been made, and these men could have stayed to see them properly implemented, if they had not insisted on being doctrinaire about them.

The reviewer will perhaps be pardoned for pointing out that the "domestic allotment" ideas of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 came very little from Spillman's "limited debenture" plan but

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instead from none other than Beardsley Ruml, whose ideas had been worked up in chapter x of the reviewer's *Agricultural Reform in the United States* (1929). Ruml was looking for something to take the place of the McNary-Haugen proposals which he did not like, and apparently got his suggestions from the German import certificate scheme. The "adjustment" idea, represented in the middle term of the A.A.A., had still another genesis.

JOHN D. BLACK

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Wilson: The Road to the White House. By ARTHUR S. LINK. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947.—xvii, 570 pp. $5.00.

Except for a brief introductory chapter on Wilson's "Formative Years", Professor Link devotes his thick volume entirely to the decade 1902-1912: from Wilson's inauguration as president of Princeton to his election as president of the United States. For the great majority of Americans, interest in Wilson's career begins where Professor Link leaves off. It is Wilson in the White House whom they laud or loathe according to their party affiliations: Wilson relentlessly driving his reforms through Congress, struggling in vain to preserve our neutrality, enthusiastically leading the crusade to "make the world safe for democracy", battling for the acceptance of the covenant of the League of Nations at Paris and Washington, appealing to the American people to reverse the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, and dying, a frustrated champion of idealism, with the prophecy (so tragically fulfilled) of a new and more awful world war unless the nations, our own in the lead, should subordinate their selfish material interests to a common effort for world unity.

These better-known chapters of Wilson's career as president will be the subject of further volumes by Professor Link, as we are assured by the numeral I following the title of the present book. Meanwhile, the author deserves the highest praise not only for the immense amount of research which has gone into his volume, but also for the scrupulous honesty with which he has verified and evaluated his sources. It is safe to say that *The Road to the White House* is the definitive story of this heretofore rather neglected or ill-comprehended decade in Wilson's career. It furnishes the indispensable background for the understanding of the presidential years, showing especially how Wilson developed, through his struggle for democratic education at Princeton

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and for democratic politics in boss-ridden New Jersey, from a conservative disciple of Burke and Bagehot into one of the most progressive statesmen of our country.

While Professor Link's admiration for Wilson is apparent, it never leads him into the indiscriminate adulation which characterizes some of the Wilson biographers. Many of the policies of Wilson in dealing with Dean West or Senator James Smith or George Harvey are criticized as arbitrary, contradictory, or even in some cases not quite aboveboard. For example, when Wilson condemned West's book on a *Proposed Graduate College of Princeton University,* one of the trustees asked him why then he had written a fulsome preface to the book. Wilson answered that he had not seen the book when he wrote the preface! But West testified that Wilson had read and carefully edited the manuscript. "The present writer", says Link (p. 70), "accepts West's statement as correct." "This does not mean", adds Link by way of extenuation, "that Wilson deliberately made a false statement . . . . He had a notoriously bad memory for details (as his friends will testify) and it is probable that in his excitement he forgot that he had ever seen the West manuscript." The incident reminds one of Wilson's unconvincing denial in 1919 that he had seen the secret treaties negotiated by the Allies during the World War. During the presidential campaign also, in his eagerness to get votes, Wilson resorted to some rather questionable tactics. For instance, in his *History of the American People* he had spoken most disparagingly of the Polish and Italian immigrants to America. But now he praised them lavishly and explained his former strictures on them as applying only to those few who were "undesirable citizens" in their own country. "If my terms were too sweeping", he wrote to the Polish-American leader Drobinksi on February 7, 1912, "they must be attributed to my clumsiness in expressing myself." "Clumsiness" in Woodrow Wilson's powers of expression! "It is difficult to believe", writes Professor Link (p. 386), "that Wilson was really sincere in these fawning letters . . . . Had he admitted straightforwardly that he was mistaken when he wrote the passages in 1902, he might have convinced more persons of his sincerity. Instead, he endeavored to prove that he had not meant what he had written in 1902, with the result that he satisfied the complaints of few of the organizations of foreign-born voters."

Practically one half of Professor Link's volume (pp. 309-528) is devoted to the presidential campaign of 1911-1912. Here again, as in the chapters on the Princeton controversy and the New Jersey

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governorship, Professor Link has sifted his immense store of sources with great skill and diligence, and has given us as complete a story as we can hope to have. There will be many revisions of opinion among historians and the general public who read these pages. They will find proof that not Bryan but the "bosses" like Sullivan and Taggart were chiefly instrumental in securing Wilson's nomination, that Colonel House played an insignificant part, and that Champ Clark, in spite of his majority on the tenth ballot, never had the least chance of securing the nomination. They will also find a convincing argument of exposing the "complete hypocrisy" of George Harvey's conduct in the Harvey-Wilson-Watterson imbroglio.

It may seem ungracious to call attention to lapses in so excellent a book as Professor Link's. But one cannot agree with him that Wilson's five-volume *History of the American People* is his "magnum opus" (p. 29)—except in the magnitude of its bulk. It is mostly a scissors-and-paste job, far inferior to his *Congressional Government.* Nor did Theodore Roosevelt advocate "destroying" the "industrial giants" (p. 113). And finally Professor Link repeats the common but erroneous statement that the phrase "bull moose" had its origin in the Progressive convention of 1912 (p. 474, n. 33). As a matter of fact, it was in the campaign of 1900 that the vice-presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt assured manager Mark Hanna that he felt "as strong as a bull moose." But these are minor matters. We shall await with eagerness Professor Link's coming volumes, and shall be well rewarded when they appear.

DAVID S. MUZZEY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Horace Greeley: Printer, Editor, Crusader. By HENRY LUTHER STODDARD. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946.—xiv, 338 pp. $3.50.

Horace Greeley and the Republican Party, 1853–1861: A Study of the New York Tribune. By JETER A. ISELY. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947.—xiii, 368 pp. $4.50.

There are doubtless reasons why no major work dealing with Horace Greeley has heretofore been written. Greeley was an influence for so long and in so many capacities, has been written into so many contemporary newspapers, manuscript collections and monographs, and was so extremely prolific a writer himself, that only the most ambitious student would attempt a definitive work. Moreover, his complex

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personality, which made a kind of crazyquilt of his numerous projects, may have helped discourage a serious study of the historic period which in some ways he helped to command. The contradiction between his love of Henry Clay, for instance, and his espousal of socialist principles is not lightly explained. The state of Greeley biography is best indicated by the fact that Mr. Isely, who has written what is by far the most substantial historical work on Greeley at present available, should term James Parton's 1855 study of Greeley "perhaps the best existing full length study" (p. 14). Parton's work is a primary source, but it is too full of partisan comment, too lacking in social and political acumen to offer more than a surface portrait of Greeley and his times.

Mr. Stoddard's work is a labor of love, one journalist's tribute to another. Its virtue is that it seeks to see Greeley whole and (unlike Parton) confines itself to relevant detail. It paints a vivid picture of Greeley's distressing home life, a judgment, one is tempted to think, upon his view that woman's place was in the home and that divorce was immoral. In addition, Mr. Stoddard keenly appreciates Greeley's journalistic brilliancy and more than illustrates the clarity of style which E. L. Godkin admired, though he admired nothing else in Greeley. Unfortunately, the author lacked adequate information to make the contribution the subject required. A modern study which finds no reason so much as to note Ralph L. Fahrney's useful examination of Greeley's opinions during the Civil War is scarcely likely to add to available knowledge or understanding of him; and Mr. Stoddard's account of Greeley does little more than remind us of how long, hectic and complex a career he carved out for himself.

Mr. Stoddard's study contrasts too sharply with Mr. Isely's *Horace Greeley and the Republican Party* to warrant additional comment. The latter offers a detailed (almost too detailed) analysis of the *Tribune* editor's political opinions from 1850 to 1860. The effect is somewhat pedestrian at times, but so conscientious and elaborate an examination can hardly fail to throw light on the subject. It modifies the myth of Greeley's "terrible candor": Greeley could tack and turn with other journalists and politicians. It analyzes, even if incidentally, the close ties between his reform and conservative principles, which bound the northern laboring as well as the business interests to the *Tribune*. It reveals Greeley's extraordinary sensitivity to public opinion, as illustrated by his evolution from anti-abolitionism to abolitionism. Mr. Isely provides new evidence that he was greedy for office and personal power, and it reads better in his book than in Professor Glyndon G. Van Deusen's recent study of Thurlow Weed, who was himself no philanthropist.

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Mr. Isely comes to grips with Whig-Nativist-Republican politics in a way which sets off the *Tribune's* importance in welding the North together for battle. His conclusions about Greeley himself, however, seem too sweeping. Greeley sought in post-war years to eradicate the scars of conflict, but was opposed by the triumphant northern politicians. "Such", writes Mr. Isely, "was the bitter harvest which Greeley reaped from his antislavery crusade. The party for which he was so largely responsible had become the intrenched party of the north, determined on vengeance. The wages of battle were hatred, and Greeley saw his hopes of a harmonious society within the nation crumble about his feet. Much of his career had been spent in vain" (p. 334).

But if intent and the relative desirability of principles are not to be respected apart from gross results, it is not clear who, if anyone, is to escape censure. It is not plainly indicated what program Mr. Isely himself believes would have been more surely successful, and his failure to evaluate the influence of the abolitionists proper, not to mention those who merely opposed the extension of slavery territory, makes it difficult to judge Greeley in context.

A broader study of Greeley might well employ the insight utilized by Constance Rourke in her *Trumpets of Jubilee,* as well as the research of Mr. Isely. Greeley might conceivably emerge not only as an indefatigable schemer and dogmatist, but as a highly gifted journalist who shared many of the prejudices and crotchets of his fellow citizens, who exposed issues to light, and who was, in short, in many ways as much a product of his times as a molder of them.

LOUIS FILLER

ANTIOCH COLLEGE

Critics & Crusaders: A Century of American Protest. By CHARLES A. MADISON. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1947.—xii, 572 pp. $3.50.

Placing the credit for social progress is always a difficult task. On the one hand there are the visionaries who, far ahead of the procession, catch a glimpse of a better world and devote their lives to pursuit of the dream; on the other, there are the more practical idealists who run with the pack, or only slightly ahead of it, and exercise constructive leadership in achieving social betterment. The Ignatius Donnellys and the Woodrow Wilsons—by what means will you assess their contributions?

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Mr. Madison, one of the Holt editors, has devoted his spare time for six years to the preparation and writing of this book: a collection of biographical essays that treats the contributions of eighteen American visionaries. He has organized them into six groups, and within each division he offers first a background essay and then a chapter devoted to each of three radicals or crusaders. He defines his subject by saying, "A radical may be many things and he may be moved by complex motives, but in the last analysis he is an idealist who feels impelled to right existing wrongs" (p. 529). Mr. Madison's abolitionists are William Lloyd Garrison, John Brown and Wendell Phillips; the Utopians include Margaret Fuller, Albert Brisbane and Edward Bellamy; Henry David Thoreau, Benjamin R. Tucker and Emma Goldman represent the anarchists; while Henry George, Brooks Adams and Thorstein Veblen are classified as dissident economists. John Peter Altgeld, Lincoln Steffens and Randolph Bourne are grouped as militant liberals; and the Socialists include Daniel De Leon, Eugene Victor Debs and John Reed. A final chapter briefly notes the rôle of radicalism in our history, and speculates upon the future. There is an excellent index and a suggestive bibliography; the latter is meant for the general reader rather than for the scholar.

Another author might well choose other names from the roll of American radicals, a fact that does not justify criticism of Mr. Madison's selection. Nor could one very well argue with his statement that "The quest for freedom has been a basic characteristic of the American people from the very beginning" (p. vii); or his assertion that "The story of these frontiersmen of freedom cannot be told too frequently; actually it is not narrated often enough" (p. viii). Readers may disagree, however, with the statement that these eighteen individuals are "most responsible for the extension of social and economic freedom" (p. ix).

This volume is obviously not the product of original research. It is meant for the general reader rather than for the specialist. Other reviewers have noted the presence of a few factual errors; these are more apparent in the background essays than in the chapters devoted to the eighteen selected radicals. There is sometimes oversimplification, as when the author states that "This sectional pride . . . soon drove Abolition from the South" (p. 4), or that "nearly all Southerners . . . were resolved to secede from the Union the moment they lost control of the federal government" (p. 11). The generalizations are occasionally misleading, as when the author seems to imply that the "defeat" of the Confederate army took place at Appomattox

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(p. 13) or that Salmon P. Chase was a liberal (p. 345). There are a few careless errors, as the misspelling of Frederick Douglass in the index—it is spelled correctly at least twice in the text. The author's enthusiasm sometimes gets the better of him, as when he describes Garrison's *Thoughts on Colonization* as "the most significant tract produced in this country up to that time" (p. 22).

Yet such occasional weaknesses should not be allowed to obscure the fact that Mr. Madison's book is essentially accurate, and that it may well provide many educated Americans (who are not specialists in American history) with real insight into an important phase of American intellectual development. The writing is clear and forceful. The chapters on Margaret Fuller, Thoreau and Henry George are remarkably fine, presenting these three unusual people as well-rounded, flesh-and-blood personalities. His John Brown, however, may seem a little overdone, and he cannot make Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman very attractive persons, even though he does arouse sympathy for them. One does not have to agree that these people played dominant rôles in our social progress in order to believe that they should be known and understood by twentieth-century Americans, and to be glad that Mr. Madison has told their stories so sympathetically and so well.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN

CORTLAND STATE TEACHERS COLLEGE

Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization. By HERBERT A. SIMON. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1947.—xvi, 259 pp. $4.00.

For more than fifty years now a small number of business managers, public servants and scholars have been studying the peculiar characteristics of group activity in formal organizations such as the construction gang or factory, the corporation, the government bureau or department, and the Army. Unquestionably much of the writing on the subject has been legalistic, formalistic and mechanical.

Professor Simon is representative of those today who are dissatisfied with past study and generalization. His charge is succinctly stated: "Administrative description suffers currently from superficiality, oversimplification, lack of realism" (p. 38). He wants instead a "general theory of administration" which provides "principles of organization that will insure correct decision-making" and "principles that will insure effective action" (p. 1).

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In this volume, however, Professor Simon is less ambitious than his prescription. He seeks simply to explore some elements of the administrative process by which choices are made. He sees organization as a problem in social psychology, and he sets forth to examine the conditions and factors which influence "the operative group toward a pattern of coordinated and effective behavior." He makes the suggestive proposition that while the final goals of organizational activity involve value judgments, the means for attaining these final objectives may involve factual and hence rational judgments. He hopes it may be possible in time to invent procedural devices which will permit "a more effective separation of the factual and ethical elements in decisions" (pp. 57-58).

The bulk of the volume, however, concerns the psychology of administrative decisions—the influence of authority and of organizational identification, and the limits of rationality. Professor Simon has done all students of administration a service in refurbishing the concept of efficiency as a criterion of administrative effectiveness.

In the end Professor Simon insists that the central concern of administrative theory must be the rationality of decisions, that is, "their appropriateness for the accomplishment of specified goals" (p. 240). Since there are limits to human rationality, the "task of administration" is to design an environment in which "the individual will approach as close as practicable to rationality (judged in terms of the organizational goals) in his decisions" (p. 241).

Professor Simon admits that in this volume he has not arrived at "any definitive administrative principles." Rather he has tried to clear away much of the accumulation of the past and to prepare the way for future inquiries of a different type. Elsewhere than in this volume he has set as his goal a more "solid" administrative theory resting upon the foundations of social psychology.

This is an important book for all students of organization (here used in the sense of structure and operations combined). If the immediate contribution is essentially critical and hence negative, it is nonetheless useful in revealing the sterility of much past theorizing. Simon and many others must now move forward on a new plane with the hope of obtaining more fruitful results in understanding how men work together in the formal administrative units of our economy and of our government.

JOHN D. MILLETT

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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The Correspondence of Sir Thomas More. Edited by ELIZABETH FRANCES ROGERS. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947.—xxiv, 584 pp. $7.50.

Most of More's letters have been printed before but at various times and places in volumes which are now quite rare. Dr. Rogers, who some twenty-five years ago published a Calendar of them indicating their chronological sequence in the *English Historical Review*, now presents a critical edition of the letters themselves, based upon further research at the Bodleian, British Museum, Public Record Office, and several continental libraries. There are great gaps in More's correspondence, for many of his papers "were lost after his execution." Most of the actual letters are relatively brief, but their bulk is here swelled by including long controversial treatises in the fields of literature and theology, because these were issued in the form of personal letters addressed by More directly to his opponents. This brings the total number of extant letters up to two hundred and eighteen, of which a number are to him or about him rather than by him. His controversial opponents, however, are not allowed to speak for themselves, although it might seem that More's replies to them would be more intelligible, if we had at hand the texts which he was attacking. Also the correspondence with Erasmus, which makes up about forty of the two hundred and eighteen items, is merely indicated by title, sources, date and reference to Allen's edition of the letters of Erasmus on the ground that they are readily accessible there. This seems to the reviewer a mistake, since the correspondence with Erasmus is scattered through several volumes of Allen's edition, while here it might have been brought within the covers of a single volume, and the edition of More's letters thereby made really complete. It further leaves a serious hiatus in the picture of More which we derive from his correspondence, since we see him there in a more attractive light than in some of the documents printed by Dr. Rogers.

Extracts from More's letters have been freely quoted by his biographers and eulogists. The perusal of their complete text reveals him, not so much as the ideal individual whom he has sometimes been depicted, as a man of his age, repeating the clichés of the humanists against scholasticism and the Middle Ages, berating his opponents in the customary offensive style of sixteenth-century controversy and religious intolerance—albeit with occasional flashes of his own quiet wit, writing in conventional humility from "his Grace" to "your Grace", and serving as amanuensis and go-between in the military

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operations upon the continent of Cardinal Wolsey and King Henry VIII. Better had he, the pacifist in other writings, held aloof, like Erasmus, from such officialdom and militarism. He may have been a Christlike nature and in the end a martyr, but his letters, especially the controversial pamphlets and the official correspondence, are soiled with the smudge of the times in which he lived, and, to parody an old hymn, "I would not like to have been with him then." There is little in the way of political thought in any of the letters.

Aside from indication of textual variants, the notes are largely devoted to biographical detail as to persons mentioned in the text, including information which sometimes seems superfluous, as when we are told who Varro, Peter Lombard or Porphyry was. More explanation of the contents of the letters themselves and of their setting would have been welcome. It seems a bit odd to refer to Charles V as "Charles of Castile" instead of Charles I of Spain (p. 92) and to describe him—a Hapsburg educated in the Netherlands—as "the stately cold Spanish" (p. 239). More's Latin is not always easy reading, but Dr. Rogers seems to present a uniformly correct text. There appears to be no study of More's Latin style corresponding to Delcourt's *Essai sur la langue de Sir Thomas More, d'après ses oeuvres anglaises* (1914). One wishes that Dr. Rogers had given something of the sort by way of an introduction, and hopes that she may yet undertake this. The list of abbreviations at page 574 seems incomplete, not including AN, for instance. The Index is not very complete, not including Bainbridge, Cardinal, at page 240, failing to list letter 189 under Cochlaeus, and omitting such obvious topics and places as Greek (chairs of, study of, etc.), Italy, Louvain, Padua and Venetian ambassadors. The volume has been handsomely and expensively printed (the lines of each letter are numbered in the margin and the notes referred to the line) by the Princeton University Press.

LYNN THORNDIKE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Lord Macaulay's Legislative Minutes. Selected with a Historical Introduction by C. D. DHARKER. Madras and London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1946.—viii, 312 pp. 18*s*.

This volume throws some additional light on the Indian period of Macaulay's career, which Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Macaulay's nephew and biographer, regarded as in many important respects "the most honorable chapter of his life." It contains the text of thirty-five of the minutes, most of them hitherto unpublished, which

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Macaulay wrote while he was Law Member of the Council of India, preceded by a historical introduction of equal length prepared by an Indian scholar, C. D. Dharker, and consisting largely of commentaries on the minutes. It is principally with matters relating to the administration of justice and reforms in judicial procedure that these minutes have to do, and for the most part they express the views of Macaulay as a jurist and law reformer. The best known of all Macaulay's minutes, his famous Minute on Education, is not included in this collection.

Macaulay's primary reason for going to India was frankly stated by himself and is well known. His father had suffered serious financial reverses, and the family fortunes were at a low ebb. But though Macaulay accepted appointment as a member of the Council of India in order to win what he called a competence, and though he looked upon the years of his sojourn in India as a period of exile, he was far indeed from regarding his position as a lucrative sinecure. He worked very hard in the interest of the people of India as he understood it—unnecessarily hard, for much of his most arduous labor was voluntary.

These minutes show us a statesman and jurist applying without fear or favor, and sometimes with great courage, English principles of justice and equity to problems of Indian government. The principle of equality before the law runs through them like a leitmotiv and is sometimes expressed in pithy sentences reminiscent of the aphorisms of Burke: "All special exemptions carry with them an appearance of unfairness, and the burden of the proof lies on those who claim them." "Make your legal proceedings as simple, as cheap, as expeditious as you can, the rich man must still have an advantage over the poor man. To diminish that advantage is one of the chief ends which a legislator should propose to himself." "I regret that there should be abuses in our courts of justice. But, while such abuses exist, I think it desirable that all classes should suffer from them alike."

The great difficulty which confronted the reformer in India, to Macaulay's mind, was the apathy of the people, what he called their "passiveness under wrong". He hoped, and believed, that a better system of justice would lead to a great improvement in their character:

> The people of India will learn to place confidence in the administration of justice. They will find that they can safely stand up for their rights. They will appeal fearlessly to our courts against the tyranny of the rich and the powerful. In a few years we shall have done, I trust, what can be done by legislation. That still more important change in the character of the population, to which I look forward, must be the work of several generations.

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To say that these minutes were written by Macaulay is to say that they are marked by clarity of thought and by the utmost precision in the use of words. In his work as a legislator he emphasized these qualities fully as much as in his literary writings or his speeches. In fact he declared in one of his minutes that legislative enactments ought to be the most lucid and concise of all compositions. He labored heroically on the Indian Penal Code, of which he was the principal author. "I am not ashamed to acknowledge", he said, "that there are several chapters in the Code on which I have been employed for months, of which I have changed the whole plan ten or twelve times, which contain not a single word as it originally stood and with which I am still very far indeed from being satisfied."

The minutes which Mr. Dharker has given us supplement what has been known about Macaulay's work in India as a legislator and jurist, and they have their value for the student of Indian history as well as for anyone who is interested in Macaulay's career. So much, however, was already known about the general nature and essential character of his work that this additional material does not call for any important revisions of interpretation.

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. By G. N. DHAWAN. Bombay, The Popular Book Depot, 1946.—xvi, 354 pp. Rs. 8/8.

Gandhi has never claimed to be a political philosopher; rather, he considers himself to be a religious man engaged in experimenting with truth—Satyagraha. As a great political leader of nearly 300 millions of people of India, his political ideas are of some consequence; but Gandhi has not written a systematic political philosophy of his own. The author of the work under review is a member of the faculty of political science of Lucknow University. From a careful analysis of Gandhi's writings and speeches, he has presented a valuable study of the subject.

Gandhi, like the ancient Hindu sages, believes that politics cannot be divorced from religion; because there is a "moral and ethical basis" of the state. Thus every statesman, entrusted with the task of administering a state, is bound to carry out his moral obligations to the people—his fellow men—to serve their highest interest, which lies in furthering the cause of the brotherhood of man. "Ahimsa", which

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involves good will to all creatures, is the central ideal of his political philosophy. Gandhi is not the originator of this concept. It is in the teachings of the Upanishad; Gautama Buddha preached the doctrine; and Jesus and other great religious teachers professed it.

The author in one chapter of this work gives interesting information on those who were forerunners of Gandhi; but he insists that Gandhi is the first person who has made an attempt to apply his political philosophy systematically in the individual, social and political life of man, the national state, revolution, international intercourse, international organization and the new world order. It is impossible to give a comprehensive review of the work in the available space but it seems to the reviewer that the author has excellently summed up the character of Gandhi's political philosophy in the following passage:

> The philosophy of *satyagraha* is the philosophy of the integral man. To Gandhiji the real being in man is the spirit. The spirit is one in all and the service of the community in every sphere of life is one way to realize this truth. . . . Thus Gandhiji's political theory is an organic part of his philosophy of life. The isolation of politics from moral principles in the name of science or realism is, to him, a trap to kill the soul. The method of non-violent resistance is a great contribution of his to the philosophy and technique of revolution. With greater thoroughness than any other thinker in the history of political thought he has explained how non-violence and democracy are integral parts of each other and how each can operate successfully only along with the other. His conception of democracy, in which every individual has acquired the capacity to resist non-violently misuse of authority, in which the dissent of the minority gets the maximum consideration and which is characterised by "the magnanimity of the majority" is in advance of the Western conception of democracy. In the absence of non-violence as the ruling principle of life, Gandhiji discounts the ethical pretentions of democracies in the West and regards them as an instrument of exploitation.
>
> Similarly Gandhiji rejects the view of some of the Western economists that economics should be dissociated from ethical valuations. To him there is no sharp distinction between economics and ethics. His views on economic questions are an expression of his conviction that man's moral well-being must not be subordinated to the profit motive and money values and that economic activities like the rest of the human conduct should be so planned as to advance and not hurt moral welfare. Thus Gandhiji humanizes economics by subjecting it to the suzerainty of ethics.

TARAKNATH DAS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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BOOK NOTES

The pace and quantity of events in our time are such that the student of them may well be thankful for the series of excellent surveys of various countries and problems that Chatham House is bringing out with indefatigable industry. *The New Italy: Transition from War to Peace*, by Muriel Grinrod (London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1947; ix, 118 pp. 5*s*.), is no exception to the rule of high quality: within a very brief compass we are given a comprehensive and balanced account of the chief aspects of the Italian scene from 1943 to the opening of the current year. The period between the fall of fascism and the cessation of hostilities in Europe was of particular significance to Italy whose surrender failed to avoid the impact of warfare at home. Instead of this, she was torn in the most cruel fashion between the slowly expanding southern section under her legal government and Allied military rule and the curious, but interesting, Italian Social Republic organized in the north by Mussolini after his rescue by the Germans. The effects upon the Allies of the impression they received from their first contact with Italy, of necessity confined to the backward south, and the consequences of the division of the country in the light of the traditional north-south cleavage are appropriately stressed. But the heated debates which grew out of this situation at the time, both in Italy and outside, are largely made to vanish in Miss Grinrod's orderly, accurate and highly dispassionate description. A brief discussion of the political parties and of the activity of the government is followed by an important chapter on the economic position of Italy, and an analysis of the peace treaty closes the survey. It is wholly sound to point out that "while the territorial aspects [of the treaty] have aroused the most controversy and have proved the most difficult of settlement, the economic clauses may prove to be of greater significance as regards their effect on Italy's revival" (p. 81). No one will gainsay the importance of economic factors and it is impossible to lay too much stress on the peculiar difficulties that confront Italy as a consequence of the extreme poverty of her resources burdened by too large a population. At the same time,

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any current discussion of the Italian position might well put more emphasis on what may be called psychological factors. There has been disappointment in Italy at the lack of greater recognition for her contribution to the Allied cause, while the victims of Italian aggression have inevitably tended to put first stress on the fact of that aggression. Merely to say that "Italy came into the war on 10 June 1940 in fulfilment of her obligations under the Axis Pact of 22 May 1939" (p. 1), or that "how far the question [the South Tyrol] was decided on its own merits, and how far as a result of power politics at a high level, can only be a matter of speculation" (p. 88), are indications of a detachment that verges on the olympian, unless one call it unperceiving. But the survey remains nevertheless eminently satisfactory and useful.—RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, Barnard College.

Lions Under the Throne: A Study of the Supreme Court of the United States. . . by Charles P. Curtis, Jr. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947; xviii, 368 pp. $3.50) is not a history of the Supreme Court in the past, nor is it a penetrating examination of the present Court. It is, rather, a discussion of the rôle played by the Court in the important scenes of the drama of American government. The rôle, of course, is one of judicial supremacy, and Mr. Curtis examines the bases for elevating the Court to a preponderant position in the national government. Legal tradition has contributed to this position by the erection of a barrier between the Court and the other branches of the government. Critics would maintain that the Court isolates itself from everyday realities: indeed, Justice Roberts once stated that the Court is not concerned about the practicality of legislation, it merely measures the statute against the Constitution to make sure both match. Curtis is not so derisive as to declare with Thomas Reed Powell that the Court plays a "role of rigmarole", but he clearly implies it. The Court has not been alone in creating the position of supremacy: the other branches have deferred to it with awe and reverence. Rather than permit the honorable justices to change their minds on the constitutionality of a tax on incomes, the Constitution was changed. Moreover, a public that had almost universally condemned "the nine old men" zealously hastened to the Court's defense against the Roosevelt reorganization plan in 1937. There is the further paradox in that the supposedly isolated Court is not above descending to the level of practical politics. *Stare decisis*, or not, the the Court has altered its decisions in apparent keeping with the social and economic philosophies of the justices. The author devotes the

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major portion of the study to the old Court's decisions on the New Deal and the attitude of the new, " reconstructed ", or " converted " Court since 1937. There is no mention, incidentally, of any internal conflict among the members of the present Court, but Curtis does imply the warning that persistent dissent may well lead to schism. As for the ideal rôle of the Supreme Court in a democratic government, the author clearly supports the Holmes doctrine of noninterference with the sentiments of the legislature; that is, up to the point where legislatures do nothing to restrict or limit the essentials of democracy. Here, Curtis is not so concerned about property rights as with such fundamentals as freedom of speech and religion, which, he holds, are not valid subjects for legislation. Safeguarding these rights should be the chief function of the Court. He expects the justices to be philosophers, in addition to being lawyers and statesmen, to fill this rôle. There are some inaccuracies in this book; it is inconceivable that the author should have been unaware of the famous Virginia Bill of Rights. Though Curtis' playful prose is often puzzling, his observations are astute and challenging even to those who do not agree with him.—WILLIAM G. TYRRELL, Brooklyn, N. Y.

To most students of English history Richard Oastler is but a phantom from the early period of the agitation for factory legislation. As a reformer he was overshadowed by Lord Ashley, afterwards seventh Earl of Shaftesbury; his opposition to the poor law of 1834 failed utterly; for more than two years he lingered in a debtors' prison; and after his release in February 1843 poverty and ill-health greatly restricted his activities. Nevertheless, Richard Oastler rendered services which entitle him to be remembered in the annals of English social history. His famous letters on " Yorkshire Slavery ", the first of which appeared in the *Leeds Mercury*, October 1830, aroused the English conscience to a realization of the inhuman exploitation going on in the textile mills and started afresh an agitation which ultimately resulted in protective legislation. He was an energetic and resourceful champion of England's toilers, especially the children; and, though his activities were in the main limited to the West Riding of Yorkshire, his work made him a national figure and earned for him the sobriquet " the Factory King ". In a careful study based on extensive research, *Tory Radical: The Life of Richard Oastler* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1946; x, 598 pp. $5.00), Professor Cecil Driver has rescued this deserving man from oblivion. This book is interesting and valuable for the light which it throws on the background of and

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methods used in the struggle for factory legislation. The Wesleyan Movement left deep imprints on Oastler's father as well as upon himself. Having failed in business he became in 1820 steward of a large landed estate owned by Thomas Thornhill. For a number of years he seems to have been surprisingly oblivious of the conditions in the factories until a friend and factory owner, John Wood, opened his eyes. By this time Richard Oastler had become as devoted to England's rural life and its social and economic traditions as was his older contemporary William Cobbett. Like Cobbett, Oastler loved the country and denounced bitterly the industrial magnates. In religion he had become an Anglican and in politics a Tory, opposing the Reform Bill of 1832. He was sincere in his humanitarianism, bitter and unrestrained in his attacks upon those who literally sucked the lifeblood of little children. He had many of the most valuable qualities of the reformer, courage, sincerity, and a mastery of both the spoken and written word; but he lacked the shrewdness of Francis Place and the wisdom of Wilberforce. Had Richard Oastler possessed these attributes, his activities would have been more fruitful. Professor Driver shows how Wesleyan methods of religious propaganda influenced the factory reform movement, how it was aided by humane factory owners of the type of John Wood and John Fielden, how relentless was the competition between the industrialists and how great their economic insecurity. He discloses also why an alliance was established between Tories and Radicals against the growing plutocracy; but his assertion that Tory Democracy dates from November 1831 is open to serious doubts. *Tory Radical* is a valuable addition to the growing literature on British history in the nineteenth century.—PAUL KNAPLUND, The University of Wisconsin.

The Development of Public Opinion in Manchester, 1780-1820, by Leon Soutierre Marshall (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1946; xi, 274 pp. $2.50), is the first instalment of a welcome historical project which has been awaited since Professor Marshall foreshadowed it in a paper for the American Historical Association some years ago. By the study of Manchester as a prototype, he proves able to provide a sharply focused and precise demonstration of how oligarchical, landed England adapted itself to democratic republican doctrines and to industrialization. The volume under review emphasizes the fruitfulness of this approach. It is skilfully organized, abundant and apt in evidence, and its fairly frequent recourse to a repellent, lifeless jargon in stating argument and conclusions does not invalidate these. It copes in an

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enlightening way with its problem—" that of determining the relations between an expanding and nascent society and an extending and kinetic public opinion which was empowering earlier ideas with the force of tradition and new responses with the instruments of social integration " (p. viii). It harmonizes well with the findings of Paul Mantoux, Witt Bowden, A. P. Wadsworth and J. D. Mann, and Arthur Redford. It ignores Karl Polanyi. Almost inevitably this is a book about Redford's theme—the shifts in power and in the directions of its application among the ruling classes in Manchester, involving as they did the manipulation of the energies and ambitions of the governed. Yet its demonstration is functional in broader, more variegated senses and it eventuates in drives toward free business, free trade, broader education, better newspapers, better bookkeeping and taxation, more equitable politics, more libertarianism, and, that apparently contradictory phenomenon, greater willingness to resort to collective, even political, intervention " for preventative as well as remedial social policy " (p. 232). It may be inherent in the approach by this study of how a new interest came to dominate Manchester and stood on the brink of imposing its ideas on Great Britain that the awful burdens of taxation and deflation upon the common people during the first half of the nineteenth century are introduced in a secondary way in the early part of the book and assume somewhat more central importance only in the next to last chapter. Abolition of the income tax, imposition of the corn laws, resumption of specie payment, and repeal of the Statute of Apprentices protected, even improved, the position of the propertied, but made life almost intolerable for the unpropertied. On the basis of Manchester evidence as cited by the author there was relatively little contemporary awareness of this desperate concatenation in its effects on general well-being, but Professor Marshall's book would have gained from an early and systematic discussion of it in the light of our own knowledge. The Syracuse University Press has not flattered this treatise by its book production; some sketch maps would have been helpful; and the author might easily have reduced the number of typographical errors. —J. B. Brebner, Columbia University.

English-language studies of comparative law and comparative journalism are conspicuously few, so that a book which undertakes the study of comparative journalistic law is doubly welcome. *The Newspaper: A Study in the Working of the Daily Press and Its Laws* (London, Staples Press, 1947; xvi, 351 pp. 20s.) by Dr. I. Rothenberg

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is a pioneer work, and fortunately is broad in its appeal rather than overly specialized. While its primary usefulness is for the student of jurisprudence or journalism, it is at the same time one of the few scholarly investigations we have of the press as a social instrument in various countries of the world. It is perhaps natural enough, in dealing with foreign press practices, to develop a feeling of otherworldliness in contrasting them to American journalism, both good and bad. The spread of international cartels into the realms of news communications in the days of the Reuters-Havas-Wolff combine, the theory prevalent in many states of a sort of eminent domain over a whole country's press, and the persistent fear in other lands of the conversion of certain subsidized newspapers into agents provocateurs —these are concepts which make strange reading for an American public accustomed to newspapers as a strictly private-profit enterprise, for better or worse. Under any system, of course, there are certain impediments in the way of a flow of information to the reading public, and an awareness of their existence is peculiarly important to the understanding of public opinion as a political and social force. With scholarly inquiry into this field so long overdue, one is inclined to find one glaring fault in Dr. Rothenberg's effort. This is the absence of a separate and detailed bibliography—and, since this is a book on law, of a complete table of cases. The fact-hungry researcher cannot be satisfied with the author's one-page general bibliographic note, in which he refers to only two books—Shearman and Rayner's *Press Laws of Foreign Countries* (1926), prepared for the British Foreign Office, and Arthur and Crosman's *Law of Newspapers* (1940), from which he takes most of his references to American press law. This criticism should not prejudice the real accomplishments of the author. He has covered the whole range of newspaper practice in the Occidental world, with some references to the Near East and a scattered few to the Far East. The Introduction and the first three parts of the book relate to editorial problems such as liberty of the press, political and economic corruption of journals, libels (which, of course, are covered in great detail), and the right of the newspaper to report and criticize public affairs. Part four covers subscriptions and circulation, more from a managerial than a legal point of view; Part five relates, all too briefly, to law and newspaper advertising; and the rest of the book considers miscellany such as recognizances and bonds for securing fines against editors, registration of printers and publishers, liability for the contents of various editions, and special procedural provisions such as the lay courts for press offenses which are popular

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in Latin America. Dr. Rothenberg, who completed his research in London during the war, is a product of the group of German scholars who have done more intensive study on the press as a social phenomenon than the students of any other nation. It is to be hoped that his work may encourage the development of Anglo-American scholarship in the field.—WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, University of Nebraska.

Animated by the spirit of German idealism, Martin Foss, in *The Idea of Perfection in the Western World* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1946; 102 pp. $1.50), challenges the Greek concept of perfection which implies that the cosmos is a limited unity symbolized in the image of the globe. He confronts the static character and inherent pantheism of this philosophy with what he, the idealist, considers the essential features of Judeo-Christian philosophy: its emphasis on infinity; its belief in a God who is a living force rather than the summit of perfection; its insistence that the way counts more than the end and that any end is only a provisional stage of our pilgrimage to the absolute. In his historical survey of the two conflicting philosophies Foss elaborates upon the Middle Ages, interpreting scholastic thought as a compromise of the intrinsically Christian doctrine with the idea of perfection. His discussion reaches its culmination in an analysis of the influence this idea still exerts in modern aesthetics and ethics. It is an analysis which transcends itself. Not content with rejecting the concessions made by Kant and the English utilitarians to the notion of perfection and all that it stands for, Foss outlines both an aesthetics and an ethics in full keeping with his idea of Christian philosophy. Our activities in these fields seem to him legitimate only if they extend beyond all the aesthetic and moral patterns which wrongly pretend to absolute validity. We have to overcome such barriers, he says, in a constant drive toward the infinite which alone is absolute. According to him, the infinite is manifest in any true work of art; and it inspires us forever to transgress set rules and laws under the guidance of love and faith. The whole is pure neo-idealism. Foss is not genuinely concerned with historic concepts and their evolution; he is concerned with them solely to the extent that they corroborate or contradict his own convictions. And these are idealistic also in their remoteness from palpable content. As if overwhelmed by the absolute, Foss shows little interest in aspirations of relative value. And when he for once descends from lofty heights to discuss matters within our reach, his judgments as a rule prove surprisingly conventional. Thus

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he contends that Greek art indulged in imitation and that "the so-called 'abstract' painting and sculpture is a misunderstanding or exaggeration of a right principle . . . ." Alas, in its upward flight German idealism always neglected the immediate neighborhood. And yet this book makes fascinating reading. Foss is a born philosopher, with a passion for substantiating his thoughts down to their last ramifications. There is no dead material left; under his pressure, disparate concepts become part of a coherent pattern and suddenly glow with a life which is perhaps not their own but is life nevertheless. They all are involved in a process punctuated by clashes and reconciliations which could not be more intense. Foss's philosophy may be questionable, but in his book philosophy is caught in the act.—SIEGFRIED KRACAUER, New York City.

Austrian Requiem, by Kurt von Schuschnigg, translated by Franz von Hildebrand (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946; xi, 322 pp. $3.50), makes interesting reading and gives food for thought, but it contains nothing startling nor historically epochal. It is a simple statement, largely in diary form, of the author's life as a prisoner of Hitler and of the thoughts which occupied him, while in prison, concerning his political activities as Chancellor of Austria from the time of Dollfuss' assassination in 1934 until his own arrest in 1938. From the account, there emerge certain general observations. The peace settlement of 1919 required Austria to remain an independent state but deprived her of the conditions of viability in the face of a resurgent and hypernationalistic Germany. Schuschnigg, moreover, throughout strove to be above all a loyal Austrian—as his monarchist, military, and strongly patriotic background interpreted that loyalty. Unhappily, as events were to prove, he hitched the Austrian chariot too firmly to a prancing Mussolini. Futhermore, the Austrian government in its own way really tried to fight Hitlerism for five years before the Western World took up the challenge finally thrust upon it by Nazi force. In its evidently unsuccessful method of trying to maintain Austrian independence, the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg régime received very little outside help, particularly from some of its later harshest (non-Nazi) critics. Certainly, in trying desperately to avoid giving provocation for "reprisals" to Austria's ebullient neighbor, Schuschnigg was admittedly more authoritarian, but no more stupid nor guiltier, than many of his leading contemporaries in the more distant democratic countries. And perhaps, as he here states, any other Austrian policy would only have ended in that little country's ab-

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sorption by Germany sooner rather than later. *Quien sabe?* Finally, the diary shows that the Nazi penal system was as erratic, whim-ridden and futile under a superficial disguise of efficiency and thoroughness as were the Nazi economic, political and military systems. Emotion, particularly the emotion of hate and childlike delusions of greatness, played havoc with many a well-laid plan in both domestic and foreign affairs. In judging the work of Hitler and of his chief Austrian prisoner, the latter's words may fittingly be kept in mind: "In politics as elsewhere final success is the touchstone of a statesman. If he succeeds, then history does not ask why and how. If he fails, then any attempt to justify himself is *a priori* senseless. He merely has to pay the cost. But it does make a real difference whether the intentions were good, whether decency or opportunism sat at the helm."—WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM, Wagner College.

The history of Poland, Ireland, Ukraine and other countries provides a lesson that partition of a country for the purpose of appeasing certain unreasonable minority claims does not bring peace but civil war. To bring about unity in diversity, federation and not partition is the remedy. To satisfy the Pan-Islamist minority, however, by a most unstatesman-like act, India has been partitioned on a religious, communal basis. This has plunged the unhappy country into a state of civil war, in the Punjab and Bengal, parts of which have been incorporated in Pakistan. This will not only embitter relations between the dominions of the Union of India and Pakistan, but become a new troublesome factor in the world politics of tomorrow. What should not be overlooked, however, is that by partition the minority problem has not been solved; because there will be nearly 20 million Hindus in Pakistan, and about 30 million Moslems will be in the predominantly Hindu area known as the Union of India. Already threats are being hurled by responsible leaders to the effect that "if you ill-treat the Hindu minority we shall ill-treat the Moslem minority." This will mean virtual negation of human rights among minority groups of citizens. Such a situation can be averted and mended only through constitutional guarantees upholding "fundamental rights" of man. Indian political leaders have often declared that in the future constitution of free India, there must be provisions for a "Bill of Rights". *Fundamental Rights* by M. Ramaswamy (New Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs; Bombay, etc., Oxford University Press, 1947; xx, 252 pp. $3.50) is a constitutional and juridical study with particular reference to India in the light of the experience of the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The author is a distinguished

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lawyer of the High Court of Mysore and gives the ideal behind this study in the following sentences: "My study of this subject does not stop, however, with the mere conclusion that a Bill of Rights is desirable for India . . . . It is my earnest hope that the present study, though primarily undertaken in the interest of India, will make an appeal beyond its confines. For, the problem of safeguards for basic human rights is after all a general human problem, which transcends all limitations of race, religion and territory . . . ." This book will be of value not only to political scientists and sociologists but to constitutional lawyers. The author has made detailed reference to some two hundred American and British law cases involving issues of human rights. In the appendix he presents his draft of a Bill of Rights. At least a portion of it may be utilized in the new constitution of India.—TARAKNATH DAS, Columbia University.

Today India is free, but, as every student knows, the roots of the present lie deep in the past. Thus *The East India Company and the British Empire in the Far East* (New York, Richard R. Smith, 1945; xv, 477 pp. $7.50) by Marguerite Eyer Wilbur comes at an opportune time to review the amazing story of that early trading company which, after a long and turbulent history, died only to be reborn as a shining new diamond in Queen Victoria's crown. Truly it is history in the making. Mrs. Wilbur has chosen a wide field and covers much detail in the history of this fabulous company which in seeking trade touches not only the shores of "Inde" but those of China and North America. Nor has Mrs. Wilbur neglected the "Great" of English history who aided the development of the East India Company. Among many others, Sir Thomas Roe, Robert Clive and Warren Hastings march through the pages; for it was under their guidance that the French, Dutch and Portuguese were finally driven out of India leaving England in control of the vast wealth of this rich land. During the eighteenth century the East India Company reached its greatest period of achievement. It waged war, made treaties, and secured rich lands. Native princes swayed beneath its power. The death blow was soon to follow, however. In 1858 the British crown resumed control of this "child of Destiny" but did not bring peace to India. Today India stands divided, part Hindu, part Moslem. Again India stands at the crossroads of history. Mrs. Wilbur's early chapters are by far the best. Here one sees her ability to present historical material in a style which appeals to the general reader. She has caught the drama and adventure of the days of the "Indiamen", and fact and heroism are delightfully balanced. It is unfortunate, however, that her later

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chapters become dull and humdrum and follow the general trend of imperialism, finally becoming involved in the tangled web of local politics. It is likewise surprising that a historian of Mrs. Wilbur's abilities does not show more clearly the effect the East India Company had on British foreign and internal policies. Only occasionally does she touch on this vital question. For her source material Mrs. Wilbur went directly to original documents located in the British Museum and the India Office in London. The more careful student, however, will feel a loss in the lack of footnotes or more definite references to these excellent sources. In spite of this, Mrs. Wilbur has produced a readable and timely piece of historical research of importance to the student and general reader alike.—LORRAINE M. ROUGET, Mt. Vernon, N. Y.

The British General Election of 1945 (London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1947; xv, 311 pp. $5.00) by R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman is a real contribution to political science both in substance and in method. The process by which members of Parliament are selected has never before been subjected to such a factual and analytical study. The authors apply the statistical method to selections from the principal newspapers, a mass of party literature and election addresses. With complete objectivity events, issues and personalities are analyzed to demonstrate how an election is conducted in Great Britain. To students of British government, aid to this understanding means much, but the reader is treated to a "double dip" in that the election of 1945, the most significant one since that of 1832, was the vehicle. Indeed, it is difficult to decide whether the study of the election process or the contest of 1945 between the Labor Party and Winston Churchill is the more significant. The book will always be useful as a source of authoritative information upon either subject. For the student of the election process the chapters on the election machinery, the election addresses, the daily press, the forecasts, and the results will stand out. For an insight into recent British politics, however, the chapters on the break-up of the coalition, the candidates, the issues and the development of the contest will be considered most valuable. There are five appendixes which are not to be overlooked. Two of them are written by D. E. Butler. In Appendix III he discusses the familiar conundrum of the relation of seats to votes, taking up the old problem that the English electoral system is a gamble in that there is a possibility that a party with a minority of votes in the country as a whole might win an absolute Parliamentary majority.

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His inquiry leads to the judgment that the system is not too unfavorable. After showing statistical analysis of election results he advises politicians and journalists to pay less attention to general impressions and more to statistical facts if they hope to be near reality.—JOHN A. PERKINS, Lansing, Mich.

Although *The Keynesian Revolution* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1947; xiii, 218 pp. $3.50) by Lawrence R. Klein was, according to the publisher, "written primarily for the general reader," it should not be inferred that Dr. Klein has produced yet another of the oversimplified re-hashes of Keynes's General Theory so frequently encountered of late. Actually, the book is addressed principally to professional economists and to only those laymen whose intelligence and interest are equal to the task. In this connection, it is interesting to note that much of the material contained in the book was originally presented by the author in 1944 as a doctoral dissertation. Consequently, the work is marked throughout by the high order of scholarship which should be associated with graduate research. Pleasantly surprising, however, is the combination of a graceful and unclouded use of language with such scholarship. In the first few chapters, Dr. Klein presents the orthodox and heretic doctrines inherited by Keynes, being careful to show that Keynes's great work was that of synthesis, a rearrangement of existing thought into an analysis which yielded conclusions significantly different from prevailing economic thought. In succeeding chapters, Dr. Klein digresses to answer some of the more significant unfriendly criticisms of the Keynesian analysis, and to discuss alleged anticipations of Keynes's General Theory in the work of J. A. Hobson, N. Johannsen, S. Gesell and, surprisingly enough, Karl Marx. Dr. Klein attempts to equate the Keynesian analysis with the Marxian analysis, arguing that the formula National Income = Consumption + Investment could be expressed in Marxian terms, National Income = Sum of Wages + Surplus Value. For both, Klein then points out, crisis results from the discouragement of investment by declining or static consumer expenditures while surplus value, or automatic savings, accumulates. A similar parallel might be drawn between Keynes's view of the fall in marginal efficiency of capital in a mature economy with Marx's falling rate of profit. The final chapter is concerned with the relationship of Keynesian theory to present-day policy problems. The extensive acceptance of the Keynesian analysis among contemporary economists is indicated, but Dr. Klein also points out that among those who accept the correctness of the economics of

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Keynes there are those who believe that political impediments will prevent Keynesian programs from being initiated. Critics of Keynesian analysis from the left insist that members of the investing group in pursuing individual aims will act to the detriment of the group and will fail to grasp the immediacy of the crisis which threatens each and all. Recent history, Dr. Klein comments, unfortunately seems to support this latter view.—Louis R. Salkever, Sampson College.

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